

THE  
PROBLEM  
OF  
MEANING  
IN  
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY



R.C. PANDEYA





R. C. PANDEYA

**The  
Problem of Meaning  
in  
Indian Philosophy**







**THE  
PROBLEM OF MEANING  
IN  
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY**

**R. C. PANDEYA**  
VYAKARANACHARYA, M. A., Ph. D.

**MOTILAL BANARSIDASS**  
DELHI ★ VARANASI ★ PATNA



*Publishers :*

Sundarlal Jain

⊙ MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar

Delhi-6.

*Printers*

B. Dut

The Eureka Printing Works (P.) Ltd

Godhowlia

Varanasi

1963

FIRST EDITION

Price Rs. 15-00

Books available at :

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi.

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, Nepali Khapra, Varanasi.

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, Bankipore, Patna.



TO  
THE HALLOWED MEMORY OF  
MY FATHER AND GURU  
PANDIT RAJNARAYAN SHASTRI

इदम्पितृभ्यो मुक्तैभ्यो वाक्सुमं श्रद्धयाऽर्पये ।  
यत्सुतेन मया लब्धे येभ्यो वाग्वाक्परिष्कृती ।





## CONTENTS

PREFACE	...	...	...	i
ABBREVIATIONS	...	...	...	viii

### CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN INDIA	...	...	...	1
---	-----	-----	-----	---

### CHAPTER II

MEANING : A THEME FOR PHILOSOPHY	...	...	...	24
(i) The Metaphysics of meaning—(ii) The logical syntax of language				

### CHAPTER III

SPEECH AND ITS PARTS	...	...	...	54
(i) The unit of speech—(ii) Parts of speech— (iii) Meaning in use.				

### CHAPTER IV

NAMES : THE STATIC PARTS OF LANGUAGE	...	...	...	86
(i) Names and their meaning—(ii) Gender and number of names—(iii) The relation of names to each other—(iv) Complex and compound names.				

### CHAPTER V

VERBS	..	...	...	117
(i) Suffixes of verbs—(ii) Tenses and moods of verbs—(iii) Command : The meaning of verbs— (iv) Cases—(v) Conclusion.				

### CHAPTER VI

THE ŚĀBDABODHA	...	...	...	149
(i) Introductory—(ii) Factors leading to the formation of sentences—(iii) The principal in a sentence.				



## CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE OF MEANING ...	...	171
---------------------------	-----	-----

(i) Introduction—(ii) Meaning : a product of convention—(iii) Meaning as impersonal and eternal relation.

## CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE OF REFEREND ...	...	188
----------------------------	-----	-----

(i) Referend as the individual participating in the universal—(ii) The referend as universal.

## CHAPTER IX

THE NATURE OF REFEREND (CONTD.) ...	...	200
-------------------------------------	-----	-----

(i) Meaning as negation—(ii) The Jaina conception of referend—(iii) Conclusion.

## CHAPTER X

SPHOṬA : THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE OF MEANING ...	...	224
--	-----	-----

(i) Conceptuality of words and objects—(ii) The relation of words to objects—(iii) Sphoṭa : The absolute principle of words and objects—(iv) The evolution of words and objects.

## CHAPTER XI

SOME OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE THEORY OF SPHOTA ...	...	267
--	-----	-----

(i) There is no sphoṭa over and above words—  
(ii) The world is not an evolution of words.

EPILOGUE ...	...	278
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...	...	281
INDEX ...	...	286
ERRATA ...	...	300

## PREFACE

The philosophy of language has, hitherto, been a comparatively unexplored region of Indian thought. In this branch of philosophy, as in every other branch, a good deal of work has been done by ancient Indian thinkers. With the advent of Logical Positivism in the West, contemporary philosophy has concentrated its attention more on languages than on metaphysics. It has become out of fashion now to talk about metaphysical problems in philosophy because positivism has taught people to call such philosophy nonsense. The labour of the modern thinker is spent more on analysing and examining the implications of what people say than on what people want to refer to. The dominating bias for science is the only explanation that we can offer for such change of view. But this may be only one aspect of the philosophy of language. The real philosophy of language may not overlook the metaphysical basis of what we speak. The study of language necessarily leads to the study of what it means. In Indian philosophy a harmony of language and reality is firmly maintained. This contrast in the fundamental approach to language has prompted me to undertake an exhaustive study of the problem of meaning in Indian Philosophy.

I have not studied the whole problem in its historical perspective. History has a very important role to play in the development of human thought ; but in my view *truth* remains unaffected by the circumstances in which it is discovered. Truth is universal, it has no reference to a particular time. Circumstances may lead to the discovery of truth, but the discovery of truth has no effect on the nature of truth. The history of philosophy is different from philosophy. I have studied the philosophy of language as a discovered truth ; I



have not tried to study the circumstances in which truths concerning language have been discovered in India.

My guiding principle in this book has been the logical relation of truths. How does one truth logically lead us to the discovery of another truth? Or how are two different truths related to each other? and whether they are related at all. In this work I have tried to study the whole philosophy in the light of these questions. My aim here is to show the logical necessity and validity of views expressed by philosophers. I am concerned, only in a circumstantial way, with date and time of authors and the time of the composition of a book. But as history facilitates the understanding of a subject, especially for laymen, I have given a very brief review of the development of the problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy at the beginning.

The present work is divided into three parts. The *First Part* is an introduction to the subject. In the *First Chapter* a brief historical survey of the Indian Philosophy of language is given. In the *Second Chapter* an attempt has been made to show that the problem of meaning is a legitimate problem to be considered in philosophy. The *Second Part* of the book begins with the third chapter. This part mainly deals with logical and syntactical problems. In the *Third Chapter* I have shown that the unit of language is a sentence and there is no difference between a sentence and a proposition. The division of a sentence into parts is unreal but necessary for the understanding the nature of a sentence. In the *Fourth and the Fifth Chapters* I have studied in detail the nature of parts of speech. I have also attempted to assess the logical meaning of names and verbs and suffixes. With the *Sixth Chapter* the second part of the book closes. In this chapter on 'The Śābdabodha' I have shown how the parts are united in a sentence and what factors are necessary for such union. The contribution of each part to our verbal knowledge is assessed. The *Third Part* of the book deals with the relation of language with Reality. The *Seventh Chapter* is

devoted to the explanation of relation between a word and its referend. In the *Eighth* and the *Ninth Chapters* the nature of referend is explained. In the former is given the view of those who accept the universal as a referend. In the latter chapter I have mainly considered the view of the Buddhists who maintain that the referend of a word is negation. The *Tenth Chapter* deals with the Sphoṭa theory. It has been shown in this chapter that language and referend are products of a common Reality and their separation is illusory. Sentences that we speak are momentary, but they indicate a mental sentence and also a mental meaning. But as no knowledge is possible without words the meaning itself is in words and thus there is no difference between a mental sentence and a mental meaning which is also in words. In the *Eleventh Chapter* some objections against the views expressed in the last chapter are considered. The *Epilogue* explains the importance of the study of meaning and language in human life and gives also the conclusions reached in the body of the book.

I cannot claim any originality in this work. I have only put together views expressed by thinkers in the past. I have arranged the views of philosophers in a logical order and tried to explain them. While explaining and examining the views of philosophers I have tried to follow the lead of Patanjali and Bhartṛhari. Any conclusion arrived at in the body of the book may be regarded as the view of these giants of Indian Philosophy. In a way the whole book is an explanation of the views of Patanjali and Bhartṛhari. If bringing out the views of ancient thinkers to light deserves any credit, my learned readers, after careful examination of the book, will allow me that. Whether I have been successful in bringing out the views of thinkers and in explaining them is to be judged by the connoisseurs of ancient philosophy. I have spared no pain in arranging important views in a logical order and explaining them. Attempt has been here made to show the logical



necessity of a particular view advocated by a particular school on the basis of its fundamental assumptions. It has always been my aim in the following pages to show that the views of a philosopher about a particular issue are in conformity with the general standpoint of the philosopher. Every problem is studied against the background of the whole philosophy of a school.

Those views which are taken as final here are not accepted without any foundation. It has been my aim to give reasons for my preference. The views of Bhartṛhari and Patanjali are not accepted dogmatically. I have no charm in the personality of these philosophers. I have every reason to believe that Patanjali and Bhartṛhari are the most consistent thinkers on the subject.

I doubt whether there can be anything completely new. In the realm of thought novelty is possible only in explanation and interpretation of old facts and arguments. The whole Indian Philosophy is a vast commentary on the Vedas or on the sayings of the Great Buddha and Mahāvīra. The present work is, therefore, an humble attempt to explain and examine the old views on the subject and to compare them with the advances made in other lands.

But when I remember my indebtedness to scholars like Dr. T. R. V. Murti, formerly Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Professor of Indian Civilization and Culture, Banaras Hindu University and now the Vice-Chancellor of Samskrit University, Varanasi, under whose eminent guidance this work was done and to my revered father the late Pt. Raj Narayan Sharma, Head of the Department of Vyakarana and the Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Learnings of the Banaras Hindu University, I am ashamed to claim anything as my own in this thesis. What is good and commendable in the thesis belongs to these two lions of the forest of philosophy. But I have the pleasure to accept faults occurring in this as my own. I express my respect to these two guides of my life.

Dr. T. R. V. Murti has always encouraged me by giving the help necessary for writing this thesis. He has opened my eyes and shown me the way. Every line of this thesis bears his mark. If he had not been my guide the work would not have seen the light of the day. My indebtedness to him is inexpressible.

My revered father Pandit Raj Narayan Sharma, at whose feet I have studied the whole of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya, had prepared the background for writing this thesis. But for his initiating me in Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya and trying to make me proficient therein, I could not have ventured to offer such a difficult subject for my research. He was always ready to help me and explain difficult texts. Alas ! he could not remain to see the work in print.

The idea of writing a thesis on this subject was suggested by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, now the President of the Indian Republic, in 1953. I hope he may be pleased to see the work done. I express my thanks to him for encouraging me to write this thesis.

Some part of this thesis was written when I was working as Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Research Fellow in the Banaras Hindu University. I thank the then Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Professor and the authorities of the Banaras Hindu University for the monetary help they provided. The major part of this work has been done by me as the Government of India Research Scholar in Humanities. I thank the Government of India, particularly the Ministry of Education, for their help.

It is my great fortune that I have been receiving constant encouragement and guidance from Dr. N. V. Bannerji, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. I am thankful to him for elucidation of some difficult points in the philosophy of language. I am also thankful to Dr. V. V. Gokhale, Professor of Buddhist Studies in the University of Delhi, who has gone through some parts of this book and has given valuable suggestion.



Dr. A. C. Joshi, D. Sc., F. N. I., Vice-Chancellor, Punjab University, has always been a source of inspiration for me. I take this opportunity to express my profound gratefulness to him. Dr. S. Mukerji, Director, Nalanda Pali Institute gave valuable suggestions for the improvement of this book. At many places I have tried to follow his advice. I shall be ungrateful if I do not pay my regards to him for the enlightenment he gave.

My thanks are also due to my friends and students who have helped me in one way or the other. I am also thankful to the publishers Messrs. Motilal Banarasidass for undertaking to publish this book and also to Mr. Amar Nath Dutt of The Eureka Printing Works Private Limited for printing this book in a very short time of one month.

As this book is printed in a hurry, printing and other mistakes are bound to creep into it. I offer sincere apology to my readers for that.

University of Delhi,  
*August 15th, 1962.*

R. C. PANDEYA





## ABBREVIATIONS

B. S.	...	Brahma Sûtra
Bhûṣaṇa	...	Vaiyâkaraṇa Bhûṣaṇa Sâra
M. B.	...	Mahâbhâṣya of Patanjali
Mañjûṣâ	...	Vaiyâkaraṇa Siddhânta Laghu Mañjûṣâ
N. S.	...	Nyâya Sûtra
S. B.	...	Śāṅkara Bhâṣya
S. K.	...	Siddhânta Kaumudî
S. V.	...	Śloka Vârtika
T. S.	...	Tattva Samgraha
V. P.	...	Vâkya Padiya

---

## CHAPTER I

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN INDIA

#### I

The twentieth century heralds a new era in all spheres of knowledge. Constant and systematic emphasis on science and scientific methods could not leave any corner of human knowledge untouched. What was unscientific was condemnable. Science became synonymous with culture. Thinkers in the west posed themselves to follow the lead of science blindly and the result shows that both humanists and technologists acknowledge the supremacy of science. Philosophers, attracted by the certainty of scientific methods and accuracy of its conclusions, blindly followed the dictation of science. Philosophy became scientific.

The impact of science on philosophy is so powerful that the hereditary property of philosophy, what is called metaphysics, was mercilessly condemned and thrown away. This was because the dazzling light of science had blinded the eyes of philosophers and they could not see anything higher in life which cannot be perceived and which yet can never be denied. The popular formula that science gave was the equation of the existent with the perceivable. Thus metaphysics supposed to deal with the Real became a science dealing with unreals. The result of it was visible in the cultural life of the people. Complete distrust brought on by science in the higher values and existence has made man coarse and greedy. The meaning of life has lost attraction and the result is seen in the form of the Atom-Bombs and the Hydrogen-Bombs, on the one hand and the uncompromising conflict between communism and capitalism leading the world to wars and destruction on



the other. This unbalanced, biased and blind faith in science hastened the birth of unreasonable disbelief in life, peace and values.

This conflict between metaphysics and science gave birth to new methods, akin to those used in science, in philosophy. To condemn metaphysics as a science of unreals without advancing convincing arguments is never acceptable. Science supplied the justification for condemnation of metaphysics in the form of 'verification'. Only what is verifiable in the outside world is acceptable as real. Metaphysics expressed in language ( metaphysical propositions ) is not verifiable and, therefore, never acceptable as a statement of truth. Its aim was very narrow. It could never lift its head above the immediately presented so as to peep into the realm of superior values which are real in a quite different sense. Our external senses cannot reach them but our inner eye can visualize. Science shuts our inner eye but throws light to sharpen the range of our outer senses. But however sharp our outer senses be made they cannot grasp the object of our inner senses. Thus science dominated the higher plane of life and man is left with poor perceptibles that are without any deep foundation.

In philosophy language became an instrument for science. What is sensed can be expressed and thus, is verifiable. But what is not sensed if expressed in language has no meaning as it is not verifiable. It has got no sense ; the language expressing unverifiables is condemned as nonsense. This condemnation of metaphysics as nonsense brought distrust, in the thinking mind about the presence of higher values. Polished by the glamour of science it attracted a large number of thinking mind and thus has become a fashion of the time and a popular creed. People thought it ridiculous to talk of those things that metaphysics proposes to deal with. An obvious corollary of this mentality was visible in the cultural life of people. People thought

themselves following the Golden Path of science while really they were marching ahead on the Road of Destruction.

Although this suicidal pursuit of science was a glaring error that man has ever fallen in, it brought forth something valuable as well. Science employed language as an instrument to dethrone metaphysics, and in this context the potentiality of linguistic expressions was widely searched. This close examination of language as a vehicle of our knowledge opened a new path leading to an entirely unexplored branch of human knowledge. Language as the bearer of knowledge, as the seat of meaning, attracted the attention of scientists and the result was the emergence of a new branch of knowledge in the form of Semantics.

Semantics thus has its beginning in the negation of human values and of the higher planes of existence. Dogmatic acceptance of verification as the only criterion of existence is the property of science that it has inherited. Higher values of life and the experience of immediate presence are never verifiable in the same way as propositions in the physical sciences are. The application of the same yardstick to two entirely different realms of existence brought about complete distrust in the highest existence. But as far as the verifiable world was concerned Semantics left no aspect of language unexplored. Semantics arose and developed as a science of language confined to the world of experience, as other sciences are. Language as the vehicle of verifiable meaning is the only subject matter which it tackles.

This is the line of development of Semantics as a science of linguistic meaning in the west. In India the beginning of this science is entirely on a different footing. Unlike its development in the west in India it arose as a harmonising force between sensuous and supra-sensuous experiences. It neither condemned the higher values nor overlooked the sensuous. Its spirit was always to give proper and balanced emphasis on both. From the very beginning semantics in India



was taken as a science of linguistic meaning. But the word 'meaning' was never confined to the verifiable meaning only. Its scope was extended to include metaphysical expressions. Propositions in metaphysics are meaningful because they are verifiable in an entirely different sense. This is the reason why language in India is treated as the mirror of Reality and not as a servant of science. Its indicative forces were investigated minutely and details were given of the way to reach higher principles through language. The Vedic seers instructed men to reach that (Vāk) which is hidden and which is fore-shadowed in our language. The Upaniṣads emphatically suggested that the principle of language is the higher Reality. What we speak is not language and what is language is not speakable. Speech only indicates the higher language. The Prātiśākhya maintained that the unity (Samhitā) in language is fundamental and prior to diversity of words (pada). The writer of the Nirukta and Vyādi propounded the unitary character of language in a logical and syntactical way. Kātyāyana said that words, objects and their meaning (relation) are eternal. Patanjali summarised the whole philosophy of language in a very scholarly way and advocated the doctrine of the higher speech (Sphoṭa). Bhartṛhari, the great systematic semantist of India, elaborated the position of Patanjali and brought out in a logical way the supremacy of Higher Language. Kaiyaṭa, Nāgeśa and others followed him and maintained that the language that we speak is not the only language. What we speak are only sounds that make various languages. All these languages really stand for *the* Language. There is the Language in which all languages merge and owing to it all languages are possible. Languages are meaningful because they participate in *the* Language.

This was the main current of semantics in India. But this was frequently subjected to vehement criticism by eminent thinkers of this very soil. They maintained that there was no such Language. There are only languages.

They denied the double plane of languages. But this positivistic tendency could not dominate the scene in India for a long time. The latest development of the science of meaning in India makes this point very clear. The Tāntric school of Indian philosophy which was fundamentally based on the power of words and languages or rather the Language (mantra) dominated the thinking mind of India. And with this Indian semantics virtually ended. The importance of the mantras and their visible influence on man was an emphatic challenge to those who denied the double character of language. The theory of the evolution of sounds (nāda) from the Real (Śiva) is not an invention that the school has made. It is based on the Vedic conception of speech.

In India, therefore, science could never capture and enslave philosophy. But science and philosophy were never set apart. They were harmoniously united and kept under one whole. Both science and metaphysics were given their respective places in the life of the people. Perhaps this is the reason why India has never voluntarily entered into wars. She has always advocated the cause of peace with all the force at her command.

## II

We can trace the beginning of speculation on language and meaning back to the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. If we regard the Vedas as the earliest written record of human beings we find that the people at that time began to think of language as the highest gift that the Providence has bestowed upon them. Speech is regarded as the creation of Gods which they have put everywhere.<sup>1</sup> The Vedic seers say that the loom of speech is writ large over the whole creation.<sup>2</sup> This is

---

1. tam mā devā vyadhuḥ puruṣā  
bhūriṣṭhātṛām bhūryāveśayantīm.

—R. V. 10. 10. 125. 3.

2. yāvad brahma viśṭhītam tāvatī vak. —ibid. 10. 10. 114. 8.



the reason that every one on earth is indebted to speech. It is through speech that one sees, breaths and hears others.<sup>1</sup> This shows that people at that time recognised the social importance of speech. Communication among members of a society is very necessary for the existence of the society and of its members.

Speech is not to be taken lightly. It ought to be valued and regarded. Those who do not pay due attention to the use of correct language are condemned. The people of low status in society such as ploughmen are called fools because they cannot use language correctly as it is spoken by the Brāhmaṇas and priests. Learned people are conscious of what they speak. They filter away the blemishes from language. Their speech is beautiful.<sup>2</sup> The communication of meaning depends upon speech, says a Vedic seer. One must use meaningful language in communication; unmeaning language is without blossom and fruit<sup>3</sup>. Those who do not appreciate the beauties of speech cannot see language even when they are seeing, cannot hear it even when they are hearing, but those who understand the language know the speech very well. They know the ins and the outs of speech, because the speech unfolds her secrets to them like a beautiful maiden garbed in colourful dress<sup>4</sup>.

Bṛhaspati is depicted as the saviour of speech in one of the Sūktas of the R̥gveda. The demon Paṇi had taken away all the cows belonging to Indra, the King of Gods. He requested Bṛhaspati to detect the cows. He detected the cows and

---

1. *ibid.* 10. 10. 125. 4.

2. *Ibid.* 10.7.71. 2.

3. *uta tvam sakhye sthirapītam āhur nainam hinvantyapi vājineṣu. adhenvā carati māyayaiṣa vācam śuśruvām aphalām apuṣpām.*

—*ibid.* 10.6.71. 5.

4. *uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācam  
uta tvaḥ śṛnvan na śṛnotyenām  
uto tvasmai tanvam viśasre  
jāyeva patya uṣatī suvāśāḥ.*

—*ibid.* 4.

redeemed them out of the dungeon. The place where the cows were put by the demon is described as the 'pit of ignorance' (guhā tiṣṭhantīr anṛtasya setau). This phrase throws light on the symbolic character of the episode. Cows are the speech which men use in their communication. They are hidden in ignorance till our soul does investigate them. As soon as the real character of speech is detected the whole world becomes full of speech, ignorance in the minds of human beings fades away. The world of experience unfolds its secrets<sup>1</sup>. 'O Bṛhaspati' prays a seer, 'people have names (in their mind for things) even before they can (actually) speak. This (mental speech) is the forerunner of (actual) speech. The knowledge of the highest and purest speech which is hidden in the dark cave (of ignorance) is possible only through reverence'<sup>2</sup>. The subsequent development of Sphoṭavāda and the philosophy of Bhartṛhari is forshadowed in this line. The fourfold division of speech into parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī is found in one RK quoted by Patanjali in the Mahābhāṣya. The speech has four stages, and these are known to learned Brāhmaṇas; ordinary people do not know the three stages of speech because they are hidden from their eyes: they speak only the fourth speech<sup>3</sup>.

Thus in the R̥gveda we find the evidence of speculation on the nature of speech. At some places we are astonished to see the depth of philosophical insight into the nature of speech.

---

1. *ibid.* 10.5.67.

2. Bṛhaspate prathamam vāco agram  
yat prairata nāmadheyam dadhānāḥ.  
yadeṣam śreṣṭham yadaripram āsit.  
prenā tadeṣam nihitam guhāvih.

—*ibid.* 10.6.71. 1.

3. catvāri vāk parimitā padāni  
tāni vidur brāhmaṇa ye maṇiṣinah.  
guhā trīṇi nihatā nengayanti  
turīyam vāco manuṣyā vadanti,

—M. B. 1.1.1.



The Vedic seers regard speech as something beyond the sounds that we utter. The real speech is something that is to be realised and that is the basis of what we speak.

As the ritualistic importance of the Vedas grew, it was obvious that a science of meaning should grow. Scholars began to investigate the rules of interpretation of Vedic sayings. They also felt the need of a regulating science of language that can check the incorrect use of language and save it from deterioration and decay. In the *Brāhmaṇas* we find the beginning of the analysis of language and of meaning.

In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, for example, we find an attempt to explain the word 'indra' etymologically<sup>1</sup>. The word 'angirāḥ' is explained there as 'angānām hi rasaḥ' (the essence of limbs)<sup>2</sup>. In the *Tāndya Mahābrāhmaṇa* we get an explanation of the words 'antarikṣa' and 'mānuṣa'.<sup>3-4</sup> *Śatapatha* explains antarikṣa,<sup>5</sup> agni,<sup>6</sup> hiranya,<sup>7</sup> svapna,<sup>8</sup> rathantara,<sup>9</sup> maghavan<sup>10</sup> and many other words. In the *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka* also the word 'puruṣa' is explained as 'pūrvamevāham ihāsam iti'. (I was existing here before).<sup>11</sup> The Upaniṣads also try at some places to give etymological explanations of words.<sup>12</sup> In the *Taittiriya Samhitā* it is said that in the beginning speech was not analysed. Once gods asked Indra to analyse the speech ; Indra having got the favour of gods analysed the speech and since then the speech is called vyākṛta (analysed).<sup>13</sup>

1. 6.1.1.22 and 14.6.11.2.

2. ibid 14.4.1.8.

3. & 4. 20.14.2 and 8.2.10.

5. 7.1.2.23.

6. 6.1.1.11.

7. 7.4.1.16.

8. 10.3.6.13.

9. 9.1.2.35.

10. 14.1.1.13.

11. 23.1.2.

12. See Chāndo Upa. 6-8.

13. Taitti. Sam. 6.4.7.

The first man to analyse the speech and give a grammar to language is Indra. Indra is called the first grammarian.<sup>1</sup> The beginning of the analysis of language and of meaning is found in the Vedas and these are subsequently developed in Vyākaraṇa, and Mīmāṃsā.

The nature of the highest and purest speech is described more fully in the Upaniṣads. The speech that we use in our conversation cannot describe the Real because the Real is beyond speech. Our speech is based on the knowledge of the object by a subject. If the Real is one and pure consciousness and all the world of experience is a construction out of It how can speech, which is also a construction, fully describe the Real. The Real is thus beyond human speech. Our mind and speech cannot reach it.<sup>2</sup> The description of the Real is possible only negatively. By negating the ascription of everything to the Real we can however find the glimpse of the Real.<sup>3</sup> But in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* the Real is symbolised by the word 'Aum'. Human consciousness works through the three stages of waking, dreaming and sleeping. There is a fourth stage also which is 'not that which is conscious of the subjective, nor that which is conscious of the objective, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is an all-sentient mass, nor that which is all darkness'.<sup>4</sup> It is described as unseen, transcendent, inapprehensible, uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, the sole essence of the consciousness of self, the completion of the world, the ever peaceful, all blissful, the one unit.<sup>5</sup> The fourth stage presents the real nature of the Self or Ātman. Aumkāra with its parts A U M symbolises the three stages of waking, dreaming, and sleeping consciousness. But the

1. M. B. 1;1.1.

2. Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.

3. Neti neti.

4. S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy Vol. I. p. 160.

5. Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad. 1.7.



whole ( AUM ) represents the unity of consciousness which we call turiya. The word 'Aum' stands for exclusive self and common ground of all.<sup>1</sup> Bhartṛhari in the beginning of the *Vākyapadiya* refers to this 'Aum' when he says that the Reality is without decay and death and it is of the nature of word and 'is also the essence of words in the form of meaning.'<sup>2</sup> 'Aum' should be taken as inseparable from the Real because when words cannot describe it how can this word 'Aum' describe it? The Real and the word 'Aum' are one, the symbol and the symbolised are one. The realisation of the unity of 'Aum', the transcendence of A-U-M ( waking, dreaming and deep sleep ) is the highest goal of human pursuit. Thus the Upaniṣads have paved the way for the philosophy of Sphoṭa. Although our speech is discursive and unreal, it shadows the Reality and is meaningful because of It. Our speech, therefore, is an unreal expression of the Real which is the highest speech or Aum.

In the Vedic period we find a creative mind at work. Thinkers of the time have tried to study all the aspects of language although their study may lack in details and seem to be inadequate. But they have certainly paved the way for more analytical and logical study of these aspects of language. The problem of meaning has its roots in the Vedas.

The importance of the Vedas was recognised in performing rituals. The socio-religious life of the people was governed by the Vedas and thus the importance of the Vedic *mantras* grew. A need was felt to preserve the entire Vedic literature because writing at that time was perhaps in a primitive stage. The oral tradition of the Vedas required phonetic laws and the analysis of language in order to understand the meaning of the *mantras*. The *Śikṣā* literature gave phonetic laws to the language of the Vedas and the *Prātiśākhya*s

1. Gauḍapāda Kārikā, 1.22.

2. anādi-nidhanam brahma śabda-tattvam yadākṣaram  
vivartate' rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. V. P. 1.1.

analysed the Vedic language which was at that time going out of use and was being replaced by classical Samskrit. The Nirukta began to give the analysis of meaning of words. It was concerned more with meaning and thus it tried to explain the meaning of words on the basis of verbal roots. The science of Grammar was concerned more with the form of language than with meaning or phonology. It aims at the correct use of language and only indirectly with the communication of correct meaning. Thus the Śikṣā, the Prātiśākhya, the Nirukta and the Grammar have arisen to preserve the sanctity of the Vedas and to help keep the Vedic tradition of ritualism.

The origin of the Prātiśākhya is very old. The present form in which these are available may be very late (even later than Pāṇini) but they embody the spirit of the time when they were first composed.<sup>1</sup> They give etymological derivations of words and also a brief statement of phonetic laws. They have carried out the task of the Brāhmaṇas successfully and must have initiated the necessity for writing a complete grammar of the Samskrit and the Vedic languages. The Ṛk *Prātiśākhya* begins its enquiry by saying that a sentence is composed of parts ( pada-prakṛtiḥ saṁhitā ). The word pada-prakṛti in the statement may be interpreted in two ways. It may mean that the sentence is real and parts are unreal abstractions, it may also mean that the parts which are real compose a sentence which is nothing more than parts added together. The question of relation between a sentence and the words composing that sentence initiated in the Prātiśākhya is developed by the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vyākaraṇa schools of Indian philosophy. The anvitābhīdhānavāda, the abhīhitānvayavāda and the Sphoṭavāda have their beginning in the statement *padaprakṛtiḥ saṁhitā*.

---

1. See Dr. Mangala Deva Sastri's Introduction to the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya.



The Nirukta of Yāska mentions the names of several authorities and shows that the speculation on meaning and language had begun long before Yāska.<sup>1</sup> He divides language into four parts, viz., names, verbs, prefixes and prepositions.<sup>2</sup> He defines a name as meaning a static referend and a verb as meaning a dynamic reality.<sup>3</sup> This definition has far-reaching influence on the subsequent development of the philosophy of language.<sup>4</sup> He also gives a tradition of the authors of the Nirukta. All names are derived from verbs, according to Śākaṭāyana, nairuktas and some grammarians and thus he accepts that verbs are the most important parts of language.<sup>5</sup> For the first time in the history of Indian Philosophy of language such division is made and definition of names, verbs, prepositions and prefixes is given in unambiguous terms. This division first proposed by Yāska is accepted by almost all philosophers so far as the form of language is concerned. In this respect Yāska may be said to be the founder of the logical syntax of language.

If we include the Prātiśākhya and the Nirukta in the Vedic literature we can safely say that at the end of the Vedic period metaphysical and syntactical problems of language have been fully stated. The schools of Indian philosophy have developed their views on the basis of these problems.

The Vedic language ceased to be the spoken language and its place was taken by classical Samskrit. The study of

- 
1. (a) nigamanānnighaṇṭava uccyante *ityaupamanyavopi*.  
 (b) atīndriyanityam vacanam *audumbarāyaṇaḥ*.  
 (c) śaḍbhāvaṅvikāra bhavanti *vārsyāyaṇiḥ*.  
 (d) na nirbaddhā upasargā arthānnirāhuriti *śākaṭāyanaḥ*.  
 (e) uccāvaca padārthā bhavanti *gārgyaḥ*. —Nirukta 1. 1.
  2. tadyānyetāni catvāri pada-jātāni.  
 nāmākhyāte co' pasarganipātāśca. —ibid. 1. I.
  3. bhāvaṇpradhānam ākhyātam sattvaṇpradhānāni nāmāni.  
 —ibid. 1. 1.
  4. see the Chapters on Names and Verbs.
  5. tatra nāmānyākhyātājānīti *śākaṭāyano nairukta-samayaśca*.  
 —Nirukta. 1. 4.

the Vedas and their allied branches became a thing of antiquity. The Prâtiśākhya and the Nirukta were studied only to keep oneself close to the language of the rituals. All other functions were performed in Samskrit. But Samskrit was not the only language spoken by people. There were other languages also that were current at that time. But Samskrit was nearest to the Vedic language and thus its use in rituals was permitted. The use of other languages spoken by the people was not allowed during the religious ceremony. These other languages were called apabhraṃśa because they were fallen languages. They could not answer to the norm set up by the convention. Samskrit was, therefore, regarded as the standard language to be used during religious performances and it was therefore called as sâdhu (standard) language.

Because Samskrit was intimately connected with the Vedic language and in a way it was a modified version of the Vedic language and because it was freely used by the priests—the leading class of the society, it was regarded as the most sacred language as well. Samskrit was considered as the standard and sacred language and the use of other languages was prohibited during a religious performance. The use of Samskrit was considered sacred because it engenders merit. The use of standard and correct language (Samskrit) was regarded as meritorious. It facilitated the clear communication of views on the one hand and generated the unseen merit to be reaped by the user hereafter. The norm of language was confused with religious and spiritual uplift.

The *Mimāṃsā Sūtras* set out to examine the duty of human beings (dharma). Duty was defined as imperative. That which gives oneself some urge is called duty.<sup>1</sup> Perception cannot determine the nature of such duty because it depends on the contact of senses with objects. This is

---

1. Condanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah.

—Mimāṃsā Sūtra. 1. 1. 3.



possible only when objects are presented, thus it cannot guide us to past or future acts which may be called the duty of human beings. Inference, analogy etc. being based upon perception cannot be adequate proofs for establishing the nature of duty. But words have a perpetual and eternal capacity to signify things. Things cannot remain without names and *vice versa*. The knowledge arising from the use of words does not depend for its verification on something other than words themselves. The utterance of words gives us knowledge; this knowledge is unaided by other factors and it is also universal. Meaning does not depend on something other than words themselves, and thus, words are regarded as the only source of duty.<sup>1</sup> Words are regarded as eternal, because if they are momentary they cannot communicate meaning; they will be destroyed as soon as they are uttered. Being the bearer of meaning they are eternal.<sup>2</sup> The relation between words and their referend is impersonal. It is not made by a person. It is natural. A child, for example, without knowing the relation between a word and an object calls an object by a name. He is not taught by his parents to call an object by a name, still he does so because our knowledge cannot function without the help of language. Thus words are related to objects not by any person but they are related by their very nature.<sup>3</sup> The Vedas are eternal and impersonal sources of our duty and guiding forces of our life.

Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* says that the Vedas are the authority on the duty of man because they give injunction. The Vedic injunctions are infalliable and guide the human soul to prosperity and the highest good<sup>4</sup>. But he does not recognise

1. Autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānaṁ upadeśo' vyatirekaś cārthe anupalabdhe tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt. —ibid. 1. 1. 5.

2. ibid. 1. 1. 18.

3. uktam tu śabdapūrvatvam. —ibid. 1. 1. 29.

4. (a) yato' bhyudaya-niḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah.

(b) tadvacanād āmnāyasya pramāṇyam. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1. 1. 2-3.

words as eternal and the relation between words and referends as impersonal. Words are non-eternal because they are produced and everything that is produced is destroyed.<sup>1</sup> The eternal relation between words and objects cannot stand logically. Every name has a beginning. It is related by a person and the convention follows the first-initiated relation. Thus a name is said to have meaning and meaning has a beginning.<sup>2</sup> The Vedas are considered as the source of dharma because a person—God—has revealed them. The Vedas are the creations of God.<sup>3</sup> We must obey the Vedas because God wants us to obey those laws. The person, who has created the whole universe and all human beings, wishes us to follow the rules of morality which are embodied in the Vedas. In this respect the Vedas are infallible sources of our duty. The *Nyâya Sûtras* follow the idea of the *Vaiśeṣika Sûtras* and they say nothing very new on this point.

The *Mīmāṃsâ Sûtras* of Jaimini try to preserve the authority of the Vedas without introducing a person but the *Vaiśeṣikas* take resort to God as the creator of the Vedas. But the aim of both the schools is to preserve the authority of the Vedas. They both agree that the Samskrit language is the only standard (sâdhu) language and its use alone can engender merit. They also say that meaningfulness is co-extensive with sâdhutva. The words in the Vedas have no beginning, yet they are meaningful; other words which we use in our language have a beginning of meaning by way of convention and thus their meaning is not eternal and they cannot be the sources of our duty. Such words according to the *Mīmāṃsâ* have a shadow of meaning. Only Vedic words are really meaningful. According to the *Nyâya*, the Vedic words have meaning because of the will of God and other words do not have the will of God and therefore are meaningful only in a secondary

- 
- |  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| 1. anityaś cāyam karaṇataḥ.                | —ibid. 2. 2. 28. |
| 2. pratyakṣa-pravṛttatvāt sanjñā-karmaṇaḥ. | —ibid. 2. 1. 19. |
| 3. buddhipūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede.           | —ibid. 6. 1. 1.  |



sense. These secondarily meaningful words are not meritorious because either they are not eternally meaningful or they do not embody the will of God. Only Samskrit words are eternally meaningful or they are the only words to which God had given meaning. Thus they alone deserve to be used in rituals and religious ceremonies.

Pāṇini was concerned more with the form of language than with its meaning. He did not, therefore, enquire into the nature of relation between words and their referend or into the question of eternality of words. He was concerned with speech and its parts. He has thoroughly investigated into the nature of parts of speech and etymological derivations of words. He has tried to explain the spoken language of his time by providing a scientific explanation of words. His enquiry was limited only to those problems which were dealt with in the Prātiśākhya and the Nirukta. He did not enquire, at least explicitly, into the metaphysical problems first initiated by the Upaniṣads. But he has his metaphysical presuppositions and a definite attitude to all those problems which were first set out in the Upaniṣads. These presuppositions of Pāṇini are clearly brought out by Patanjali in his great commentary called the *Mahābhāṣya* on the sūtras of Pāṇini.

Patanjali in unambiguous terms says that the purpose of writing a grammar (śabdānuśāsa) is to give a standard language (sādhu śabda) the use of which facilitates communication and assures merit to the speaker hereafter.<sup>1</sup> It might be thought that the use of correct language depends upon accepted usage and this usage can be known from the use of a language in a society and thus there may not be any necessity to compose rules governing a language. But the chief purpose of grammarians is to show that a particular use of language confers merit. It shows that only a particular word

1. ekaḥ śabdaḥ suṣṭhu prayuktaḥ śāstrānvitāḥ svarge loke ca  
kāmadhug bhavati. M. B. 1. 1. 1.

when used will give rise to merit and not the use of other words.<sup>1</sup> All words, to whatever language they belong, are meaningful. But all of them are not sâdhu i. e. they cannot give merit to the user. Meaningfulness cannot be confused with sâdhutva. A word may be asâdhu yet meaningful.<sup>2</sup> In this respect Vyākaraṇa presents a more liberal and logical view than Mimāṃsā.

Kātyāyana and Patanjali show that Pāṇini presupposed that words were eternal.<sup>3</sup> It is also clear from their discussion at various places that Pāṇini regarded the referend as eternal and this eternal referend must be of the nature of universal<sup>4</sup>. Patanjali gives the views of Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana regarding the nature of referend. According to him the former thinks that referends of words are particulars but the latter regards them as universals. But Patanjali is of opinion that in any case they have to recognise both as referend although there may be difference of stress.<sup>5</sup> The views of Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana with regard to the nature of referend are in accordance with the views of Nyāya and Mimāṃsa respectively. Patanjali, besides explaining the syntactical problems of Pāṇini, has also given a metaphysical background to the sūtras. It is impossible to understand Pāṇini without this background. The importance of Patanjali in the history of the philosophy of language is owing to this grand task that he has so eminently performed.

All these schools unanimously hold that language cannot function without the help of universals. One cannot name a thing which is devoid of any reference to a class. The most

---

1. lokatorthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate. —ibid. 1. 1. 1.

2. ekaikasya śabdasya bahavo' pabhrāmśās tadyathā gaurityasya gāvi, gonī. ācāre niyamah. —ibid. 1. 1. 1.

3. siddhe śabdārthasambandhe. —ibid. 1. 1. 1.

4. atha kam punah padārtham matvā vighrahaḥ kriyate siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ceti ? ākr̥tim ityāha. —ibid. 1. 1. 1.

5. M. B. on 1. 2. 3. 64.



primitive particulars can neither be known nor be communicated. But the Buddhists, who by this time had sufficiently developed their philosophy, were opposed to such universal and they regarded that the universal is a construction of the human mind. It is unreal and words refer only to this unreal universal. Really words cannot refer to reality which is pure particular ; hence reality is not communicable and the communicated is unreal. They maintained, therefore, that words really do not refer to something positive ; they merely show that the thing in question is other than what it is not. Dinnāga's polemical attack against the views of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā is based on this line. A great controversy over the nature of referend continued through a very long period. Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Udyotakara, Vācaspati, Prabhākara and Kumārila, to mention only a few, took prominent parts in the controversy on the nature of referend and of language.

But these philosophers were content with the language that people speak in their conversation. They did not try to examine whether there is something beyond the spoken language. The Word-Absolute of the Upaniṣads was not tried or accepted by these philosophers. Vyāḍi, Vasurāta, and Bhartṛhari continued the Absolutistic philosophy of language begun in the Upaniṣads. Vyāḍi, Vasurāta, and Upavarṣa are only names to us ; we do not have any work of these authors left. But fortunately the great work of Bhartṛhari is before us and we can know from this the absolutistic trends of the philosophy of language.

It is evident that a long tradition has preceded Bhartṛhari because he mentions the names of several authors. He says that words that we speak are momentary and they cannot be the bearers of meaning. They are only manifestations of a real language which is the true bearer of meaning. This language is the highest reality and the whole world of words

and objects is a manifestation of this Absolute Word. Our speech imperfectly imitates this. A sentence is more real than words and the sentence is the bearer of meaning. Words do not have letters and sentences do not have parts, words and sentences are not separate. To study a word in its own capacity shows one's foolishness. The division of words, sentences and letters are for our convenience ; it is not real. Speech is one whole without parts. The meaning of words and sentences is called by some as particular, others take it as universal. But Bhartṛhari says that the real meaning of words is neither the particular nor the universal ; it is Pure Existence. Our language means the Absolute Existence which he calls Brahman. Words as bearers of meaning ( and not those words that we speak ) are eternal and they are eternally and inseparably related to the Absolute Existence. He says that the relation between words and objects is not created. It is natural. Words by their very nature refer to objects. If the objects are knowable they cannot remain without words, for human knowledge cannot function without words. 'No knowledge is possible without words ; every knowledge is in the form of language', says he. Thus Absolute Existence itself manifests in the form of words and their meaning. There is no difference between them, and Brahman Himself is the word.<sup>1</sup>

Bhartṛhari after describing the nature of the Absolute sets out to examine the unit of language and he says that sentence alone is the unit of language. Words cannot remain without a sentence and this sentence is not what we speak but is mental. It is a proposition. He refutes the views of the Nyâya, the Mīmāṃsâ and the Buddhists and says that our knowledge takes resort to sentences which are divided into words only for our convenience. The division of a sentence is unreal but this unreal division may be helpful to understand the real speech.<sup>2</sup> He then examines the nature of parts of speech and

1. See the Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa. 1.

2. See *ibid*, Kāṇḍa, 2.



their referend. He also studies at length the nature of referend and mutual relation among words and meanings of words. The whole of the third chapter of the *Vākyapadīya* is devoted to the study of words. But Bhartṛhari is conscious of the real nature of words and he does not give them more reality than what they deserve.

He says that the realisation of the Absolute is the highest aim of the human soul. The science of meaning and language is a very easy road to reach the Absolute. The Vedas which are the manifestations of the Absolute have shown us the way to the Real. And for the liberation of our misery-stricken and bound soul we must know its real nature. It is not different from the Real<sup>1</sup>.

The place of Bhartṛhari in the history of the philosophy of language is very high. He for the first time undertook a thorough study of the Word-Absolute and demonstrated its logical implications. He claims that his philosophy is based on the Vedas and on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali<sup>2</sup>. But it was the intellect of Bhartṛhari himself that could bring out such implications from the *Mahābhāṣya*. Patanjali has not very expressly stated his views on these philosophical questions. But Bhartṛhari has rightly interpreted Patanjali and given us the highest philosophy of language. Bhartṛhari is the first and the last original thinker of the Absolutist school of Indian philosophy of language. This is the reason why his name is mentioned even by his opponents with great reverence.

At the close of the mediaeval period of Indian Philosophy (A. D. 1200) we find three distinct tendencies in the philosophy of language. The *Naiyāyikas*, the *Mīmāṃsakas*, the *Jainas* and the *Buddhists* were trying to study the nature of referend of words and they were opposed to the Absolutist view on the

---

1. *ibid.* Kāṇḍa. 1.

2. V. P. 1.

ground that words make a sentence ; words are prior to sentences. Real words make an aggregate called sentence. The followers of Bhartṛhari on the other hand maintained that sentences are prior to words and words are unreal abstractions of the real sentence. The meaning is inseparably related to words. Objects cannot be known without words. The third tendency was working in the sphere of syntax. Many commentaries and sub-commentaries were written on the sūtras of Pāṇini and on the Mahābhāṣya. They were concerned more with the form of language and the correct use of words than with the meaning of words and other philosophical questions. But the thinkers belonging to the latter category followed Bhartṛhari in the realm of metaphysics. Kaiyaṭa and Vāmana are absolutists in Philosophy.

We may say, therefore, that except the Buddhists and the Jainas all other thinkers of the time related the question of sādḥutva with language. The use of language was regarded sacred and it was believed that the right use of language will give spiritual reward in the life hereafter. The Buddhists and the Jains did not connect the question of merit with the use of correct language. But they hold that words always refer to reality and for the knowledge of the real words are helpful. All their discussions about the nature of language presuppose their particular metaphysical standpoint.

In the beginning of the 13th century Gaṅgeśa wrote his famous treatise the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* on the problems of logic. He dealt there with words as independent means of valid knowledge. He also tried to give his own metaphysical interpretation of the syntactical problems. Before Gaṅgeśa the grammar presupposed the metaphysical views of Bhartṛhari, and this was a source of inconvenience to the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas. They felt the need of explaining the division of speech and other syntactical problems in the light of their realistic philosophy. Gaṅgeśa for the first time reviewed



grammar in the light of the realistic philosophy of Nyâya. Jagadîśa and Gadâdhara, commentators on the *Tattvacintâmaṇi*, wrote independent works<sup>1</sup> on the philosophy of language with the Naiyâyika background. The Mimâmsâ also had its philosopher exponent. Gâgâ Bhaṭṭa wrote a treatise called *Bhāṭṭacintâmaṇi* and Pârthasârathi Miśra, besides explaining the philosophy of Kumârila, wrote an independent book called *Nyâyaratnamâlâ*. These authors gave their own explanation to grammatical problems. In the latest period of Indian philosophy, scholars were concerned with the form of language and with other syntactical problems.

But the philosophy of the Upaniṣads as expounded by Patanjali and Bhartṛhari found its exponents in Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita<sup>2</sup> and Nâgeśa Bhaṭṭa, who wrote elaborate works on the philosophy of language. They agreed with Bhartṛhari and tried to explain him. The *Vaiyâkaraṇa Siddhânta Manjûṣâ* of Nâgeśa is a work of great merit and it deals with almost all problems of the philosophy of language.

The Tantras stressed the importance of the mantras in the life of man. They showed that the power of words (mantras) are infallible and they are capable of giving everything, even mokṣa (liberation) to one who repeats them. The Tântrika philosophy has accepted that the whole world is an evolution out of words and the Real Śiva coupled with his Power, Śakti, is of the nature of powerful word. Our spoken language evolves from the Powerful Reality. The absolutistic tendency of the Philosophy of language in India has its beginning in the Vedas and its end in the Tantras. Those who did not believe in the Absolute Word began to follow the lead of the Tantras, and in the spiritual realm they tacitly accepted

---

1. Jagadîśa has written the *Sabdaśaktiprakāśikâ* and Gadâdhara has written *Vyutpattivâda* and *Śaktivâda*.

2. Bhaṭṭoji has written many books on grammar. But the *Śabdakaustubha*, a commentary on Pāṇini, *Siddhânta Kaumudî* and the *Kārikâs* of a philosophical nature, Bhūṣaṇa, are more important works.

the Tantric philosophy. Even the Buddhists and the Jainas accepted the authority of the Tantras and implied thereby the supremacy of the Absolutistic philosophy. At the end and in the realm of spiritual sâdhanâ all philosophers in India joined hands. The philosophy of the Vedas branched off into various schools only to converge in the Tantras<sup>1</sup>.

Thus in India the philosophy of language was never separated from the spiritual consideration and this has extended a very healthy influence of the life of the people. People never forgot the Real which is guiding the destiny of the world and they had a constant vision of a transcendent Real which persists while the things of the world change. The Real was there to give them solace in misery and distress. Even today any Hindu, when in distress, repeats the name of God and thereby feels that God is present before him. He realises that the Name of God is not different from God.

---



---

1. The Tantras have a very ancient origin and Bhartṛhari is also called a Tāntrika. The Philosophy of the Tāntrika school has dominated the trends of Indian thought.



## CHAPTER II

### MEANING : A THEME FOR PHILOSOPHY

The phenomenon of speech has confronted human mind from the earliest times and attempts have been made to study it in its various aspects. Some people saw it as a divine creation; others took it to be a natural evolution. There are people who want to confine themselves to the formal aspect of speech. Philologists have viewed speech as an historical evolution and have discovered various laws governing the development of language. There are persons who have crossed the barrier of formal speech and have tried to see some ultimate principle lying behind it. They say that the speech is what it is because it participates in something which is beyond speech. Philosophy is an honest pursuit of truth and it has tried to discover the truth of speech. Speech when formally presented is called language and language consists of words. The word is a symbol for something. It stands for something beyond itself. The association of a word with an object is conventional. The word 'cow' stands for something because a long convention has made them stand in close association. But the convention has its beginning somewhere. If there is no one to start this convention of association between words and objects, they cannot come in contact with each other. Thus the use of language would become impossible. Every word that we utter has had some beginning. Someone must be there to start the convention and say that a particular word means a particular thing. Scientific formulas and the names of persons and newly discovered objects provide examples. The father gives a name to his newborn son and this newly given name of his son becomes conventional in due course. Here the father is the originator of

the convention about the relation of a name with the son. All words that we use in language have their beginning.<sup>1</sup>

This convention about the association of words with objects implies two things. A word is associated with an object because it is capable of standing for that object. This is because words have power to *mean* something. It is, as if, we know one thing through some medium. Words have, therefore, only a secondary purpose. A word has to do nothing more than to convey a certain association between itself and an object. The sole purpose of words is only to convey this association. A word may, therefore, be defined as a symbolic expression standing for something other than itself with the intention of communicating its relation to others ( to hearers ).

This capacity of words to stand for something is called the 'power of words'. A word which has no power to stand for something or to mean is not a word at all. A thing, for example, cannot be called a word because it is incapable of standing for some other thing. A watch cannot stand for a pen because it has no power to mean that. In certain cases one thing does stand for another. Cloud stands for rain. But in this case the cloud has the power to mean rain and can be said to embody the essence of the word, provided it fulfills the second essential condition of words. Words have not only power to mean; they are also communicative. They not only contain meaning but also transport it from the speaker to the hearer. Things which may stand for another are not communicative. They merely possess that meaning which cannot be transported. Words are, therefore, both bearers and vehicles of meaning.

The power to mean presupposes two things. There are words which have the power to mean and there are things in connection with which the words are said to have that power. In other words, words *mean* and they mean *something*. The

---

1. Cf. the Nyāya conception of God as the originator of this convention. Śaktivāda, I.



power of words (śakti) is a bond between them. If there were only words, the power to mean would never have been there. If there is nothing to be meant, both the word and its power would be impossible. Similarly, if there were only objects without there being words to express them the knowledge of those objects would become impossible, as things are known only through symbols.

Communication is possible only through some kind of words. Without the help of words one cannot convey one's thought to the hearer. The language of sign and gesture is effective only through their appeal to words in the mind of the person to whom it is presented. He interprets a particular sign as standing for a particular bit of knowledge that the other person wants to convey to him. His interpretation of these signs and gestures is in and through some words of a language that the interpreter happens to remember at that time. If he does not remember any word for the thing which the other person represents through a particular sign, he would be at a loss to understand the meaning of that sign. Knowledge is always presented in words.<sup>1</sup> That knowledge which is not embodied in words is not knowledge. We cannot be said to know a thing unless we can also express it to others. Knowledge is communicative and informative and this communication is possible only through words. Every object is known through words. Even in animals and insects there is some sort of language. Words and objects are interdependent. The one is not possible without the other. There is a

---

1. (a) na sosti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād r̥te ; anuviddham  
iva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāṣate. — V. P. I. 124.

(b) vāgrūpatā cedutkrāmed avabodhasya śaśvatī ; na prakāśaḥ  
prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī. — ibid. 125.

(c) tadvaśād abhiniṣpannam sarvam vastu vibhajyate.  
— ibid. 126.

(d) arthapravṛtti-tattvānām śabdā eva nibandhanam.  
— ibid. 1. 13.

relation binding words and objects and this relation is called the power or the meaning of words.

Meaning is different from words and objects. It is different from them because it belongs to a separate existence. It is not like words and objects existing in the material world. If it were so, it would be another term and thus would require some other relation. But at the same time it is a unifying bond between its terms. Relation is not of the same nature as its terms are. Relation is the presupposition of their existence. Terms exist because they participate in one relation. Meaning being only a relation between words and objects runs through them and is yet beyond them.

We utter a word and understand some meaning. This understanding is the understanding of relation between that word and an object. The word 'cow' means some particular object. When one understands the relation existing between the object cow and the word 'cow' he is said to understand the meaning of the word 'cow'. But what is this relation? It may be said that it is the universal that relates the two. There is cowness which connects the word 'cow' with the object. This universal is present in all cows and thus all of them are called cows. If universals are denied no language is possible; the reason is that our knowledge cannot function with mere particulars. A particular in itself, excluded from all references, can never be the object of our knowledge. We cannot know a bare particular which is devoid of any reference to a universal. Even to know a particular as something we have to take the help of the conception of 'thing' which is universal. A particular is known only as participating in a universal. What we know is a thing qualified by some class-characteristic. Without some class-consciousness associated with it a particular is meaningless. Thus knowledge presupposes universals and language being an expression of knowledge must take the help of universals. Every word that we utter in language refers



to this universal and this is the bond between word and object.<sup>1</sup>

Universal can be understood in two ways. It may be said to reside in the word itself and to be applicable to objects or it may be in the object to which the word refers. In either case this universal is the medium that unites the word with the object. This universal may be as many as there are groups of objects referred to by words. Objects are numberless but they are grouped under class-concepts. This class-concept inheres in different individuals and the individuals falling under one class-concept belong to one group. But language cannot refer to these individuals without referring to their class-character. We cannot refer to this or that cow but only to cow in general. Thisness is external to language; language is always the language of the Universals. Particularity in language is imposed from without.<sup>2</sup>

But on the other hand particularity is very essential for the language to exist. Mere universal is unknowable unless it is associated with words. If a thing cannot be expressed in words, if there is no association of a word with an object the object is as good as non-existent. Every knowledge, however primitive it may be, is possible only through words. Our knowledge is not a direct knowledge of objects which are known only as referred to by words. Our knowledge cannot go beyond what is given to our senses and the given is always nameable. Thus the famous formula 'what is knowable is nameable' is the basic expression of the knowledge-situation.

---

1. (i) V. P. III-I, 25; 29, 32-34.

(ii) *ākṛtiḥ hi vyaktyā nityasambaddhā, tasmāc chabda akṛti-pratyayasya nimittam.* Śābara B. i. 3, 10, 33.

(iii) *viśeṣamātra iṣṭe ca na sāmānyamatir bhavet; sāmānyamātrabodhe tu nirnimittā viśeṣadhīh.* —S. V. 16. 6.

(iv) *yadi tāvadasādhāraṇam svalakṣaṇam eva vastu syān na sāmānyam yathā saugatairucyate tato' yam gaur ayamapīti sāmānyabuddhir na syāt.* —N. R. 16. 6.

2. Even proper names do not stand for a single individual. For this see the Chapter on Names.

Name ( word ) is only a medium for knowledge, helping it to reach at things. Things being totally foreign to the nature of knowledge cannot be directly known. Knowledge cannot come in direct contact with things. It takes the help of words to get at things. Word unites knowledge with things.

This position is very fundamental from our point of view. Knowledge is a very wide term to include any and every sort of mental activity. Beginning from the lowest animals to the highest level of development of animality ( in man ) this position holds good. Even an earthworm is sensitive to light and touch. It recognises light as light, not once, but whenever it is presented. If it could not, it would not respond to light in a certain peculiar way. The knowledge of light is there but as knowledge it can never be direct; it must be mediated by words to be effective. The earthworm must have some concept for light and it recognises light only through that concept. This concept is always in the form of words and, therefore, if there were no words no concepts could be formed. Consequently no knowledge of light would have been possible for the earthworm. It is quite immaterial from our point of view whether the word in the earthworm is articulate or inarticulate or whether it is manifest or mental.

What is articulate and what is not depends upon the position of the hearer. English words for example are quite inarticulate to an Indian villager but to an Englishman it is the most articulate language. Animal speech may be quite articulate to animals and one who can understand this articulatory character of animal language can have knowledge of their language. The cry of birds and the shrieks of animals are articulate and are as good bearers and transporters of meaning and knowledge as human words are. The division of language based on its articulatory character is the division only of audible language. But the audible language is a very late development in evolution. Scientists admit that there are words of animals which are beyond our apprehension. They



are not audible because they are either too low or too high in pitch. If we do not find any sign of the existence of speech organ in earthworms and such other creatures, we can very well infer the existence of mental language in them. We human beings also do not always think aloud. Words are uttered only to communicate. But as an instrument to knowledge words need not always be *uttered*. They exist in the mind. The need for communication transforms this mental word into physical sound. However for knowledge, whether it is communicated or not, words are the necessary conditions. To attain the status of knowledge there must be some words, manifest or mental.<sup>1</sup>

Thus a word leads to the knowledge of an object. As soon as a word is uttered some knowledge is conveyed from the speaker to the hearer. This verbal knowledge is always the knowledge of the relation between a word and an object traditionally associated with that word. We have called this relation as the meaning of the word and, therefore, the knowledge through words is the knowledge of the meaning of words. This knowledge of the meaning in its turn is the knowledge in the form of words. The reason is, as we have seen, that the knowledge is always associated with words. Knowledge cannot be without words. Verbal knowledge arises from words, goes to the meaning of words and ends in embodying those words. Words manifest their meaning which is always in the form of words. No knowledge of the meaning is, therefore, ever possible without there being words.

The conception of pre-linguistic meaning widely advocated by modern science is only an illogical representation. In science the linguistic meaning is distinguished from the meaning of things. The meaning of things is 'largely instinctive' and the signs of these meanings are adherent to the things signified. It is said that the meaning of things 'is our name

---

1. V. P. I. 124-126.

for clues to adoptive movement'. It is identical with motor reaction as we have seen in the case of the sensation of light in earthworms. This is the activistic meaning in the sense that 'the meaning is something in an act which is selected because it arouses an anticipatory reaction to its sequel'. This perceptual meaning 'involves recognition but not revival of past experience.' As an example of this meaning Lloyd Morgan's experiments with newly hatched chicks is given. A chick after pecking at various caterpillars comes upon the cinnabar caterpillar which has a bitter taste. After repeated impulsive movement of pecking, the tendency is finally inhibited. The markings of the cinnabar have become signs to the chick. The cinnabar is said to have acquired meaning for the chick. This acquired meaning is a name for a cue to an adoptive movement and this is activistic.

If we thoroughly examine this view we find that the acquiring of the meaning of a thing is nothing more than acquiring the meaning of a word. When we come across something entirely new we cannot pay any attention to its existence and can never acquire any meaning of it unless we are acquainted with it. When it is repeatedly presented we get a name (whether conventional or invented) for the thing and thus acquire the meaning of that thing. This associating of a word with a thing is to encircle the thing in the net of words so that it may be helpful for our knowledge. We tame a wild thing in the cage of words. As long as a thing is not associated with a word it can never acquire a meaning and can never be recognised. In the example of newly hatched chicks the acquiring of the meaning of the markings of the cinnabar is acquiring a name for those markings in the vocabulary of the chick. It probably associates a particular shriek with the cinnabar. The chick must have some language to know that particular insect as meaning bitter taste. It recognises that insect having certain markings, as having a bitter taste only because it has some



concept for it and the concept is nothing other than words themselves. The chick has got some verbal pattern, a specific shriek in its mind for that. The fact that the word is conceptual is enough to refute the existence of pre-linguistic meaning. But if by language only the historical language is meant and not the metaphysical language we have no quarrel over that and in that sense we are ready to admit the existence of pre-linguistic meaning. But we shall try to show in the next section that language primarily means the metaphysical language and only secondarily it means historical language.

But it is clear that the meaning in the above mentioned example is not totally activistic. It is as much activistic as it is linguistic. The contention that the perceptual meaning involves recognition and not the revival of past experience is baseless. The chick recognises that caterpillar as cinnabar. It may be asked here 'what is the basis of this recognition?' Recognition is the process of discovering a thing as falling in the accumulated past experience of a person. It must, therefore, be based on some cue and that is provided only by the revival of past experience. Recognition is possible only when the whole experience associated with it in the past is revived. If the past experience is not revived recognition will not be recognition but only a presentation of an entirely new fact. If the earthworm does not recall that light is conducive for it as it was in the past, it cannot know the light as light. Every experience of light for it would be a new experience if it is not associated with the revival of past experience. This revival is the revival of the concept of light in the mind of the earthworm and surely this concept is nothing different from words. In animals there may not be any explicit sign of a language in the sense of historical language but the necessity of supposing a conceptual language cannot be denied. We emphatically maintain that no knowledge is ever possible without involving some word.

Man takes the help of language to know a thing. Language is the intermediary between the knower and the known. Knowledge as the result of the labour of the knower to discover the known presupposes some relation between the words uttered and the objects signified. If this were not the case, language would never have become the vehicle of knowledge; and knowledge would never seek the help of language to get at things. But as every one knows that words do convey meaning and they necessarily help the birth of knowledge, they are necessarily related with their referend.

Knowledge is born out of language yet it governs language. Language is both the product and the producer of knowledge. If language tries to set up its course separate from the government of knowledge, it would vanish. It would become unintelligible and its purpose would be lost. It is always necessarily governed by knowledge. Language is always a language that can be understood. That which cannot be understood is not language at all. Similarly language facilitates the birth of knowledge. If I utter the sentence 'There is a snake' I facilitate the knowledge of the existence of a snake in my hearer. Uttered words illuminate the hidden knowledge behind them to the hearer. Language governs the knowledge of things. Things are known through words associated with them. If there were no word for a thing, if a thing is left ungoverned by a word, the thing will never be known. There is another important fact to show that the knowledge of things is governed by language. There are separate words for separate things.<sup>1</sup> When one word is applicable to two or more things a great confusion arises. This confusion is there only because one thing is not exclusively associated by one word. This confusion vanishes where one word is used for only one thing. Distinct knowledge is based on distinct association of a word with a thing. Knowledge inspires language and language facilitates knowledge.

---

1. tadvaśād abhinispannam sarvam vastu vibhajyate.



We have seen that our knowledge cannot go beyond words. Words are always present where knowledge is present. No knowledge is possible without them. But only those words which are related to things figure in our knowledge. In other words every knowledge is in the form of meaningful words. Unmeaning marks never constitute our knowledge. Everyone who studies the philosophy of knowledge, what is technically called epistemology, is forced to examine the nature of knowledge. He is inevitably inclined to consider the relation of words to our knowledge and also the nature of words. It is at this point that epistemology considers meaning. This is the epistemological problem of meaning and we shall consider these problems under the philosophy of meaning. Meaning is, therefore, a legitimate subject for epistemology. Let us now see whether meaning may be considered in any other branch of philosophy.

## I

## THE METAPHYSICS OF MEANING

If the consideration of meaning in epistemology is justified it is equally justified to consider the nature of meaning in metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science of what we know or can know and epistemology provides us the analysis of the process of knowing. We know something when a word is uttered. This knowledge involves some relation between the word and the thing for which it stands. The verbal knowledge arises from words, goes through words and ends in words. This journey of knowledge from words through words and to words is not insignificant. By this journey knowledge is enriched ; it gets something new which it did not have previously. This new element in our knowledge is called meaning. When the verbal knowledge reaches its destination it has acquired something new in its body. The knowledge or the hearer of a sentence arises from the words of the speaker and it reaches him through words and these words *having been*

*understood* end in the shape of knowledge (Śābdabodha) which is again in the form of words.<sup>1</sup> The understanding of words is a new thing for the hearer, which was aroused by the words of the speaker.

We have considered in the last section the way in which this understanding arises and the shape which it takes. In this section we shall try to see the nature of this understanding. The first question that arises here is : this understanding is the understanding of what ? It is true that we understand words uttered by the speaker. But do we really understand words themselves or the thing which those words stand for or is there something else to be understood ? In our everyday life we are said to understand words. But this is a wrong notion. Words are presented to a hearer. He senses them either through ears as they are spoken or through eyes in their written form. If words themselves are to be understood the perceiver of those words can at the most understand the construction of words presented to him ; its different constituents and their shape and size, if he sees a written word. A student of engineering, for example, sees a machine and he is said to understand the machine. His understanding of the machine is confined to various components and their mutual relation and position. He does not go beyond the immediately presented. His understanding is confined to the object before his eyes. Similarly if a man is said to understand a word he would, in the real sense of the verb 'to understand', understand only the formal aspect of the word. He

1. (a) ātma-rūpam yathā jñāne jñeya-rūpam ca dr̥śyate, artha-rūpam tathā śabde svarūpam ca prakāśate. V. P. 1, 5.

(b) yathā jñānam jñeyaparatantram jñeyarūpapratyavabhāsa-  
vad anirdeśyasvarūpam api jñānāntarasyeva bhinnam  
svasyaivātmanah svarūpamātram darśayati, tathā hy atītam  
anupaladbham apy anyena jñānena smrtiviśayatvam pratipa-  
dyate. tadvad 'ayam arthe śesabhāvam āpadyamānah  
śabdo' bhidheyatantras tadrūpopagrāhī svarūpamātram  
pratyavabhāsayati. —Bhartṛhari on the above.



cannot go beyond the immediately presented words and understand its *meaning*, because this meaning is something over and above the formal shape of words. But if a hearer understands meaning of a word and yet we speak of him as understanding a word, the use of the word 'word' is not in its primary sense. It is only by courtesy that we speak of him as understanding a 'word'.

The hearer does not understand the thing for which the word of the speaker stands. It is against all usage of language to say that by the uttering of a word we understand a thing. I may have never seen a telescope but when the word is uttered before me I understand something. Obviously I cannot be said to have understood the telescope which I have never seen. Again, we understand such words which do not stand for a thing. 'A barren woman's child', for example, does not stand for any thing, yet we understand the phrase. If by word we understand a thing, no knowledge of the meaning of the phrase would ever have been possible. But as we understand something by that phrase and that does not stand for some *thing*, the thing cannot be the object of our understanding. It is only in a secondary sense that we are said to understand a thing by a word.

We cannot be said to understand the formal structure of the word or a thing for which that word stands, when a word is uttered. Then, what is it that we understand when a word is uttered? We understand the relation between the word and the object for which that word stands. We do not understand the word 'pen' nor do we understand the object called by that name when the word is uttered. After hearing the word there is a mental process in the hearer. His mind connects the word with the object for which that word stands. As soon as the knowledge of relation between the word and the object is achieved we are said to understand the meaning of the word. So when we speak of understanding a word or an object we really mean to say that we understand the *meaning* of the word or the relation of the word to the object.

The relation between a word and an object is a unique type of relation.<sup>1</sup> There are persons who say that this relation is nothing but a convention beginning in time. It is only the arbitrary desire or will of the person who initiated this convention. 'This thing should be known by this word' is the desire of the initiator of meaning. This desire binds that word with that particular object. When a word used with this intention is carried long in usage it gets its conventional meaning. This convention presupposes that there were words and there were objects, the initiator only combined them. Before this combination that word was meaningless and that particular object unnameable. But if that object was unnameable, it was obviously unknowable, and what is unknowable can never be known. The initiator of the convention could never have known that particular object unconnected with any name and thus could not have given any name to it. A name of a thing is not external to the nature of the thing. It is intimately related with that thing.<sup>2</sup> It is quite right to say that one and the same thing can assume various names. But it does not prove that a name is imposed upon that thing. The name 'cow' or 'gau' may have some beginning in history but these are not real names. This Real ultimate name is the real name of a thing and the historical name is only a physical expression of that name.

- 
1. tasmāt padapadārthayos sambandhāntaram eva śaktir vācya-  
vācakabhāvāparaparyāya. —Manjūśā p. 26.

2. (a) śabdeśvevāśritā śaktir viśvavyāsa nibandhani ; yannetraḥ  
pratibhātmāyam bhedarūpaḥ prat'yate.

—V. P. I, 119.

netram hi paricchedopāva iti. tena hi śabdena viśiṣṭa-  
śaktiḥ. nahi tena vinā gavayādi - padārthaviśaya-prati-  
bhotpadyate. —Vṛṣabhadeva on the above.

- (b) vāgevartham paśyati vāg bravīti vāg evārtham nihitam  
santanoti.

vācyeva viśvam' bahurūpam nibaddham tadetadekam  
pravibhajyopabhunkte.

Quoted by Bhartṛhari in the Tīkā of I. 19



This dual nature of names is very important for us. What we speak is called expression or dhvani. The word 'expression' (dhvani) is a relative term meaning the expression of *something*. Words that we use in our everyday life are expressions of something which is not given. Our historical languages (the specific languages of men all over the world) are only expressions of the same universal language which is one, while the historical languages are many.<sup>1</sup> The use of a particular historical language (e. g. English) is an appeal to the universal language.<sup>2</sup> It is not true that we understand words presented to us because, as we have seen, we cannot understand words. We understand words only in a secondary sense, that is, we understand the universal language which is hinted at by a particular historical language. This historical language is only an incomplete, imperfect expression, in itself a juxtaposition of sounds.<sup>3</sup> It is an imperfect and unreal way to get at the perfect and real word.<sup>4</sup> But this cannot undermine the importance of historical languages. They provide the clue to get at the real, and herein lies their great importance. The communicative aspect of language is limited to the words that we utter. The real word cannot be communicated to others without the help of these historical words. The sign-language serves the same purpose as the word—language but imperfectly. All these expressions are helpful in conveying or to be more

---

1. avikārasya śabdasya nimittair vikṛto dhvaniḥ. upalabdḥau nimittatvam upayāti prakāśavat.

—V. P. 195.

2. Universal language is sphoṭa or pratibhā, while historical language is a translation of dhvani or nāda.

3. samyogaja-vibhāga-dhvanivyāṅgyaḥ sphoṭaḥ.....sphoṭā-nugrahaṇastu yathottaram apacīyamānābhivyakti-sāmarthyā drutādivṛtti-behda vyavasthāhetavo' pacayaṭmakā dhvanayaḥ.

—Bhartrhari on V. P. I. 103.

4. upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānām upalālanāḥ ; asatyē vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate.

—V. P. II. 240.

precise, in arousing latent real language in the mind of the hearer.<sup>1</sup>

One may question the necessity of supposing a universal language. We may place before him the fact of translation from one language to another. The English word 'cow' is translated as 'gau' in Samskrit. They are two different words and historically they widely differ. But they are regarded as one from the point of view of meaning, as the meaning of the two is identical. This identity of meaning is the common ground for the translation of one language into another. We can express this symbolically for our convenience. The relation between 'cow' and the object is equal to X and that between 'gau' and the object is also is equal to X. X in the former case is identical with X in the latter. This consciousness of identity supposes something which is common to both. If this not the case, the knowledge of the identity of the two X's would require another term Y to make the two identical and the relation Y and the two Xs will require some other factor to make them both identical. In this way there will be no end of this infinite mediation of a common term. It is, therefore, logically justified to suppose one common ground on the pattern of which different languages admit of mutual translation.

This clearly brings out the nature of relation. Relation is that which unites two or more different terms in one bond. It goes through these terms and yet remains apart, so that it may also not become a term requiring another relation to unite. Relation, therefore, necessarily differs from the terms which it unites.<sup>2</sup> Meaning being a relation is neither the word

---

1. (a) *sphoṭasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛto dhvaniṇiṣyate*, Saṃgraha, cited by Bhartṛhari on I. 77.

(b) *prākṛta-dhvanīśabdena sphoṭa-vyañjakamatrocyaṭe*.

—Manjūśā p. 235.

2. *Sambandho hi sambandhibhyām bhinno dvīṣṭha ubhayāśritah*.

—Manjūśā p. 22.



nor the object, it depends upon them and is yet beyond them. This proves the existence of meaning as a metaphysical reality.

A relation being dependent upon its terms can never be conceived apart from those terms. If terms of a relation are destroyed the relation between them automatically vanishes. If there is no word or no object the relation between them will be automatically absent. No special effort is necessary to destroy the relation. It is said, therefore, that a relation cannot exist in itself. The conception of meaning as a separate metaphysical entity existing beyond words and objects is only a logical fallacy,<sup>1</sup> it may be thought.

It is true that a relation depends upon its terms. Two pieces of wood are connected by a metal hook. This hook provides the relation between the two pieces of wood. If one piece is destroyed the relation is automatically destroyed. But can this destruction of one piece annihilate even the conception of a connection? What it can do at the most is to make the physical existence of the relation disappear. But it cannot annihilate the conceptual existence of the relation. Even if one piece is destroyed we can still have the notion of relation, although we cannot realise it.

To some this argument may not appear very satisfactory. They may maintain that even the conceptual relation involves the notion of conceptual terms.<sup>2</sup> This can be challenged. A

- 
1. (a) "In the first place a relation without terms seems mere verbiage."
  - (b) "The relation is not the adjective of one term for, if so, it does not relate. Nor for the same reason is it the adjective of each term taken apart, for then again there is no relation between them. Nor is the relation their common property, for then what keeps them apart?"

—Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* p. 27.

2. "a relation which somehow precipitates terms which were not there before or a relation which can get on somehow without terms.. is really a phrase without meaning. It is, to my mind, a false abstraction, and a thing which loudly contradicts itself."

—ibid.

relation when conceived involves the notion of terms. But that does not annihilate the possibility of a relation existing in itself without any reference to the terms. The terms are necessary only when we try to conceive a relation. That relation which is beyond our conception may exist without any reference to its terms.<sup>1</sup>

The necessity of a relation as existing beyond its terms is proved. It is metaphysical and provides the basis for our communication. In its true sense we cannot call it a relation, as in itself it is devoid of any reference to terms. But for our purpose here the least that we can say of it is that it is pure existence. Being pure existence it provides the meeting ground for words and objects. It supports their existence and without it they would fall apart. It is not the relation that depends upon its terms ; it is rather the terms that depends upon this relation. Space which is perceivedly the relation of things (as distant, near etc.) is at the same time something in itself which remains when the things are taken away. However it could not in itself give rise to the spacial relations of 'near' or 'distant'.

- 
1. Bradley proves by these arguments that 'terms appear to be something beyond their relation' and yet he maintains that terms which are not related are not conceivable (p. 124-125). Then the terms appearing beyond their relation are, in the words of Bradley, 'nothing', his Real which is a Whole is certainly not conceivable, being beyond any relation. Again, relation being intrinsical resides in terms and terms are not beyond the Real hence the Real is pregnant with relation and hence should be conceivable. Bradley has no way of getting out of this riddle. We maintain that terms being totally dependent upon their relation are nothing beyond this relation. Hence relation appears to be something beyond its terms. This relation is the presupposition of the existence of terms. It is intrinsical to its terms and is yet beyond them. Thus one and the same relation viewed from the point of view of terms is a relation but viewed as a supposition of the existence of terms is the Absolute.



The word 'cow' means a certain object because they both participate in the existence. Their existence in usage depends upon this higher Existence. Without this no language is possible. It is the presupposition of every speech.<sup>1</sup>

This Existence is manifest in the form of language (words) and in the shape of objects.<sup>2</sup> The symbol and its referend are fundamentally one and the same, as they both belong to this Existence. The world around us is a construction of names and things. But this construction has only a projected existence upon the supreme Existence. The supreme existence manifests itself in names and things.<sup>3</sup> These names and things are, therefore, real because they both belong to this principle. In themselves these are nothing. They have only a relative existence. They are not ultimate. If we are permitted to use a strong term, we may call them unrels.

The importance of names and things cannot be undermined by calling them unrels. Their existence is but inevitable. The Reality, which is pure Existence, is by its very nature inclined to be manifest. The dynamic power of Reality, which is not separate from it, cannot remain inactive. Its appearance is unavoidable and necessary.

What we see and what we use to express our feelings are nothing but the Existence manifest. These are the only ways through which the Existence can be conceived of. The existence in itself being devoid of all reference to limitations cannot be conceived by the human mind in its pure form. Our knowledge works only in relatives. We know a thing as thing because it exists in relation to others. That which has no

1. V. P. I. 119.

2. avibhakto vibhaktebhyo jāyaterthasya vācakah ; śabdāḥ tatrāṭmā sambhedam upagacchati.

—cited by Bhartṛhari V. P. I-44.

3. V.P. I. 4.

relation to anything can never be known. A book is known as a book because it is different from the pen and the table on which it is put. A book is a book in relation to things which are not books. The consciousness of 'different from others' is the minimum requirement of knowledge. The Existence for which there is no *other*, therefore, being not relative, is unconceivable.

The use of every word points to this Existence. Words cannot directly describe the Existence because it is beyond description. It is not a contradiction to say that words emerge out of this Existence and yet cannot describe it. Words are only imperfect manifestations, in themselves they are nothing. They are like bubbles in the air blown by a playful child; they in themselves are not water, yet they emerge out of water. By seeing them we cannot know what the water is, the least they can help us know is that there is water somewhere. They only suggest the existence of water. Words and things only *suggest* the existence of the Real.

There is a difference between suggestion and meaning. Meaning is the immediate product of words and suggestion is a remote indication. A word means something i. e. it means its relation with that thing. That relation is immediately felt when a word is uttered. With suggestion the case is different. What is suggested is different from what is meant. In metaphors such suggestion is clearly seen. To call the face of a lady 'flower' is different 'from' the meaning of the word 'flower'. In the former case the word does not mean flower but suggests the existence of some qualities ( beauty, fragrance, softness etc. ) in the face of the lady, which is not the case in meaning. The meaning of the word 'flower' is entirely different from the suggestion it gives in metaphors. A word, therefore, may mean anything with which it is associated, but in every case it suggests the existence of the Real



Existence which makes the existence of these words and objects possible.

The manifestation of the Real is possible only in individuals.<sup>1</sup> These individuals in the form of words and objects indicate the existence of the Real. This Real is technically called Pratibhâ.<sup>2</sup>

The conception of Pratibhâ—the Real Existence—is the basis of the evolution of names and things. The dynamic power of it makes it appear either as the principal source of words or as the originator of objects. Viewed from the point of view of words it is called the source of those words through which the knowledge of things is made possible. In this sense the first evolute of Pratibhâ is called sphoṭa. Sphoṭa is the first principle of the evolution of words. These words in themselves embody the knowledge of objects and objects are not separate from these words. Objects are conceptual and words are intimately and inseparably associated with these objects.<sup>3</sup> This is the reason that words always stand for something and things are always associated with words. Words that we use in our everyday life are only sounds. As sound they are born and perish. They are momentary. The ultimate philosophy has no concern with these sounds. But these sounds serve one purpose. They indicate and suggest the existence of real words.<sup>4</sup> These ultimate words embody in themselves both the things and the words. In them things and words are not differentiated. It is only when they are expressed by sounds that the difference between words and objects is clearly manifest. The word is split into two parts—in the form of sounds and in the form of things. In our practical life things and sounds represent two different entities and for expressiveness of words we

---

1. *anekavyaktyabivyaṅyā jātiḥ*. V. P. I.94.

2. V. P. I.119.

3. V. P. I.44.

4. V. P. I.98.

require a relation to bind them. A sound expresses a thing because they both are related to each other.<sup>1</sup> This relation is called the meaning of a word.<sup>2</sup> We have shown that dialectically this relation must be something higher out of which these emerge. In *sphoṭa* we find such a relation.

From the point of view of things, to which words are foreign, the same *pratibhā* appears as *jāti* or the universal. The universal is not objective. What is objective is perishable and inevitably momentary. Hence the objections brought against the universals by the Buddhists do not hold good. The universal is not objective and what is objective is not universal in the strict sense of the term. It only suggests the existence of such universal as sound suggests the existence of the *sphoṭa*.<sup>3</sup>

In the body of the *sphoṭa* things are represented not as we find them in the objective world but as things in the form of conceptual universal. Sounds that we utter and things that these sounds represent are united in concept. Every sound arouses the conceptual word and there the thing is represented as the conceptual universal. The *sphoṭa* cements them together. Words and things are related not in the actual

1. V. P. I.59.

2. (a) *ghaṭabodha - janana-sāmarthyam eva ghaṭādipadānām śaktiḥ.*  
—Śābdakaustubha.

(b) *indriyāṇām svaviśayeṣv anādir yogyatā yathā ;*  
*anādir arthais śābdānām sambandho yogyatā tathā.*

—V. P. III-III, 29.

(c) *Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa-36.*

(d) *Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell. p. 351.*

3. *anupravṛttirūpām yām prakhyātāmākṛtim viduḥ.*

—V. P. III-I, 19.

*sabdarthortha iti vā padārthavyavastheyam anugatakārā yā buddhis tasyām pratibhāsamānas tadākāro'rtha-rūpatayā' vasiya-mānavapur dṛśyavikalpayorabhedādhyavasāyāt sāmānyamāhuḥ. evam ca bāhyasya sāmānyasyābhāvat...*

—Helārāja on the above.



world but in the conceptual universe.<sup>1</sup> In practical life they are entirely different but ultimately they are one, they are the sphoṭa.

This sphoṭa is not different from pratibhā. It is only the first appearance of it and thus ultimately it does not admit of any separate existence. Sphoṭa is the source of both words and objects. Being not different from the Existence it is eternal. Words and objects (jāti) are eternal because they are nothing but the sphoṭa itself. Sounds (dhvani) and objects (vyakti) are eternal because they are not different from the word and the universal (jāti) respectively and this is identical with the sphoṭa. But to call these objects (vyakti) and sounds, these words and universals, as real as they appear is a great mistake. They are only appearances as they are seen by us. But ultimately words, objects and their relation are eternal.<sup>2</sup> This is the metaphysical aspect of meaning and we are justified in considering meaning in the realm of metaphysics.

## II

### THE LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE

The Pratibhā is to be realised by being one with it. It is not and cannot be made an object of study as it is beyond human apprehension. Human knowledge can study only what is equal or<sup>3</sup> inferior to it ; it cannot study what is

1. *ibid.* III-I, 24 and Helārāja on it.

2. *Siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe.* M. B. 1. 1. 1.

3. (a) *iha dvau śabdātmanau-nityaḥ kāryaśca. nityastu sarvavyavahārayonih samhṛtakramāḥ sarveśāṃ antaḥsanniveśi prabhavo vikāraṇām āśrayaḥ karmanām adhiṣṭhānam sukhadukkhayoh.*

Bhartṛhari on V. P. I. 131.

(b) *tadabhyāsacca śabdapūrvakam yogam adhigamya pratibhām tattvaprabhavām bhāvavikāraprakṛtim sattām sādhyasādhanaśaktiyuktām samyagavabuddhya niyatā kṣemaprāptir* *iti. ibid.* 132.

higher than itself. The higher, being the originator, is beyond its grasp. If any study of language is made it must be of the language that is spoken. The study of words is really the study of spoken words and not of the *śpōṭa*. It is only by studying these spoken words that we reach the Real word and realise the real nature of Existence. Hence its importance. Logical syntax is the study of such a spoken word. The importance of this branch of knowledge is that it makes the knowledge of the Real possible. One cannot immediately jump to the Real discarding altogether what is apparent. If the Real is to be attained it must be through the study of the spoken language and we proceed now to study the meaning in the spoken language.<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of speech is expression and communication. It serves to convey the knowledge, feeling and emotion from the speaker to the hearer. That much of language which is necessary and sufficient for this purpose should be regarded as the unit of speech. This minimum requirement is fulfilled by a sentence. Only a sentence conveys one full idea of the speaker. Words are only partial expressions of the whole idea contained in a sentence. A paragraph or other large combinations of these sentences cannot be called units as they do not form one idea. They are the combinations of different ideas. A full idea can neither be expressed by a word nor by a paragraph. The minimum that we require to present one idea is only a sentence. Sentence is the unit of speech.<sup>2</sup>

---

1. (a) śāstreṣu prakriyābhedaiv avidyaivopavarṇyate. V. P. II. 235.

(b) asatyē vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṁ samīhate. —ibid. 240.

2. (a) padārthābhisambandhasyopalabdhir bhavati vākye. iha devadatta ityukte kartā nirdiṣṭaḥ karma-kriyāguṇaṁ cānirdiṣṭam. ihedānīm devadatta gāmabhyāja śuklām ityukte sarvaṁ nirdiṣṭam yeṣāṁ padānāṁ sāmānye vartamānānām yadviśeṣe' vasthānam sa vākyaṛthah. —M. B. 1. 2. 2. 45.

(b) ata eva vākyaṁ eva mukhyaḥ śabdaḥ. vākyaṛtha eva mukhyaḥ śabdārthah. —Kaiyata on the above.



One single idea is a combination of different concepts. In spoken language these concepts are represented by words. There are as many words in a sentence as there are concepts constituting an idea. It depends upon the mental capacity of the speaker as to how far he could analyse an idea. This is a question to be studied by anthropologists and philologists. We do not propose to enter into its details. For our purpose it is sufficient to say that the ideas admit of finer analysis and these analysed concepts are represented by words. One single idea is divided and thus a sentence has parts. There are part of speech.<sup>1</sup>

The parts of speech depend upon the mental capacity of the user of a language. Usually it is determined by the linguistic forms prevalent in a society. Some languages ( in the sense of languages prevalent in a society ) admit of six parts of speech, others may admit only two or three. Those who admit greater number of these parts of speech show a better sense of analysis than those who use fewer parts of speech. It is the duty of grammarians to study and assess the linguistic value of these parts. Philosophy is not concerned with their number and place in a language. The concern of philosophy in this field is limited to investigating the minimum number of those parts which a language uses and without which it cannot stand.

We cannot divide a language arbitrarily. We must have some fundamental principle on which the division of language is effected. As we have seen the division of language depends upon the analysis of a single idea into parts. A language can admit of as many parts as there are divisions of ideas in mutually exclusive groups. For each group to be expressed in a language we have one part of speech corresponding to it.

---

1, avibhaktepi vākyaṁthe śaktibhedād apoddhṛte; vākyaāntaravibhāgena yathoktam na viruddhyate.

If we analyse our ideas we find that every idea has got two things in its make-up. There is something given and that given is in succession and not simultaneous. That which is given always admits an existence and the succession is always succession in time. These ideas are ideas embodied in a spatio-temporal form. There is no other element at the time of the emergence of knowledge and its grouping in ideas. These space and time are only subjective but they firmly correspond with the objective space and time. The language, if it is at all to be divided, should, therefore, be divided on this firm basis of space and time. In space and time we have got a firm foundation for the division of speech into parts.<sup>1</sup>

The names present the static element of our ideas and they, in their wider sense, include everything that is not succession. Adjectives, pronouns, conjunction, indeclinables ( *nipāta* ) all these are only names for a static existence.<sup>2</sup> Verbs on the other hand express the temporal element in our knowledge. Prepositions and adverbs express only qualities of action and thus they are nothing more than the action in the sense that they are successive.<sup>3</sup> We have only two parts which are fundamental for the existence of a language. Names and verbs are the parts of speech and other parts are dependent upon mutual relation of names and verbs to themselves or to each other. Fundamentally and logically

- 
1. (a) *kālāt kriyā vibhajyante ākāśāt sarvamūrtayaḥ ; etāvāne-  
vabhedoyam abhedopanibandhanah.*

V. P. III-VII (8) 6.

- (b) *arthapoddhāra eva hi padāpoddhārasya nimittam. animittehi  
tasmin varṇāpodhārasyāpi prasangāt teṣām api vyutpādyatā  
syāt. Vākyaṛthaśca sthita-lakṣaṇo niraṁśaḥ kāraṅkotkalitaś-  
arīasvabhāvataḥ. tatra cāmśāmśikalpanayā poddhāre  
kāraṅkātma kriyātmā ca pravibhāgarha. iti siddhasādhya  
lakṣaṇāmśadvaya-viśyaḥ padāpoddhāro dvividho nāmākhyā-  
tarūpaḥ.*

—Helārāja on V. P. III-I. 1.

2. *ibid.*

3. *ibid.*



we have only two parts of speech. Plato and Pāṇini acknowledge this fact.<sup>1</sup>

What do these names mean? Do they mean an individual or do they stand for the universal element in the individual or do they mean an individual participating in the universal. Certainly the last mentioned view is the most logical and correct among them, from the practical point of view. In the sentence 'Bring a pen' the word 'pen' is not merely an individual because in that case it will not even be known as a pen. It is not merely a universal which is meant by the word, as the universal being conceptual cannot be brought. Inevitably we can bring only that pen which participates in the universal. In other words, the word, 'pen' stands for an individually real and transcendentally universal pen.<sup>2</sup>

Here we have to clarify one point. We have said that the word 'pen' means an individual participating in the ideal universal concept. Certainly according to our previous analysis the meaning of a word is not an object, it is only the relation between an object and a word. It will be wrong, therefore, to say that a name means an individual qualified by the universal. But as we have seen the word 'to mean' is always used figuratively. Sometimes that word stand for another word and sometimes it stands for an object. Meaning being a relation lurks in either of its terms. A name means an individual participating in the universal not in the sense in which it is presented to us. It is not such an individual that is meant. What is meant is the relation between a word, say 'pen', and the individual found in our experience as participating in the universal. Relation is not abstract. Relation is a relation 'from' and 'to' something. In a relation terms are related and thus the concept of relation always takes the help of its terms in order to come into existence. The word 'pen'

---

1. (a) The Sophist. 262.  
(b) Suptiñantam padam-Pāṇini I. 4. 14.

2. Vyaktyākṛtijāyatas tu padārthah. —Nyāya Sūtra 2. 2. 65.

means an individual participating in the universal and this meaning constitutes in itself both the word 'pen' and such an individual. It indicates a relation from the word to an object. When we say the word 'pen' means such an object we really want to say that a relation exists from the word 'pen' to that object. This is the real position of meaning in our practical life.

A name is related to an individual participating in the universal. This meaning of a name is for our practical life. When we try to go deep into the problem we face difficulties. A name is a word and not necessarily a sound. Being a word it is conceptual and thus ideal. A thing which we experience in our practical life is not necessarily an individual in itself. It is merely an expression of the concept of the thing. It is, therefore, ideal as the words are. They are conceptually related to form a meaning. Being conceptual they are universals and not individuals. The relation between names and objects starts from the universal word to the universal object. The meaning of a name is the universal and not an individual. Logically a name means not an individual but the universal.<sup>1</sup> In our experience a name means an individual participating in the universal.<sup>2</sup>

The meaning of verbs may also be similarly explained. Verbs mean action. Action is succession. In experience we have this or that kind of succession and not succession in general. But a particular succession is recognised as a succession because it participates in the universal succession. In experience a verb means a particular succession participating in the universal succession. But according to the logic applied in the case of names verbs always stand for the universal action or succession.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. V. P. III-I. 32-33.

2. *ibid.* I. 62-63.

3. *ibid.* III-I. 35.



Both names and verbs logically mean universals and experientially they mean individuals. As these two parts exhaust the whole language, the language itself is the language of universals and not of individuals. But for our practical purposes we recognise the role of individuals in our language.

Now, the question is : how are names related to verbs. According to our analysis this question assumes two forms : How are these names related to verbs ideally and how are they related practically. As our practical life depends upon the ideal, the explanation holding good in the ideal sphere must hold good in the practical sphere as well.

The relation of the given to succession in our ideas is that of causation. The given causes succession in various ways. A name representing the given causes an action or makes an action possible. An action is not possible in itself. In our spoken language this causation is expressed by 'cases'.<sup>1</sup> What are these cases and how many are they is the question that we shall consider in the body of this book. Similarly the relation of time to succession will be discussed in a later chapter. The details of the analysis of verbs into roots and suffixes and prefixes form a subject for our subsequent study. Here we only try to justify the inclusion of meaning as a theme for logic and syntax. We have tried to show that the meaning is of vital importance for logic. In syntax we are primarily concerned with meaning. When we consider the relation of various parts of speech to each other and when we analyse verbs and names into further elements such as roots, prefixes and suffixes and try to assess their contribution to the whole sentence we are primarily concerned with meaning.

---

1. (a) V. P. III-VII. 1

(b) Helārāja on the above.

The consideration of meaning is possible in epistemology because our knowledge cannot get rid of words. It may be included in metaphysics too, because meaning in its supreme form is nothing more than the pure Existence. It is included in logic because the meaning when expressed in language admits of finer analysis in names, verbs, roots, cases etc. etc. and it is the concern of logic to study their relation and their contribution to totality. Hence the consideration of meaning in philosophy is fully justified.<sup>1</sup>

1. (a) sarvavedapâriṣadam bīdam śāstram.

M. B. 1. 1. 1.

(b) V. P. I, 11-22.



## CHAPTER III

### SPEECH AND ITS PARTS

Speech is a collection of sounds ( or of lines, if written ) arranged in a certain way and endowed with the power to convey some sense.<sup>1</sup> In other words, it is in verbal form and bears a meaning. Those forms of words which do not yield any sense to any one are not taken as speech. On the other hand, a sense when not put in words is not the concern of any one. Meaning unexpressed in words does not make any sense and, therefore, is not called as speech. Only when words uttered are related to a certain sense in the mind of the speaker with an intention to convey that sense to his hearers, then alone the product is known as speech. Mere words or mere meanings do not constitute speech. To make a speech both of them are necessary ; words are forms of speech of which the meaning is content.

Thus the study of speech is always the study of meaningful speech. Again, no study of meaning is ever possible without the study of the speech in which it is expressed. We cannot know the intention of a man unless he expresses himself in words. There are other ways of expression also. A man may express himself by waving his hands or by expanding and contracting his eyes in peculiar ways or even by his facial changes. Certainly these are also the forms in which a man may express himself, but these expressions are rather obscure and do not yield accurate results. Speech, on the other hand, aims at accuracy in conveying a meaning. It is the most accurate, easy and popular way to convey a meaning. The study of meaning, therefore, begins with the study of speech.

---

1. pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ucyate —M. B. 1.1.1.

As has been said, the speech has a formal aspect. The formal speech, in ordinary discourse, is called language. There be many languages, and they may widely differ from each other ; that need not concern us here. We are not concerned with the study of each and every way of the expression of meaning. Linguists may take delight in it. Our concern with language is limited. We have to see and examine the characteristic of language as such. We may try to find out what logically follows from the conception of language. We have to see the most general and yet the most essential characteristic of language. This is the maximum that we require from the study of language.

## I

### THE UNIT OF SPEECH

#### ( 1 )

Speech is the vehicle of meaning. Its primary aim is to bear and convey meaning from the speaker to the hearer. Meaning is that which the speaker wants his hearers to know after he has spoken. For this purpose the speaker takes the help of language. Language is the means to achieve this end. Thus that much of language which is sufficient to carry the meaning of the speaker is employed by the speaker. The amount of language may vary in different cases. It may be only one word, or it may occupy thousands of pages to convey the complete sense of the speaker. It depends upon the nature of meaning. There is no hard and fast rule for the use of the maximum amount of language. The *Iliad* or the *Rāmāyaṇa* is one full expression of its author. Homer or Vālmiki has used that much of language to express his meaning. This fuller expression is called Mahāvākya.

There may not be any maximum limit for the use of language. But we may try to find out the minimum that must



be used by a speaker in order to convey certain meaning. The speaker says something about some fact. Something cannot be said about nothing. There must be some fact, some point or nucleus around which the speech of the speaker revolves. 'Dr. Rajendra Prasad is the first President of the Indian Republic', is an example. The speaker of this sentence says something about 'Dr. Rajendra Prasad', 'the first President' and 'Indian Republic'. All these are facts. About these facts he says something. He posits some relation among these facts. This positing of relation among facts is technically called 'judging'. Judging is a mental activity and it centres around facts. This mental activity cannot itself be the object of our investigation. We can study it only when it is formally expressed. The formal expression of judging about facts is called 'proposition' in logic.<sup>1</sup> Facts in themselves are neither true nor false. 'The first President of the Indian Republic' is neither true nor false. We cannot attribute truth or falsity to that. But the whole proposition 'Dr. Rajendra Prasad is the first President of the Indian Republic' may be true or false as the case may be. Truth and falsity can be attributed only to propositions and not to facts. Those forms of language which are true or false are called propositions. It follows, therefore, that commands, requests, exclamatory sentences and expressive sighs are not propositions because they are neither true nor false.<sup>2</sup> 'Truth and falsehood are co-extensive with judgment' says Bosanquet<sup>3</sup>.

Logic is concerned with truth. It investigates the conditions of truth. It is called *pramāṇa śāstra* or the science of truth. Its subject-matter, therefore, is only that which is capable of being true or not-true. That which can neither

---

1. Cohen and Nagal: "An Introduction to Logic and scientific Method". p. 28.

2. Stebbing, L. S. 'A modern Introduction to Logic' Ch. IV.

3. Logic. Vol. I, Ch. 1 (Here Bosanquet means by 'Judgment' what we call proposition. )

be true nor false is not the subject matter of logic. Facts are not studied in logic, because they are mere facts devoid of truth or falsity. It is only when some judgment is made about facts, that logic enters and studies the expressed judgment or proposition. But being a universal science logic does not take into consideration the form of a proposition, or to be more precise, logic does not study the language in which a proposition is expressed. The study of language does not belong to the province of logic. This means that a proposition, although expressed in a language is different from languages. 'I think, therefore, I am'; '*Cogito ergo sum*' and '*je pense donc je suis*' are different expressions expressing one and the same proposition.<sup>1</sup> Pramāṇa is, therefore, that which is expressed by words and not words themselves, implies Patanjali by saying 'śabda-pramāṇakā vayam; yacchabda āha tad asmākam pramāṇam.'<sup>2</sup> A proposition, therefore, must be expressed in a language otherwise it is useless; but a particular language is not necessary to express a particular proposition. A proposition must acquire a form but that form need not be specific. And again, those forms of language which are capable of being true or false are propositions and other forms are only expressions of facts.

Propositions are meant by those forms of language in which they are expressed. Those forms themselves are not propositions. In the above-mentioned example one and the same proposition is meant by different forms of languages. A form of a language expressing a proposition is called a sentence. A sentence has a definite form and also expresses a definite meaning which can be true or false. (We postpone for a while the consideration of those sentences which do not express a proposition). 'I think, therefore, I am' is a sentence. It has its definite form. We cannot change the constituents of this sentence because then it would either change its meaning or

---

1. 'A Modern Introduction to Logic', *ibid*.

2. M. B. 1. 1. 1.



would become meaningless, nor can we replace this by '*Je pense, donc, je suis*', because the latter is an altogether different sentence although having the same meaning as the former. Thus we may define a sentence, for the time being, at least, as that unit of a language the meaning of which can be true or false.

This provisional definition of sentence assumes that although sentences mean propositions they are not themselves propositions. There is a distinction between a sentence and a proposition which it refers to. "A sentence" to quote from Cohen and Nagel, "is a group of words, and words like other symbols are in themselves like physical objects, distinct from that to which they refer or which they symbolize. Sentences when written are thus located on certain surfaces, and when spoken are sound waves passing from one organism to another.....Sentences, therefore, have a physical existence... But they are not true or false. Truth or falsity can be predicated only of propositions they signify.<sup>1</sup>" But every combination of words which has an appearance of a sentence does not mean a proposition. 'Walking sat eat very', for example, does not express a proposition. In order to make a sentence meaningful, rules of grammar and usage concerning that particular language to which that sentence belongs, must be followed. The importance of grammar lies in this point. Grammar makes the expression of propositions in language possible. Without the help of grammar a sentence cannot be meaningful because it cannot adequately express a proposition. Thus for logic language is of as much importance as propositions. Logic cannot go without grammar and language. They are necessarily connected with logic.

(2)

Thus far we have studied those forms of language which express a proposition, i. e. the meaning of which can either

---

1. 'An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method', p. 27.

be true or false. Logic in the West recognises only such sentences as expressions of propositions. The founder of Western logic, Aristotle, has set forth this for the first time in his *De Interpretatione*. He says 'yet every sentence is not a proposition, only such proposition as have in them truth or falsity.'<sup>1</sup> Those other forms of sentences which express meaning which can neither be true nor false, in other words the meaning of which is neutral, do not express propositions. There can, thus, easily be two sets of sentences in language. There are sentences the meaning of which can either be true or false and secondly there are sentences the meaning of which is 'neutral'. In modern terminology we may say that the sentences of the former category are 'verifiable', while the latter being unverifiable are nonsense. Commands, requests, exclamatory sentences or prayers being unverifiable i. e. their meaning being neither true nor false, do not express a proposition. They however have meaning. Thus in the western system of logic meaning and proposition are regarded as distinct.

But what is the reason for this separation between a propositional and an ordinary sentence or rather, between a meaning which is at the same time a proposition and a simple meaning? Can meaning remain without a proposition? The main reason for this distinction seems to be the metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotle. For Aristotle, Being is general and universal. It is the cause of occurrence and change. It is this through which and out of which a particular is to be conceived. The task of true science is to see how the particular follows from the general. In other words the general is the ground by means of which a particular is proved. Scientific explanation of phenomena by Being is, therefore, based upon the deduction of particular from general. The aim of science is to exhibit the necessity with which a particular follows from the general cause. The task of science,

---

1. Aristotle : 'De Interpretatione,' 17 a, I.



according to Aristotle, is to show the dependence of the particular upon the general. This consideration has led him to formulate the rule of subordination of concepts in syllogism. His 'doctrine of syllogism' has to do only with the knowledge of those forms of thought according to which it is to be decided, with the help of an intermediate concept, whether a subordination of one concept under another occurs or not.<sup>1</sup> By this he has shown that only propositions of a lesser degree of generality could be deduced from those of higher generality and not *vice versa*.

Apart from this subordination of concepts in syllogism the general metaphysical considerations of Aristotle have led to another important consequence. The true Being manifests itself in the phenomenal world. It is the essence of the world of our experience. Aristotle calls this essence as Matter. Matter is the possibility of that which, in the complete thing, has become actual. This actualisation of essence is possible only through forms. Occurrence is the process in which the essence passes over from mere possibility, through form, into actualisation. We can know the essence only in process ; i. e. only when it realises its possibility in forms. The universal is real only in particulars and particulars are there because of the universal realising itself in it. Thus only by abstraction can we differentiate between Form and Matter. The knowledge of an *Idea* as excluded from any occurrence is impossible. We can know it only as *occurring*. In other words the subject of our knowledge must be in a form or to be more precise, it must be qualified. Our knowledge must in subject-predicate form. Therefore for Aristotle a proposition is always in the subject-predicate form with a copula in—between asserting their relation.

Agreement of a predicate with a particular subject is the basis for truth or falsity of a particular proposition while the

---

1. Windelband : 'A History of Philosophy'. p. 135.

subordination of a concept under a more general concept is the basis of the validity of proof or conclusion in syllogism. If mortality agrees with humanity, the proposition 'All men are mortal' is true, otherwise not. Similarly if Socrates is included in the class of human beings then the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal' is true ; otherwise the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Thus the agreement or disagreement between two concepts (subject and predicate) and subordination of one under the other is very essential for scientific thinking and reasoning in the grand system of Aristotelean logic.

Since the subject-copula-predicate form is the only possible logical form in which knowledge can manifest itself, all sentences in order to be examined as true or false must be restated in that form. And only in this way their role in a syllogism can be judged. All statements of matters of fact when restated in this subject-predicate form can easily be shown to be true or false by examining the agreement or disagreement between the subject and the predicate. It is necessary for a true proposition that its subject must agree with the predicate. It is immaterial whether they have agreed in past, or they agree at present or they will agree in a time to come. The place of time in a proposition is of no value. "Brutus killed Caesar" is an example where Brutus and 'the killer of Caesar, agreed in the past. And yet the proposition "Brutus is the killer of Caesar" is true. Similarly, "All the products of the Indian Steel Corporation will bear the mark of lion" is a statement concerning the time yet to come. But the proposition expressed by that sentence may be true or false, because it is definite that the predicate can or cannot agree with the subject. The speaker is definite about the agreement between the subject and the predicate. One takes or does not take the agreement between subject and predicate as definite and certain. When the speaker is indefinite about the correspondence between them, when he prays, hopes, commands, requests or exclaims something to occur about a subject, he is



not definite about their agreement. Thus there is uncertainty about agreement and so the predication of the subject is not capable of truth or falsity. Sentences expressing such uncertain states of relation between a subject and a predicate do not mean a proposition and are not fit for syllogistic reasoning and for drawing valid results.

Thus Aristotle resolutely holds that sentences expressing prayer, command, hope, request and exclamation do not mean proposition, i.e. their meaning is not capable of being true or false. The speaker of such sentences is not certain about the agreement between the subject and the predicate of such sentences. The meaning of such sentences is not *capable* of being true or false at the time the sentence is used. 'O Lord forgive my sins' is, for example, a sentence expressing a request. The man praying to be forgiven is not sure that Lord will forgive his sins; that the concepts 'Lord' and 'the forgiver of sin' are not taken to agree or disagree at that time. Lord will be forgiver or not is not certain in his mind; the speaker merely hopes that they should agree. This state of hope does not imply a definite attitude of the speaker about their correspondence. As soon as this state of indefiniteness in the mind of the speaker is replaced by a definite attitude towards the correspondence of the two concepts, the statement, 'Lord will forgive my sins', will mean a proposition which can be true or false. Thus Aristotle had justified himself for separating the two types of sentences, i.e. those expressing propositions and those stating the neutral meaning. This is the explanation for separating the meaning from proposition which originated in the fertile mind of Aristotle and has come down to us through the ages.

( 3 )

This distinction between propositionary and ordinary sentences may seem quite reasonable at its face value. But when one sets out to examine it thoroughly it displays the lack

of insight into the nature of sentences expressing prayer, command, request and exclamation. As has been shown, Aristotle does not recognise definiteness of attitude of the speaker towards the relation of predication in such sentences. Let us take a sentence: 'Study scriptures'. When this sentence is explained it becomes somewhat like this: 'I command you to study scriptures.' The sentence does not only mean the study of scripture but an order to study scriptures. 'Study scriptures' is an abbreviated form of 'I order you to study scriptures.' Let us put the sentence in a context. 'I was annoyed by his ignorance of the fundamental principles of morality. So I told him "Study scriptures"'. If we state the abbreviated sentence "Study scriptures" more fully in this context it would read "So I told him : I order you to study scriptures" and not simply "So I told him to study scriptures", because the sentence implies an order or command, the subject of which is the speaker himself and not the person to whom it is addressed and the fact of ordering to do certain act is predicated of the speaker himself who is the real subject. The speaker is definite about himself that he is making an order. Thus the meaning of this sentence can be true or false as of any other so called propositionary sentences. In this sense there need not be any distinction between the two types of sentences as advocated by Aristotle.

Aristotle mistook the person to whom an order, request or prayer is made to be the real subject of the sentence, while the real subject of the sentence is the person who prays, orders or requests. The use of verbs in these sentences is the cause of this mistake. In the present example the verb 'to study' is used as 'study' which presupposes an agent who can study. The agent of 'study' is surely the person to whom it is addressed. But being used in the imperative mood it presupposes also a person who makes a command or order. Thus the use of the verb presupposes another agent, i. e. one who orders or commands. It has, therefore, two agents. But as



the person to whom an order is made is immediate and the person making such an order is made understood, the sentence "Study scriptures" appears to have only one subject. But really there being two agents of the verb 'study' the sentence needs expansion. The whole sentence may thus be analysed in two forms 'I order' and 'you study the scripture.' When these two parts are put together to form one whole it becomes 'I order you to study scriptures'. This sentence is capable of being true or false. If in my heart I do not wish the person so ordered to study the scriptures the sentence refers to a false meaning, otherwise it is true. A poet says: "Hopes are dupes" because false hopes can be raised. According to Aristotle no hope can be false (or true), because the sentence expressing hopes cannot mean a proposition.

Thus, Aristotle has failed to recognise the nature of prayer, command or exclamation because of the abbreviated use of verbs in grammar. He could not see these sentences in their analysed form. This mistake accounts for the false distinction between those sentences the meaning of which can be true or false and those the meaning of which is neutral. This wrong distinction is blindly followed even to-day in logic.

( 4 )

In India no such distinction was ever attempted. The meaning of every sentence is capable of being true or false. The theory of *svataḥ-prāmānya-vāda* advocated by the Mīmāṃsā school of Indian thought holds that the meaning of every sentence, as soon as the sentence is uttered, is taken as true. 'Intrinsic validity belongs to all sources of right knowledge, for a power, by itself non-existent, cannot be brought into being by another.' says Kumārila.<sup>1</sup> Knowledge gives rise to the sense of its own validity and the verbal

---

1. S. V. 2. 47.

knowledge being a legitimate knowledge is intrinsically valid, i. e. it is at the first sight true. It may become false, but it is not neither true nor false. Thus the meaning of every sentence is always either true or false. There is no such sentence in the whole world the meaning of which is neutral. Every sentence means a proposition.

The purpose of language is, thus, to communicate a thing which can either be true or false. In other words, language always communicates propositions. We may safely employ this criterion to assess the minimum of language that must be used in order to make the hearer understand the speaker. That form of language which communicates truth or falsity should be the unit of language. The form of language expressing a proposition is called sentence. A sentence means an idea as occurring in the actual world of experience. An idea devoid of occurrence is unintelligible and an occurrence without something that occurs is impossible. In the sphere of logic we may say that a subject must have a predicate, i. e. only a subject or a predicate is worthless for right thinking. A linguist may say that in language the use of a name and a verb is imperative. The use of a name without any reference to some sort of activity attributed to it has no meaning, and similarly a verb cannot but have a name which it may qualify. The reason for this is that the hearer of a mere name or of a verb cannot form any judgment and thus he is dissatisfied by the use.

On certain occasions a mere name or a verb is used and its meaning is clearly understood by the hearer. If in the silence of a dark night a man cries "Thief!" his neighbours cannot have any doubt in understanding that a thief is about. Thus it is argued that even single words have meaning and a sentence may not be regarded as the unit of language. This argument does not seem very convincing. Although in this particular case full meaning is understood by the use of one single word but it will be clear on close



examination that the circumstance in which the word is used supplements the word 'thief' with other words in order to make one complete sentence in the mind of hearers. In that circumstance the word is definitely used to mean that a thief is about. The word 'thief' is only an abbreviated form of a full sentence. Where the hearer of a word cannot find a definite context to supplement a solitary word used, he asks : about the thing and is satisfied only when he gets a proposition. If a man says 'pen' when he is talking to his friend about some matter of business, his friend is puzzled. He asks 'What about pen?' By this question he shows that he is unable to form a proposition in his mind; he is at a loss to understand the meaning of the word uttered before him. Either the sound has no significance and in that case he thinks that his friend has become mad or if it is used to convey some sense let that sense be forthcoming by supplementing the word. Certainly his friend has not become mad because he was talking about his business sanely. He has the second alternative in his mind and requests his friend to use a full sentence in order to make some meaning possible. Patanjali, therefore, is of the opinion that where no verb is used with a name one must add an appropriate verb to make sense.' A single word has no meaning. 'Only in the context of a proposition has a name a meaning' says Wittgenstein. Names, in order to be meaningful, require a context and that context is supplied only in a sentence. Hence no meaning is possible without a sentence. Sentence is the unit of language.

- 
1. (a) *astir bhavantīparah prathamapuruṣo' prayujyamāno' py-  
astīti gamyate, vṛkṣaḥ plakṣaḥ astīti gamyate.*

—M.B. 2 3.11.

- (b) *jñātam vastu param pratipādayitum śabdaḥ prayujyate.  
jñānam ca sata iti yatra kriyā-padāntarasya prayogas  
tatrotargataḥ sattāpratītirityastīti kriyā-  
padānuṣāṅgāt..... Kaiyata on the above.*

Language is, therefore, a verbal statement of truth or falsity. The content of language is proposition and its form is supplied by sounds that express the proposition. Sounds are momentary; they are produced and destroyed every moment. A sentence is a combination of these momentary sounds arranged in a certain order.

## II

## PARTS OF SPEECH

## ( 1 )

If we can divide the proposition which is expressed in language, the language itself will automatically admit of division. As a sentence corresponds to propositions so also a part of a sentence will correspond to a part of that proposition. Can we then divide a proposition?

A proposition is defined as that which can either be true or false and expresses the essence as occurring. There is an essence, a Being, and there is a form in which it is expressed. Can these two be presented separately? Can we say of a Being without at the same time referring to its occurrence? Can Form and Matter be separated? On this question philosophers differ widely. Some are of opinion that they can really be separated and thus there may be real parts of speech. Others hold that a sentence does not consist of words, it is indivisible because a proposition does not admit of division. According to the former view the essence can be separated from its occurrence and according to the latter view they cannot be separated. The division of propositions into concepts and that of sentences into names and verbs are real according to the former view but the latter view takes them as unreal distinctions.

If we remember our previous reference to Form and Matter in propositions we can very well understand the discussion that follows. The question of relation between Being



and Becoming is very old. It is present alike in the philosophies of the East and the West. The world of experience is everchanging. There is substance and there is change. Some people take substance and change as separate from each other. According to them they are united by chance or by some outer agency. Others do not admit such separation and they recognise that the change cannot be possible without something that changes and a substance that does not change at all cannot be known. To some, only change is real, the conception of Reality is, to them, only a construction of the human mind. In other words, either Being is the only real thing, or Becoming is the only real explanation of the world of existence. There may be a third way in which both Being and Becoming are united. Both of them put together are real. But in this view also some philosophers emphasise the Being aspect of the combination and others take Becoming as predominant. We can call the first view as realistic and the second as nominalistic. The third view is conceptualistic with two different shades of emphasis. In India Vedânta, Buddhism, Nyâya and Mîmâṃsâ are the advocates of these views.

A proposition according to the conceptualistic view, is a combination of two concepts, viz., the concept of essence and the concept of change. Reality is their combination, each of them in itself is not real, only their combination is perfectly real. But each concept can be conceived as different from the other at least in abstraction. Concepts are possible within propositions and thus sentence can be divided into words.

In the realm of language although the sentence is the unit of language yet it has subdivisions. It is a combination of words. Words are primary units of a sentence while the sentence itself is the unit of language. Words are at the root of language. Sentences may have a very important place in meaningful language, yet they are not of primary impor-

tance. Words are prior to sentences; sentences are combinations of words.<sup>1</sup>

Upto this point both the schools of Nyâya and Mīmāṃsā agree. But they have difference of opinion about the relation of words to each other in a sentence. The former holds that words in a sentence are pregnant with a string of relation to other words. A word by itself is related to other words of a sentence. The latter holds that words are independent of each other. They are united only in a sentence. According to the former a sentence is a *construction* of words and according to the latter the sentence is only a *combination* of words. In philosophy they are known by the name of anvitâbhidhâna vâda and abhihitânvyaya vâda respectively. This difference of opinion is owing to the particular metaphysical view advocated by each school.

( 2 )

Words make a sentence. Words are the parts of a sentence. Sentence is a whole. According to the Nyâya philosophy the whole is different from its parts. It is something over and above its constituents. Constituents of a whole are primary, but they give rise to a whole which embodies something more than all the constituents put together. The whole is not a sum total of its parts; it is something more. There are some peculiarities in the whole which cannot be found in parts taken in isolation. A body, for example, is an aggregate of atoms and it is visible, but its constituents (the atoms) are not visible. The visibility of a body arises only when atoms are united in a relation. Atoms are beyond human perception,

- 
1. (a) tadevam ekasmṛtisamāroheṇa ekārthâvacchedena padânām samūho vākyam.

—Vācaspati on Nyâya Sūtra, 1.1.1.

- (b) na anapeksya padārthān pārthagarthyaena vākyam arthāntara-prasiddham.

—Śābara Bhāṣya 1.1 25.



yet their aggregate is perceivable. If the whole is not different from the sum total of its parts, a body could not be visible to our eyes. But as we see a body we can infer that the whole is different from its parts. Parts when united give rise to some quality which is not found in them taken individually. There is a difference between aggregate and whole. Aggregate may not be different from its parts but the whole is certainly a different entity. A jungle, for example, may be an aggregate of trees, but a piece of cloth is not an aggregate of threads. The difference between these two examples is that in the former a relation among constituents is lacking while in the latter constituents are related to each other. This particular relation is called *samavāya* or inherence. The whole inheres in parts. Parts are not free. They have an integral and internal relation to their whole. A part when taken from the whole of which it is a part speaks for itself and also for the whole. The thread of a piece of cloth is at one and the same time a thread and also a thread belonging to the cloth. Parts cannot remain divorced from its whole<sup>1</sup>.

This view when applied in the case of language gives rise to *anvitābhidhāna vāda*. A word being a part of the whole sentence is always related to the sentence. A word means its own referend and also the sentence to which it belongs. Cooking is affected by the combination of various means. It is achieved by fire, water, pot, fuel and many other things taken together. All these are parts of cooking but they have also their separate existence. Fuel burns in its own capacity and cooks in its capacity of being a member of the whole cooking.<sup>2</sup>

- 
1. (a) *tasmāt samuditāṇusamayasthānasya arthāntarasya—jāti-  
viśeṣa-bhivṛtyaktiviśayatvād avayavyarthāntarabhūta iti.*

—Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya 2.1.36.

- (b) *Vārtika and Tīkā on N.S. 2.1.33-36.*

2. *Nyāya Manjarī. p. 366.*

Each word means a sentence in its own way, but each word is not sufficient to mean the whole proposition. But at the same time each word is indispensable for the sentence. Each leg of a table is not sufficient in itself to hold the table but at the same time each leg is indispensable for holding the table. Thus words in a sentence have their individual meaning : they have their separate existence but at the same time they are not entirely free. They are related to the sentence and mean the whole proposition. In other words, words mean as parts of a sentence; there is not a single word which can have a meaning entirely divorced from its reference to a sentence or proposition.<sup>1</sup>

But if a word has meaning only in a sentence how is it that people learn the meaning of words first and combine these of their own accord in various forms to form a sentence ? A child first learns words. He is not taught sentence at first. If the meaning of sentences is primary and over and above words, the hearing of an entirely new sentence will not convey meaning to the hearer. It will be like a new word. This difficulty may be overcome by stressing the role of individual words in sentences. Words are not denied their independent meaning. They have their own meaning. Their relation to the sentence in each case is determined by context, proximity of other words, intention of the speaker etc. As soon as the meaning of a word in one sentence is known, wherever that word will occur the meaning of it would be known. Thus a sentence may be entirely new but when the meaning of words constituting it is known the meaning of the sentence is automatically realised. The sentence may be entirely new to the hearer, but its constituents are not new. The novelty of a sentence lies not in words but in the context, proximity, intention etc. of words. Words have their own meaning but only in a context; the context may vary but words have the same meaning. The maximum

---

1. *ibid.* p. 368.



requirement for the meaning of a word is some context and not a particular context. In this sense a word has meaning in some context. 'A word always has some relation to a context; it cannot mean independently. This nature of words is emphasised by the phrase *anvitâbhidhâna vâda*<sup>1</sup>. When applied in the realm of concepts this theory is called *samsargatâ vâda* or the theory of relational conceptualism. We shall consider this theory in a later chapter when we shall deal with the *śābdabodha*.

( 3 )

The theory of *anvitâbhidhâna* is countered by offering the theory of *abhihitânvaya vâda*. The *Mīmāṃsā* school of Indian philosophy does not subscribe to the views advocated by the *Nyāya* school. The relation of parts to the whole is not, according to the *Mīmāṃsā*, an organic relation. The whole is a combination of parts put together. The whole is not something different from its constituents. The aggregate of parts is called a whole. Constituting parts are free in themselves and when they are put together they yield the consciousness of unity and novelty. But really speaking the whole does not contain in itself any thing that is not in its constituting parts. Jungle is not different from trees which are in it.<sup>2</sup> The apparent unity in a jungle is an illusion. Because when trees are seen from a distance they produce an illusion of unity ; many trees seem put together in one whole. But really they are trees and there is nothing as a collection of trees which we call by the single name 'jungle'. Jungle is a name given for convenience in communication to trees as 'army' is the name given to soldiers.<sup>3</sup>

1. *ibid.* p. 367.

2. *tasyā' pyatyantabhinnaṭvam na syād avayavaiḥ saha. vyaktibhyo jātivac caṣa na nikṛṣṭaḥ prtiyate,*

—Śloka Vārtika. 18.75.76.

3. *ibid.* 54. 56.

The introduction of samavâya is illogical. Parts do not have a peculiar relation to the whole. They are self-subsisting and do not need the help of others for their existence. The only justification for the acceptance of the relation of inherence is that the whole contains some qualities which are not found in individual parts. This quality is produced by the organic combination of parts. But a piece of cloth does not seem different from the threads of which it is made. A piece of cloth can occupy more space than one single thread because it is a combination of threads and naturally many threads will occupy more space than one thread, as many pots will occupy more space than one single pot. We do not find something extraordinary in the whole which is not found in its parts. The quality of the whole is not different from the qualities of parts taken together. The colour of threads is the colour of the cloth also. Threads of yellow colour cannot produce red cloth. Atoms are invisible, but their combination in a body is visible<sup>1</sup>. The reason for this is not that the body is something distinct from atoms of which it is made, but the quality of visibility is imposed. Just as a piece of hair is not visible from a distance, but a lock of hair can be seen so also an atom may not be visible but its aggregate can be seen. But atoms are invisible while the hair is visible, therefore this simile may not hold good. The only explanation left for the Mîmâmsâ is that the visibility in a body is illusory as the unity of jungle is imposed upon individuals. The aggregate of atoms is visible because atoms have united to form a body. A body is nothing but atoms and its visibility is owing to aggregation of atoms.

Words being parts of a sentence are meaningful in themselves. Every word has its own meaning. It does not depend upon other words for its meaning. It has no relation to other words of a sentence. When words are used in close proximity

---

1. Sâstradîpikâ. p. 106, 107.



with an intention to communicate some meaning to a hearer words take the shape of a sentence. But being members of sentences they have some obligation to other members also. They are not completely detached from the sentence for their meaning. They express their meaning independently but this meaning is incomplete, it becomes complete only in a sentence. Sentence is, therefore, necessary for a full meaning. But nevertheless every word has its own meaning also. Sentence is a completely meaningful combination of incompletely meaningful words.<sup>1</sup>

The reality of a whole is not denied. A sentence is real but it is completely false that a sentence is something new. It is nothing more than words combined. Words are primary and the sentence is secondary. Any one who makes a statement takes resort first to words and in order to make himself complete uses a sentence. Someone sees a patch of white colour at a distance, hears the peculiar sound that horses make, and at the same time he hears the clattering of hoofs. He then infers that a horse is running and says. 'A white horse is running.' This sentence is really a combination of words 'white', 'horse' and 'running.' Any kind of knowledge presupposes words as primary units and sentences as secondary units.<sup>2</sup> A child learns words first and sentences afterwards. Those who do not understand the meaning of words used in a sentence do not understand the meaning of the sentence also. If a sentence is different from words, there may be some possible instances where one would understand the meaning of a sentence without understanding the meaning of the constituting words. A sentence is not a new construction which is different from its constituents. Words have their independent meaning in a sentence. A sentence does not have independent existence.<sup>3</sup> This theory advocated

---

1. padārtha eva tāvat parasparānvita vākyārtha ity ucyate.

—Nyāyaratnamāla. P. 77.

2. S. V. 23. 350-51

3. ibid. 23. 328-39

by the Pūrva Mimāṃsā school of Indian philosophy is called abhihitānvayavāda.

( 4 )

Kumārila says that his philosophy does not take resort to those facts which are contrary to our experience.<sup>2</sup> To a man in the street words are of primary importance. He does not take much delight in sentences; he is content with words he may come across. The reality of sentence is dependent upon words. Words form the backbone of language. If word are not there, the existence of a sentence is impossible. If there is no 'horse', no 'white' and no 'running' the sentence 'White horse is running' would become impossible. It is contrary to our experience in every-day life to say that words always await a relation to other words in order to form a sentence. No one ever waits to hear other words in order to know the meaning of a word. As soon as a single word isolated from a sentence is uttered the hearer knows the meaning of that word. This is the reason why he asks for other words to complete a meaning. Suppose someone says 'horse', the hearer immediately knows the meaning of the word 'horse' and then asks his friend 'what about 'horse'? I he had not known the meaning of the word 'horse' uttered isolatedly how could he have asked the question about it. This shows that a sentence is not necessary for the meaning of a word. A word does not depend upon a sentence or its meaning; it may await completion of its meaning in a sentence but that is another question.

The view of Nyāya presents practical difficulties. No one understands the meaning of sentences without first knowing the meaning of words constituting it. If a word has its own meaning it is useless to say that it has a relation to the whole. If it can have its own meaning without the sentence then it is independent and does not presuppose a whole. In a sentence the constituting words do not acquire



some new meaning. The word 'horse' has the same meaning both within and without a sentence. There is not a single instance where a word has different meanings within and without the sentences. This has led some Naiyâyikas like Jayanta to reject the much honoured Naiyâyika view of anvitâbhidhâna vâda.<sup>1</sup> But the other view also is equally defective. In our experience we do regard a whole as distinct from parts put together. The body of a man is certainly distinct from hands, feet, neck, chest etc. etc. It is certainly more than the sum total of limbs. The Mîmâṃsâ overlooks the unitary character of the organism or the whole and reduces it to parts of which the whole is made. But there is a distinction between an organic whole and an aggregation. The heap of bricks does not make house; a house is not only a heap of bricks. In an organic whole parts have mutual relation without which the existence of a whole is impossible. To call an organic whole illusion shows recklessness of mind. There are qualities of the whole which may not be found in any of its constituents. To call such quality as illusory is against human experience. No one ever finds himself contradicted when he recognises a whole as distinct from its parts. In its zeal to over-simplify the experience the Mîmâṃsâ has reduced the reality of a whole to illusion. Disapproval of samavâya is the main cause of this difficulty.<sup>2</sup> The Mîmâṃsâ in the realm of metaphysics presents a very poor show.

Words seem to have their independent meaning but on close examination we can see that single words also have an indirect relation to a sentence. The word 'horse' has its meaning because the hearer of the word associates the word with other words like 'is there', in his mind. When he finds many such words with which he can associate the word and is unable to find a clue to associate the word with certain words only and not with others he asks the speaker 'what

1. Nyâyamanjarî. p. 369.

2. S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy Vol. 2. p. 428-29

about the horse' ? The question does not demand a context to be supplied by the speaker himself but he asks to specify a particular context in which the word 'horse' is used. Although the word 'horse' has its meaning but it is not complete until a sentence is given. The incompleteness of meaning shows that the word is not independent. It requires the help of other words or sentence to complete its meaning.

The Mīmāṃsā says that words have their independent meaning, but when they arouse some inquiry (âkâṅkṣâ) in the mind of the speaker or the hearer they are grouped together to form a sentence. The sentence is, therefore, a group of incomplete words (sâkâṅkṣa) awaiting their completion in a context. The sentence itself is nirâkâṅkṣa, while words of a sentence are sâkâṅkṣa. The âkâṅkṣâ of other words for the meaning of a word is itself a proof to show that words do not have their independent meaning. If words would have their own meaning they would never have been in need of other words to complete their meaning. This rise of the consciousness of meaning from utterance of a single word is only illusion. Words do not have their own meaning. They have meaning only in a sentence. Similarly, the definition of sentence as a 'group of individual words put independent of each other' is untenable and illogical. It also does not recognise the unity of a whole sentence.

The definition of the sentence as an organic whole in which words are integrally related to each other recognises 'relation' (samsarga) as the meaning of sentence. Words have their own meaning but they also have a relation to each other, besides their individual meaning. This relational meaning is the differentia of sentence. This is the new element which a sentence produces and which is not the contribution of the constituting words. Words have their own meaning but they also have something besides; they embody and presuppose other words of a sentence. But how do these words happen to have their own meaning without a sentence ? If words for



their meaning depend upon a sentence, how can they have their independent meaning prior to sentence? If words are dependent upon sentences for their meaning they cannot have their separate meaning. If they have separate meaning it is not quite consistent to say that words depend for their meaning upon sentences. If the supremacy of sentence is acknowledged words lose their significance. As has been shown meaning is not possible without sentences; sentences are primary units of language. If this is acknowledged words are unreal abstractions of real sentence. The division of sentence is logically impossible. We cannot reduce languages to words. Hence the questions of *abhihitân vāya vāda* and *anvitābhīdhāna vāda* do not arise at all. Sentence is one indivisible whole having no real parts.

### III

#### MEANING IN USE

The consciousness of parts in a sentence arises by repetition and concomittant variation<sup>1</sup>. Similar sounds heard at various occasions becomes a definite word meaning a definite object. In 'He goes' 'They have gone' 'John will go' the sound of 'go' is constantly found and thus the sound stands for a certain meaning. Where that does not occur the meaning is not found. If we replace 'go' by 'cast' the meaning is altogether changed. The primitive man must have learnt to dissociate words from sentence only in this way. The attributing of meaning to words also is arbitrary. It is not based on a definite principle. The word 'cat' means a particular object not because of some necessity but because of the arbitrary intention of the initiator who for the first time would have given a meaning to that sound.

Sentence is only a collection of momentary sounds. Sound cannot remain for more than one moment. This being the

1. *abhyāsāt pratibhā hetuḥ śabdāḥ sarvoparaiḥ smṛtāḥ.*  
*bālānāṃ tiraścām ca yathārthapratipādanā.* —V.P.II. 119.

case a sentence is altogether impossible. We cannot have a collection of momentary sounds. As soon as the next sound is produced the previous sound vanishes. This logical impossibility of sentence is very important to establish sentence as the unit of language. Every sound uttered leaves its impression upon the mind of the hearer and he then recollects his impressions and knows the meaning of the sentence. Thus a sentence is reduced to the impression in the mind of the hearer. The sentence has become mental and the word is only a verbal expression of this mental sentence. But this impression of words in the mind also is not possible because of the momentary nature of the thinking mind. Human mind by its very nature is momentary and so it can receive the impression only for one moment and thus the impression of a whole sentence is not possible in his mind. The recollection of the past impression of sounds may be possible but there too the order of sound is not guaranteed. It is not necessary for a man to remember a scene in the same order in which he had seen it. Similarly, a man may remember sounds but he may not remember them exactly in the same order in which he has heard them. He may remember 'on' as 'no' and thus the whole purpose of language would be spoiled.<sup>1</sup> Propositions, as we have said, are the meanings of sentences and they are mental, not physical. They do not occupy space or exist in time. They are beyond the bounds of space and time. They themselves are the sources of meaning and also of language.<sup>2</sup>

Propositions are the sources of language in two ways. They inspire language by providing meaning to it and secondly they make speech possible by providing sounds, words and sentences in spoken form.<sup>3</sup> Propositions themselves are in words. We always think in words. We cannot live without

---

1. V. P. II. 24, 27.

2. akramastu vitatyeva buddhir yatrāvatiṣṭhate. idid. 19.

3. dvāvupādāna-śabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ. eko nimittam śabdānām aparo' rthe prayujyate. V. P. I. 44.



words. There is not a single instance where we can show that we do not think in words. What we consider as wordless thinking is nothing but unconscious use of words. We think unconsciously in words but we fail to recognise words at that time. As soon as we are conscious of our thinking we begin to use words in our mind. We want to say with Bhartṛhari that propositions ( upādāna-śabda ) have two aspects. They on the one hand are the aims of communicative words which they want to mean and on the other hand they themselves are used in spoken form to signify the meaning. Meaning and words expressing such meaning are one. The form itself is meaning. Their differentiation is illusory and their identity is real.<sup>1</sup>

Sentences which are the formal expressions of mental propositions are particular instances in which a proposition is expressed. We have said that propositions are always in words. They are never separate from words. But they do not exist in a *particular* language. They do not have their own language. The most they require is *a* language and not this or that language. Mental propositions are in verbal form but they do not require a particular form. There is no separate language in which these propositions exist. But at the same time there must be *some* language for their existence. They are the back-bones of language. Particular languages that are used in our communication are only formal spoken forms of the mental language. We cannot express that mental language in any other way than through spoken language or through some gestures and signs. The spoken language or other means of expression are entirely momentary. They are shadows of the real mental language. Our spoken language, which is regarded by people as the only language, is only a shadow language having no existence of its own. It does not exist in itself. It is affective and communicative

---

1. ekasyaivātmano bhedaḥ śabdārthāvapṛthak sthitau.

V. P. II. 31 and 32.

only because it is an expression of the real language. People mistake our spoken language to be the real language because they fail to recognise the reality behind it. The verbal form of language is not real language. It is only an expression ( *dhvani* ) of the language *par excellence*.<sup>1</sup>

But if our thinking is always in words, which words do we use in our thinking? Certainly we use only those words in our thinking which we express in our communication. An Englishman always uses English words in his thinking. He cannot use other words. If that is so the mental language of propositions presupposes those words which are used in spoken form. The spoken language should be considered prior to the mental language. If this is granted the theory that we always think in words falls like a house of cards. A newly born child can think only when he is able to learn the language of his parents. Before he knows anything of the language spoken around him he cannot think. But that is contradictory to our experience. He thinks. He knows his parents. He recognises them and craves for the breast of his mother. This shows that the child thinks ; acts mentally. But it is apparent that he does not know words and, therefore, he thinks without words. It is said, therefore, that propositions do not exist in a form although they may be expressed in a form.

The criticism does not seem to be founded on solid reasoning. We have said that knowledge is always true or false. The knower has a definite attitude towards his knowledge. If he has no definite attitude regarding his knowledge ; if he is not in a position to know truly or falsely, he has no knowledge. The knowledge of a newly born baby is mere sensation because he is not capable of thinking truly or falsely. He is not able to form a judgment. Grown up children who are not able to speak but are capable of thinking systematically and having a true or false knowledge have a language

---

1. V. P. I. 84-85.



of their own. A child of two years says 'mum' for water. He wants water and says 'mum'. He is not able to speak the language of his parents because his speech-organs are not fully developed. The formation of judgment depends upon the mental growth of a child. When a child is capable of forming judgments he at the same time begins to use some language (even some imaginary language which does not exist in the world) with his judgment. The formation of judgment is simultaneous with the growth of language. A child, therefore, recognises his mother and wants her to feed him because he is capable of forming judgments that are in words. We can never separate knowledge from words. Words are, therefore, simultaneous, if not prior, to knowledge.

The spoken language is the shadow of the mental language of the speaker. A spoken language is determined by grammar and usage to facilitate communication and to secure uniformity. The use of words, and construction of sentences in a spoken language is largely determined by grammar and usage. If a language is not guided by grammar and usage it cannot be effective as a means of communication. One word may be used to mean differently by different people and the result might be that nobody would be able to understand the speaker. For this practical reason the guidance of grammar is necessary.

Our spoken language is not a true copy of proposition that we have in our mind. One and the same proposition may be expressed in different forms in one and the same language, but different propositions cannot be expressed in one and the same form. This is because words in spoken language have a determined meaning. One idea can be expressed by different synonymous words, but if words are used to mean different ideas there would be chaos in language. This accounts for variety in language and there is a scope for the play of ornamentation in language.

The division of speech into names and verbs is the division of spoken language and not of the mental language. Our thinking is always one compact whole. It takes into account the essence as occurring. We do not either think of the essence alone or of the occurrence alone. It is logically impossible to separate the essence from occurrence and think of one without the other. Really speaking one is impossible without the other. There is no division of propositions. We cannot divide propositions into concepts. If we divide propositions our logic forces us to admit infinite division of propositions and thus we cannot find the unit of our thinking. We have no reason to accept concepts as elementary in our knowledge situation<sup>1</sup>. Either propositions alone are real or propositions are illusory. We have to admit the first alternative because we are not prepared to grant that our knowledge, which is always in the form of proposition, is illusory.

Proposition is regarded as a construction of concepts by the Nyâya school of philosophy. It is taken to be something distinct from the elements (concepts) of which it is made and thus it is granted a real status. But we may not agree with this view. A whole is distinct from its parts but at the same time is said to reside in its constituents. But this is not true. Threads exist in the cloth and not the cloth in the threads. Hands and feet exist in the body but not *vice versa*<sup>2</sup>. The whole is always presupposed by parts otherwise parts would fall asunder. Unity will not be possible among parts. If the whole is not there how are parts possible? The whole is the first and the foremost reality on which the reality of parts depends. But the whole and its parts are not real in one and the same sense. If the whole is real parts cannot be real at the same time. The reality of parts depends upon the whole but the whole is independent of parts. There cannot be a real relation between parts and the whole. They are not separate entities. Parts have their existence through the whole. Parts

---

1. V. P. II. 28-29.

2. Tattva samgraha. p. 267.



are relatively real while the whole is the absolute. Their relation, if there is any, must be a shadow-relation. They cannot be united in the sense in which two books are put together. They are related by an unreal relation<sup>1</sup>. Parts are unreal, the whole is the reality. The conception of samavāya is inadequate to explain the real nature of parts and the whole. Parts, therefore, cannot be real and the whole cannot be unreal (as the Mīmāṃsikas think). Any attempt to grant reality to parts beside the whole is suicidal.

Prompted by this logical necessity philosophers have accepted parts as unreal abstractions of the real whole. Propositions are real and concepts are unreal. Sentence is real but the parts of speech are unreal abstractions. Words do not have letters and sentences do not have words. Words and sentences are not different because really speaking words do not have their separate existence apart from the whole<sup>2</sup>. Words are possible only by abstraction of sentences. They are words because they participate in sentences. The appearance of words as name or verb is not real. It is only an unreal division of the real sentence. The division is necessary to make people understand the nature of language easily. People are slow to understand the whole language because a complete sentence may seem unwieldy to begin with. Thus a sentence is divided into parts in order to facilitate the grasp of language. This division is not real. As a child when it begins to read letters says 'A' means 'ass' but the letter 'A' does not mean an ass. This is done only to make the child understand the letter. Similarly words are divided into parts only to facilitate the understanding of sentence. The division of speech into parts is necessary for beginners, but it is not real. The real is reached through unreal means.

- 
1. yathā pade vibhajyante prakṛtipratyayaśādayah.  
apoddhāras tathā vākye padānām upavarṇyate.. —V.P. 11. 10.
  2. pade na varṇa vidyante vākyesvavayavaḥ na ca ; vākyāt  
padānām atyantam praviveko nō kaścana. —V.P.I. 73 and 71-72.

The study of spoken language leads us to study the real nature of speech. Speech has been described as one indivisible whole. It is mental and its expression in articulate sounds is momentary. The division of speech into parts is taken as real by Nyâya and Mīmāṃsâ although the relation of words to each other and to the whole is described differently in two schools. The division is based on the Universal which is eternal and real. The essence can be known only when it occurs. The spoken language refers to the essence by names and to occurrence by verbs. But this division overlooks the unity of language. Language is one indivisible whole having no parts. Parts in a sentence are unreal creations and they are only helpful to understand the nature of language. The study of parts is necessary for the study of the meaning of the whole and in the following chapters we proceed to study them in detail.



## CHAPTER IV

### NAMES : THE STATIC PARTS OF LANGUAGE

In the wider sense of the term names include everything in the universe. Whatever we speak is only name and language is nothing but endless naming. What is knowable is nameable and, therefore, every existent in the universe is called the meaning of a name ( padârtha=pada (name)+ artha (meaning). Substances, attributes, relations, universals, actions are all names. The word name in this sense is then synonymous with word.

There is a narrower sense in which 'name' is more frequently used. It is in this sense used to mean every part of language other than verbs. The name stands for everything other than action. Action is change and change is becoming. What is becoming cannot be called by a static word. It requires fluid expression. Elasticity of language is necessary to mean the becoming reality. Really speaking, the becoming reality cannot be described in language. However fluent a language may be, it cannot cross the barrier of rigidity which is the integral characteristic of language. Language is necessarily rigid and the dynamic reality cannot be chained in language. But for our convenience we have tried to enslave the dynamic real and present it in verbs. The parts in language expressing this dynamic reality are called verbs and every other thing that is static is referred to by names. Names are the expressions of the static reality.

In this chapter our concern is with names in this second sense. Names stand for something other than the dynamic reality. Substances, attributes, relations, universals, negations are all meant by names. Adjectives, prepositions,

conjunctions are only sub-divisions of names and hence the grammatical analysis of language into various parts of speech is only for our convenience. It is not based on a very solid logical foundation. In language names are widely used. In a sentence, which is the unit of language, we can hardly find more than one verb but there may be many names. This is enough to show the importance of names in language.

## I

## NAMES AND THEIR MEANING

## ( 1 )

Names in the narrower sense are called *prâtipadikas* in Samskrit. In the last chapter we have seen that the division of speech is possible on the basis of Form and Matter. Names or *prâtipadikas* represent the Matter in language. Matter is static and rigid. Words standing for objects of our experience refer to this static character. All names are, therefore, the names of static elements in reality.

Name (*prâtipadika*) may be defined as that meaningful division of speech which stands for the unity of referend in space<sup>1</sup>. Suffixes (*pratyayas*) are not names because they are incomplete in themselves and thus lack the character of standing for the unity of referend. Patanjali makes this clear by saying that 'it is *kṛdanta* and *taddhitânta* (having *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes at the end) which is meaningful, not mere *kṛt* or *taddhita* suffixes<sup>2</sup>'. The reason is that these suffixes cannot stand independently for the unity of the referend and therefore they lack the essential character of names. Only words containing these suffixes are meaningful in the sense that they are capable of standing for the unity of referend. Such words

---

1. (a) Pāṇini. 1. 2. 45.

(b) *ekārthībhāvena laukike prayoge prasiddhattvaṁ*,  
Manoramā on *ibid*.

2. *ibid*. 1. 4. 14.



having suffixes may be called names. These words have absorbed in their reference the whole meaning of the suffixes they contain and present the unity of referend. Such names as these may be called complex names. Only in their complexity they can be called names; their parts cannot be names.

Compound names, which unlike the complex names contain two or more meaningful words, are in their entirety names. They refer only to the unity of the referend. Such names like complex words have absorbed in their body different constituents and refer to one single whole. Compound words are as good names as simple or complex words are<sup>1</sup>.

Sentences lack the characteristic of a name. Although the constituents of a sentence are related to each other but notwithstanding their relation they retain their individuality. In complex or compound name constituents fuse together to form a whole. Words of a sentence do not lose their individuality because they formally stand for distinct referends. Each word of a sentence stands for one single whole, constituents of a complex or compound words do not. The unity of a sentence is always in construction and is mental, while the unity of complex or compound words may be found also in the world outside. Referends of sentences can only be presented in parts and this is enough to make a sentence differ from names. A sentence is not a name<sup>2</sup>.

There are words which do not stand for something which we can find in the world. 'Mirage', 'hare's horn', 'barren woman's child' etc. are such words. They have no referend but they are not meaningless. They have meaning in different sense than ordinary words do have. Their referend is not to be found externally, it is to be found in the mind of the user. There may not be anything corresponding to those words in our

1. *ibid.* 1. 2. 46.

2. *yatra samghāte pūvo bhāgaḥ padam tasya ced  
bhavati tarhi samāsasyaiva, tena vākyasya na.*

*Siddhānta Kaumudī* on 1. 2. 46.

experiential world but the user has some conception about them in his mind. They are not verifiable in the outside world but they *are* verifiable in the conception of the person using them. They are verifiable mentally. This is the reason why such words have meaning, although not verifiable externally. It is like illusion. The snake in a rope is illusory and non-existent, but such a snake certainly exists in the mind of the perceiver. The illusory snake is conceptual, it exists in the mind of the perceiver. Similarly these words are conceptual. Their meaning is not to be found externally but mentally they present a perfect meaning. For a name to be meaningful its referend may not necessarily be found in the external world. The minimum condition of meaningfulness of a name is mere existence of a referend and the knowledge of it. Referends of such above mentioned words exist in concept and are known to thus exist<sup>1</sup>.

Thus far we have seen that a name stands for a single unit of referend. A referend is necessary for a name. It must exist either actually or conceptually. A name without a referend is meaningless. A name always stands for some thing. But unlike its referend a name is not independent. A book, for example, may not require any help from other things for its existence but the word 'book' necessarily requires some other word for its existence and completeness. We cannot use only the word 'book' without using some other words with it, like 'is' 'is blue' 'is torn' or whatever one likes. But the word in itself is one incomplete expression and cannot be used in language, if the language is to be significant. The reason for this is very clear. Name is only a part of a sentence which is the primary unit of language. Being a part it is always in need of a whole of which it is a part. A mere name cannot assert its independent existence

---

1. śaśaśṛṅgādīpadānām ca bauddhe śaśaśṛṅgādaḥ  
śaktir iti pūrveṇaiva prātipadikatvaṃ siddham.

Śabdenduśekhara on ibid.



and therefore names always require a whole, a verb at least, to be complete. Its arms are extended for help from other names and verbs. It can exist in language only when supported by other words. A name in a language is, therefore, always a name related to some other name or verb. This relation is called 'case' in grammar. The relation of case is presented in language by adding suffixes to names. These suffixes are called vibhaktis. A name in order to be used in language must have some vibhakti or case or other. Patanjali says that no name without a suffix is to be used in language<sup>1</sup>.

Vibhaktis or case-endings of a name perform a double function. As we have just mentioned, names being parts of language always require some help from other parts. This is indicated by adding suffixes to the end of names. These suffixes are meant to indicate the particular relation that a name has with other words of the sentence. But while doing this these suffixes make another very important contribution to language. These suffixes make a name independent and distinct from other words of a sentence. They affirm the individual character of a name in relation to other words of a sentence. This is the reason why these suffixes are called *vibhaktis* (that which differentiates). We shall consider the nature of these case-endings in detail in the subsequent chapter. Here we have touched this point only to show the nature of a name. A name cannot remain without a case ending.

Thus the formal definition of a name may be stated as that class of words which requires nothing more than a case ending suffix to mean a referend.<sup>2</sup> Mere suffixes, verbs or sentences cannot be names because they lack in this respect. Complex and compound words are names because they are

---

1. M. B. 3. 1. 1. 1.

2. etatsamjñā — phalabhūta — vibhaktītarasamabhi-vyāhārāna-pekṣayā loke' rthaviṣayakabodhajanakatvam.

Śabdendu Ś. on 1. 2. 45.

capable of standing for a referend without requiring a help from other.

( 2 )

We have said that names stand for the referend. They mean something. In other words, they are related to some thing in such a way that when the former is presented the latter occurs. The former is the antecedent of which the latter is the consequent. The former has power or force to prevent the latter occur. Names being words have this power in themselves.

Names are divisions of meaningful language. They are not constituents of unmeaning language. Again, they themselves are meaningful. Their meaningfulness lies in the sense that they refer to a referend. They are meaningful parts of meaningful language. The meaningfulness is the sole characteristic of a name. That which is unmeaning is not name.

We have described the meaning as the power of words producing the knowledge of objects. In our logical enquiry we cannot examine the nature of the thing referred to by names as this is beyond the sphere of logic. We, therefore, postpone this subject to a later enquiry. At present our concern is to see the extent to which our language embodies the characteristic of meaningfulness.

Names refer to something as all words of a sentence do. But why one name is different from others? The common-sense view about this is that because a name stands for one and only one thing it is different from other names. It is, as if, to say that a name differs from other names because a thing differs from other things. In other words one name is different from other names because the referend of that name is a distinct unit. It is the unit of referend that makes a name distinct from other names.



But what is this unit of referend ? Is it some thing independent of ourselves or is it dependent on us ? Do we create this unit or do they exist apart from us ? In order to answer this question we have to study the psychological factor in language. Things may or may not exist apart from us, we do not worry about it here. But things do not exist apart from us when they are referred to by words. Words do not refer to things as they are but as we see them.

A book may be red or green but if I happen to see it as blue I will refer it as a blue book. Its real nature will not prevent me from speaking of it as blue. It is a different question that my utterance is not true, but it is certainly meaningful. Its meaning depends upon me as I happen to see it. Psychological factors working in me give meaning to the word and not necessarily the metaphysical nature of things.

The unit of referend in language, therefore, depends largely upon the user and hearer of language rather than upon the thing referred to by words. One and the same thing may be viewed differently and this may be expressed in different ways. One and the same man is called as man, as animal, as rational being or as Adam's son. All these words refer to one and only one thing but in different ways. One and the same reality is presented differently because the man who perceives it is at liberty to manipulate and analyse it. Language is the presentation of a rational being and embodies the mind of the person who uses it. Referends of words used in language are referends as we see them.

The unity of referend, therefore, depends upon the person who uses it. I can use one word for two or more units of reality if I like. A person and the act of writing are two different things but we use one word for them, we call the person a writer. Similarly one and the same man may be called a rational being. We use two separate words for one unit of reality. But every word that we use in language has one

distinct unit of referend. A word without having a reference to one and only one distinct unit of reality cannot be used in language. Mere suffixes do not have any reference to any one distinct unit of reality and therefore, they are devoid of meaning. Compound and complex words have reference to realities which are taken as one distinct unit by the user of language. This is what we have called the unit of referend in our previous discussion. This is the most necessary condition for the use of words in language. It is true in every respect with names<sup>1</sup>.

## ( 3 )

A name means a referend because there is a relation existing between them. As soon as the name is presented the relation between the two is perceived by the mind and thus meaning is made possible. The meaning of a name is, therefore, that which is invariably presented to the mind when a name is given<sup>2</sup>. Where there is a name there is a meaning; a name cannot remain without a meaning. But this meaning of a name must be one and only one. The word 'book' means one and only one thing and this is its invariable meaning. If that word is to mean something different from what it has been meaning, that different meaning will not be invariably associated with it and thus cannot be called the meaning of that name. But, it may be asked, if in the case of transference a name abandons its original meaning and assumes another different meaning, is that assumed meaning a meaning of that name? According to our previous discussion this cannot be called its proper meaning because it is not invariably associated with that word. Thus the metaphorical use of a name would not be a case of meaningful word. To take the stock example

1. M. B. 1. 2. 2. 45.

2. (a) niyatopasthitikaḥ prātipadikārthaḥ.

S. K., Kāraka.

(b) yasminprātipadike uccārite yasyārthasya  
niyamenopasthitiḥ sa tadartha ityārthaḥ.

Śabdeṇdu Ś. on 2. 3. 46.



'a house on the Ganges'. Here the word 'Ganges' is not used in its proper sense because if the word is used in its proper sense to mean the 'stream of water' the situation of a house on it cannot be possible. It is used here in a different sense. In this context the word is used to mean the *bank* of the stream known as the 'Ganges' and not the stream itself. The meaning of the word 'Ganges' is a transferred meaning which is not usually associated with the meaning of the word. According to our discussion of the meaning of a name such use of a word would be an improper use and cannot be authorised in language.

This charge is answered by saying that the word does not abandon its original meaning and assume a totally different meaning. Its original meaning is there but as it is incompatible with the context in which the word is used (as a house cannot be in the stream) the reference of the word is shifted from the original referend to some new referend which is closely associated with its original meaning. A word cannot be transferred to some other referend which is entirely dissociated from its original referend. The word 'pen' can never stand for 'cow'. This transference is really the superimposition of previous referend on a second referend. 'Stream' is imposed on the 'bank' and in this case it is really the bank which is called as stream. It may be compared to the illusion of a snake in a piece of rope. Really there is only the rope but it is known as snake. The transference in this case is not real but imaginary. In this sense a metaphorical name is not different from a mere name<sup>1</sup>.

But this answer is not satisfactory. Imposition cannot be the same as the imposed. A snake can never be taken as the same as a piece of rope. They are different. The 'stream' is not the 'bank', they are different. In some context the word 'Ganges' means one, in others the other. The

---

1. Ibid.

referend in both these cases differ. It is true that 'stream' is its usually associated referend but it is not its invariably associated referend. It is like a word having two or more meanings. Each meaning is associated with one and the same word. The word does not differ, its referends widely differ. All referends of a word cannot be invariably associated with that word as that will create a chaos in language. A word is used to mean one and only one referend at one time. If it were to mean two or more referends then it would not be a word at all. In each case of meaning the same word is used but *means* differently. Divergence of meaning is not a hindrance in using the word in language. Therefore the proper way of defining the meaning of a name would be to say that the meaning of a name is that which is associated with it. The meaning need not invariably be associated with the name.<sup>1</sup> A referend may occasionally be associated with a name and yet be called the meaning of the name. In that case the name cannot be called meaningless. A word having the least reference to a referend is a name because it has meaning. The minimum requirement of a name should be its meaningfulness.

A name has some meaning as that meaning may not be invariably associated with it. Transferred names and the names with multiple meaning are names in a true sense, because they mean. One may question here that according to this view a word may be used in a sense in which it is never used and yet will be meaningful name as other names are. Thus a lunatic may use the word 'pen' to mean a 'horse' and this meaning would be the meaning of that word. There is no grave objection in this. A lunatic may use 'pen' for horse and this would be quite meaningful for him. He can use the word in his language meaningfully, no one can prevent him. It is as if the same word is used in two different languages in

1. pare tvtra sūtre prātipadikārtha-śabdena pravṛttinimitam tadāśrayaśca. sa ca mukhya ivāropita-tadāśrayopi.



two different senses. The word 'vadana', for example, is used in Samskrit to mean face but in Urdu it means body. But people speaking Samskrit do not object to its use in Urdu and *vice versa*. This proves that a word may be used in any sense and that will be its meaning.

But why is a word not used to mean different referends at different times? The answer is that the social convention has restricted the use of a name to one referend only. The word 'pen' cannot mean horse in the language of people speaking English because the convention in English resists such use of the word. This resistance is exercised by convention to prevent chaos in language and to facilitate accuracy in communication. But the word does not thereby lose the potentiality of referring to other referends. If a word is used in an entirely new sense and there is the knowledge of some meaning for even at least one single individual, in the language of that individual that word is a meaningful name. Invariable association of a particular referend with a particular name is not a necessary condition of meaning, the minimum that is required for a meaning is that there must be some association between a word and a referend.

Meaning is, therefore, a relation of words to their referends. The meaning of a name is similarly a relation of that name to a referend. What is that referend is a question that involves metaphysics and here we cannot discuss the nature of the referend. Whether the referend is universal or individual or both combined; and if combined whether the universal element is prior or the particular? Again, is the referend to be found actually in our experiential world or is it necessarily an ideal existence? All these questions fall outside the scope of the logical enquiry into the nature of meaning and we postpone their consideration to the third part of this book.

## II

## GENDER AND NUMBER OF NAMES

## ( 1 )

We cannot assess the nature of referends here because they involve some principle with which logic is not directly concerned. Our logical enquiry is based on the formal aspect of meaning; we have to study only that meaning which is expressed in words. Logic is concerned with expression and not with the things expressed. Such questions as whether the referend is universal or individual is related more with things rather than with their expression. But gender and number are more or less the properties of words themselves and not of things.

There is a great controversy with regard to including genders in the body of meaning of names. When a name is pronounced, it conveys with itself the gender of that name. The word 'country', for example, conveys the sense of feminine gender when it is used. Is this notion of gender derived from the nature of the referend of a name or is it the inseparable property of the name itself? If the former alternative is true it is out of place to consider genders here; but if the latter alternative is correct we are justified in including it in our logical enquiry. Let us proceed to examine these questions.

Genders may be of two types. In some cases genders depend upon the nature of the referend of a name. The word 'woman', for example, is of feminine gender because the referend happens to belong to a class of individuals who have feminine characteristics. Other cases of genders do not correspond with the nature of referends. They are independent of their referends. They solely depend upon the nature of names. The word 'country' is used in feminine gender but there is nothing to be found in the body of the country



(referend) which may make the name stand in the feminine gender. It is owing to the peculiarity of the name itself that a word stands in a gender entirely different from the character of the referend to which it refers.<sup>1</sup>

There is nothing to be said about the first type of gender which is very simple. A name is in feminine, masculine or neutral gender because the characteristic of its referend makes the name stand in that particular gender. But the second type presents difficulties. We cannot, therefore, make any general rule about genders of names.

Patanjali discusses this question in the Mahâbhâṣya. In our practical life we determine gender on the basis of the peculiar construction of the referend of a name. But this commonsense view of genders cannot be accepted in grammar. He cites words which do not correspond in gender with their referends and proves that gender of a name cannot be determined merely by correspondence. There should be a different principle for determining the gender of names<sup>2</sup>.

He then sets forth a scientific definition of gender. He defines gender as the result of activity and accumulation of five elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth. Every body in the universe is a composition of these elements and the result of the activity of these elements. Every referend has, therefore, these elements and activity of them in common. Every name means such bodies and thus the nature of the referend of a name cannot determine the gender of a word, yet every word meaning such referends has a gender in general. It is not masculine, nor feminine, nor neutral. It is simply a gender without any specific name. A name masculine, feminine, or neutral is given to it by the convention and usage of words.

---

1. M. B. 4. 1. 1. 3.

2. Ibid.

The convention of a language is the only determining factor of the gender of names<sup>1</sup>.

The definition of gender in general given by Patanjali is an entirely novel attempt. It has a highly philosophical significance. According to this definition of gender every name used in language necessarily has a reference to gender. Activity (saṁstyāna) and accumulation (prasava) of five elements are causes of every object that can be found on the earth. Any referend being a composition of these elements is referred to by words as such. Some names referring to this kind of referend are called masculine, some feminine and some neutral because the user of those names wants either to emphasize the activity or the accumulation as the result of that activity or only the accumulation without any reference to the activity of the five elements. Accordingly names tend to have particular genders respectively viz., masculine, feminine or neutral.

Masculine gender is an emphasis on the activity of elements rather than on the result. Feminine gender stresses the result and gives activity a secondary importance. Neutral gender is an emphasis on the accumulation alone without any reference to the activity. This emphasis on the activity, or the result of activity or the result alone is determined by convention and usage. No other factor can determine the gender of a name<sup>2</sup>.

According to this view a name referring to a referend belonging to the male class can be used in feminine gender or

- 
1. saṁstyānaprasavau lingamāstheyau sva kṛtāntataḥ...  
saṁstyānam strī pravṛttiśca pumān. kasya punaḥ saṁstyānam  
strī pravṛttirvā pumān ? guṇānām. keśām ? śabda-sparśarūparasa-  
gandhānām. sarvāśca mūrtaya evamā'mikāḥ..... pravṛtṭiḥ khalvapi  
nityā..... tattvobhayam sarvatra. yadyubhayam 'sarvatra kuto  
vyavasthā ? vivakṣātāḥ..... tasyoktau lokato nāmaitad bhavati str-  
pumānapuṁsakamiti.

M. B. ibid.

2. V. P. III. 13. 12-20.



a name of a feminine referend may be in masculine. There is nothing in the referend which makes a name masculine, feminine or neutral. It is people using names who make a name stand in a particular gender<sup>1</sup>.

This principle can be applied in case of those names also which do not stand for objects composed of elements. Abstract name or names for various mental conditions do not stand for bodies that are creations of the activities of elements. Only usage and convention gives them gender. Names of bodies derive their gender, to some extent, from the bodies (by emphasising activity or activity and result or the result alone) they refer, but largely their gender depends upon usage and convention. Names of abstract referends and mental conditions etc. solely depend for their gender on usage and convention. The latter type of names has genders on the pattern of the former type. There is no necessity for genders in their cases as it is in the former case. It is only to secure uniformity in language that the second type is also given genders.

This discussion makes it very clear that the social force is the most important factor in determining the shape of language. There is nothing in the referend that can make a name of that referend stand in a particular gender. The most that a referend can do in this case is that it makes the use of gender in language necessary. Beyond this the referend cannot do anything for the gender of names. Pāṇini, therefore, says that grammar cannot make rules for determining the genders of names; they are determined by the people using them<sup>2</sup>. Bhartṛhari after expounding the theory of elements given by Patanjali says that the theory is not universal. It holds good only in the case of such names which refer to the elemental referend. It is not universal. Masculine, feminine or

---

1. lingam aśiṣyam lokāśrayatvāt lingasya.

M. B., *ibid.*

2. tadaśiṣyam samjñāpramāṇatvāt.

neutral gender is the property of names alone; they do not depend on the nature of their referend. This is the only explanation that can be universally valid<sup>1</sup>. Thus the gender of a name is inherent in the name, it has nothing to do with the nature of the referend of the name. We are, therefore, fully justified in considering genders here.

( 2 )

Genders are properties of names themselves and so are numbers. In a majority of cases the number of names depends upon the number of referends. When there are more than one pens we use the name 'pen' in the plural, because by using in that way we try to be as faithful to the objective world as possible.

But like genders numbers are also of two types. The first kind of numbers are those which correspond with the number of referend. The other types of number is independent of referends. It is solely based on the character of names. The word 'government' is used in plural while its referend is only one body. In Saṁskrit we have many examples of this discrepancy in numbers. Again, names denoting respect are used in plural while their referend is one<sup>2</sup>.

We in our everyday use of language use names in singular while the referend is many and *vice versa*. A name for a body of persons may be used in singular when reference is intended to the unity but the name may be used in plural when the intention to refer is shifted from the unity and concentrated on plurality. In these cases number depends upon the intention of the speaker and not upon the referend<sup>3</sup>.

When we find cases where the number of names does not depend upon the number of referends we cannot make the

1. V. P. III. 13. 30-31.

2. The word 'dārā' (wife) is always used in plural, akṣata, gṛha, sikatā etc, are used in plural but their referend is an individual.

3. S. V. 18. 86-91.



general rule that the number depends upon the referend. We have to accept that number depends upon the usage associated with a particular name. By long tradition a name is associated with a number. The word 'government' is plural because the usage has made it obligatory. In certain cases the number of names depends upon the number of referend because these names are permitted by usage to be used according to the number of referend. The number of such words in language is greater than the number of the other type of names. But that does not allow the formation of a rule that every name should be used according to the number of referend<sup>1</sup>.

The intention of the speaker is not an independent factor determining the use of number. The intention of the speaker against the usage is ineffective and is not permissible in meaningful language. If a name by usage is confined to certain number only, the intention of thousand and one persons cannot make its use permissible in other numbers. The word 'dârâ' cannot be used in singular effectively no matter how many people intend to use it in singular. The intention of the speaker is effective only when it is not contrary to the usage. Thus the number of a name depends upon the nature of the name itself as it is current in language and not upon the sweet will of the user or upon the number of referend.

### III

#### THE RELATION OF NAMES TO EACH OTHER.

Gender and number of names depend upon their usage in language and not necessarily upon their referend. Names include in their very nature their gender and number. These are not given from without; they are in the essence of names. Suffixes and prepositions are used to explain them to the hearer. They do not mean gender or number; they only explain the gender or number of the name with which they are used. The function of suffixes and prepositions is to make

---

1. Pāṇini, 1. 2. 53.

explicit what is implicitly present in the nature of names. They only indicate number and gender of the name; they do not mean it<sup>1</sup>.

Apart from this they perform another function. They not only explain the number and gender of names; they also indicate the position of a name in relation to other names and to verbs. Suffixes and prepositions of the first kind are called nominal (*upapada vibhakti*) and the suffixes of the latter type are known as verbal or case suffixes (*kâraka vibhakti*). We postpone the consideration of the latter type for the next chapter when we shall have fully studied the nature of verbs. Here we shall consider very briefly the suffixes of the first type.

Speech is a whole in which every part is related to other parts. If one part is not related to other parts the meaning will not be possible. For a meaningful speech the relation of parts is a primary condition. In sentences we use many names and they are necessarily related to each other. In the sentence 'The black pen of X is presented to Y for Y's good behaviour in the school,' the position of each name is determined by the position of other names related to it. The names 'black' and 'pen' are related to each other as substance and attribute, and both of them taken together is owned by X; a pen which is black and which belongs to X is handed over to Y in order to make Y the true owner of the pen of that description; the reason for the transference of ownership being the behaviour which is good and which occurs in the school. Each name used in this sentence is united to form a whole. In this whole each name has a definite relation to other names. The name 'pen' is related to the name X, relation being that of ownership. Similarly the names 'black' and 'pen' are related as substance and attribute. If we try to interfere with the position of names in this sentence the relation will automatically be changed.

---

1. Bhâṣaṇasâra, K. 25.



If from the above mentioned sentence X is removed 'the black pen' is no more owned by any one according to the remaining pattern of the sentence.

A sentence can be interfered with in two ways. Firstly, the types of words used in the sentence may be substituted by other words of the same type. Secondly, the pattern of the sentence itself may be interfered with. In the above mentioned sentence if we use 'white' in the place of 'black', or 'horse' for 'pen', or 'Z' for 'Y' the pattern of the sentence will remain the same while its constituents will vary. But if we remove 'X' from the sentence, the pattern is disturbed. The sentence without 'X' is totally different from the sentence in which X is used. In the former case the relation of words to each other will be the same while in the latter case the relation among them also is changed.

The pattern of sentences is like a 'phrase' which never admits of any disturbance. Any attempt of disturb it would result in providing a completely new pattern for the previous one. In a sentence, therefore, each constituent has a definite relation to other constituents. Substituted words of the same type may alter the sense but their relation will be the same. Thus in a particular pattern of sentence a particular constituent has a definite particular relation to other constituents. Constituents are variable but because the pattern is constant the relation in which they are used is also a constant relation.

A name falling in sentences may be used in any relation to other names as the pattern permits. Such names may be called free names. They are free in the sense that they can admit of any relation to other names. In contrast to these names there are certain other types of names which can be used only in a definite relation to other parts. The word 'conducive', for example, can be related to other names only by 'to' and no other preposition will make the use of the word valid in the language. 'Namah' in Samskrit is another example.

These names cannot be used in any other relation. Such restricted use of names is called 'phrase'. The peculiarity of a phrase lies in this that unlike a free sentence constituents of a phrase do not admit of variation. Constituents of a phrase are not variable as constituents of a sentence are. Again, like sentences the pattern of the phrase is constant. In phrases both constituents and pattern are constant. If any change is introduced in it, it will be an entirely different expression.

Thus the relation of name to other names may be a free relation or it may be a restricted relation. The former type is widely used in language but the latter type is occasionally found. In the former case constituents are variable and their relation also is variable according to the pattern in which they are used ; in the latter case neither the pattern nor the relation of words is variable. In phrases names and their relation are rigid. These relations of names to other names are indicated by the use of suffixes, prepositions and in some cases by the position of the name in a sentence.

In a free expression the relation of a name to other names largely depends upon the verb. Only through verb a name is related to other names and their relation is determined. The nature of names do not provide any clue for determining their relation to each other. The position and nature of verbs enables a name to be related to other names. This type of relation is called 'case' in grammar and this will be elaborately discussed in the next chapter. In phrases, the relation of a name to other names is solely dependent upon the nature of names themselves. The nature of names in this case provides the clue for determining their relation to other names. Such relation is expressed in language by nominal suffixes or prepositions. These suffixes and prepositions are constant. The relation of a name to other names without any reference to verbs is a nominal relation (upapada sambandha). This nominal relation among names is possible only in phrases.



## IV

## COMPLEX AND COMPOUND NAMES

( 1 )

At the outset we have stated that a name must have only one referend at a time. Unity of referend is a necessary condition of meaning in names. Names having two or more elements in their body have necessarily one referend. Complex names are those names in which two or more heterogeneous elements are present but they refer necessarily to the unity of referend. Similarly compound names are combinations of two or more names referring to one body of referend.

Complex names are the results of the combination of verbs and suffixes. By virtue of the suffixes attached to the verbs, verbs lose their dynamic character ; they are made static. Verbs combined with certain suffixes become names. They leave their character of referring to the action and are neutralised by these suffixes to refer to a static referend. Such neutralised verbs are called complex names here.<sup>1</sup>

Thus complex names contain verbs and suffixes. They embody the meaning of the verb and suffixes attached to it. Participles, for example embody the meaning of the verb and also the suffix. They are called sometimes as nouns of action. These nouns of action contain the meaning of the verb ; as in 'living' the meaning of the verb 'to live' is kept intact, but it contains something more than the meaning of the verb 'to live'. It contains the suffix 'ing' which serves as agent to neutralise the effect of the verb and makes it rigid. The verb 'to live' no more means action of living as it means in 'lives'. By virtue of the suffix '-ing' the verb ceases to mean action. Its use only gives the meaning of the result of that action. The

---

1. Complex names are of two types. They are : Kṛdanta and taddhitānta. Compound names are called 'samasta pada'.

word means not the action of living but only the result of such action of living. Here the suffix '-ing' has made no contribution to the whole meaning except that it has made the verb neutral<sup>1</sup>. In some other cases suffixes add something more to the meaning. They neutralise the verb on the one hand and contribute something more to the total meaning of the word on the other. The suffix '-er', for example when added to a verb, say 'love', not only make the active meaning of the verb disappear but also adds the notion of agency to the whole. Consequently the combination means the 'agent of loving'. In the word 'lover', for example two different words are combined to give a compact meaning which is not possible when combining words are taken separate. Names of such description present a combination of heterogeneous words (a combination of verbs and suffixes) but their meaning is one whole. These names refer to the unity of referend. Such combination of divergent elements which gives one meaning is technically called as ekârthibhâva.

Complex names are not necessarily combinations of verbs and suffixes. A complex name may also be a combination of a name with suffixes. A name is made out of another name<sup>2</sup>. This sort of name is similar to the previous type in the sense that the new product presents a different unit of referend. A name produces another name when combined with suffixes and gives a different meaning. 'Egoism', 'deism', 'oldish', 'chemist' etc. are examples of such formation. These words are made by combining a name with a suffix. 'Egoism' is a combination of the name 'ego' with the suffix '-ism'. This combined name does not mean what it used to mean in its pure form. It means something more than ego. The suffix- 'ism' adds some new meaning to the word 'ego'. It, in its new form, means the 'doctrine of ego'. The suffix- 'ism' has made the word an abstract noun signifying condition, system etc. In this new

---

1. Such suffixes are called 'bhâva pratyayas'.

2. These are called taddhita names.



formation the word 'ego' has ceased to mean what it used to mean and in combination with the suffix takes a new meaning. The word 'egoism' has a different meaning than its root name 'ego' had. In this new formation we cannot separate the word 'ego' from 'ism' and say that the word is a collective word meaning two different referends combined at one place. 'Ego' in the word 'egoism' has no meaning apart from the meaning of the combination. The addition of '-ism' to this word has made an entirely new word. The suffix '-ism' similarly has no separate meaning. It is meaningful only in combination with 'ego'. It has a potential meaning which is made explicit only when it is combined with a name. This is the reason that no one uses the word '-ism' in isolation to mean a system or condition. It is always used with a name. Therefore only for our convenience we have made rules in grammar to analyse a complex name into a root and a suffix. Really a name thus formed is entirely a new name the constituents of which have no independent meaning of their own. They contribute only to the total meaning. They are combined to refer to one unit of referend. Thus they along with complex names of the first type are *prātipadikas*.

These two types of complex names which are called *kṛdanta* and *taddhitānta* respectively in *Saṁskrit* largely depend upon suffixes for their formation and meaning. Suffixes play a great part in the formation of complex names. These suffixes contribute a new meaning to words with which they are combined. But they cannot mean anything when they are alone. '-ism', '-est', '-er', '-ing' etc. cannot mean anything unless they are combined with a word. But when combined they contribute to a great extent. This shows that they have potential power for some specific meaning, but it is latent in them. This power is made explicit only when combined with certain words.

We have said above that words combined with suffixes are entirely new words. They do not present a combination of the two. But in grammar, it may be said, rules are laid down for

the formation of new words by combining suffixes. Does this not show that combinations are formations out of two elements and thus they retain in them the qualities of their constituents? Does this not, then, prove that complex words are not new, they are only a collection of different elements? To answer this question we have to consider the nature of grammar.

Grammar in ordinary talk is taken as an art of words or, to be more liberal, an art of speech. It is opposed to philology which is the science of speech. This conception of grammar implies that the subject is a productive art like other arts. Literary art is a creative art and it produces the object called literature. Pottery is an art and the person practicing it produces pots. One who is in need of literature to console his mind or to enjoy the beauty of literature goes to that artist and asks him to produce some piece of literature which he can enjoy. One who needs a pot to store water goes to a potter and asks him to produce pots which can contain water. The literary person or the potter produces literature or pot by combining different elements for the need of the people. A grammarian is not a man like the potter or the poet. No one goes to a grammarian and asks him to coin words which can be used in language. It is not the duty of grammarians to produce words as potters produce pots<sup>1</sup>.

A Grammarian follows the dictation of usage. He is not an independent artist like the literary person or the potter. He has to follow the usage. He only says, when asked, that a particular use of language is in conformity with usage and the other is not. He commands the use of language and his command is based on the prevalence of language in society. He is a keen watcher of the use of language and asks people to be in conformity with the recognised usage. Grammar points out what usage in language is recognised and what is not. He cannot exercise his imagination in producing new usages<sup>2</sup>.

---

1. M. B., 1. 1. 1.

2. *ibid.*



Formation of new words out of different words and suffixes is not a creation of grammar as people think. It is totally a creation of people using it. Formation of new words does not depend upon grammar; it is a product of convention and usage. Grammar only analyses words presented to it and tries to find out a uniform rule, if any, by analysing it into finer elements. Grammar is, therefore, a science which tries to find out general rules in the use of language and commends what is correct or what is in conformity with the usage<sup>1</sup>.

The primary function of grammar is, therefore, to commend what is in conformity with usage. It is only secondarily that grammar enters into analysis and synthesis of words. One system of grammar may present one sort of rule for analysis of words presented to it and another system may give an entirely different rule. The analysis of grammar is an analysis of words. The words presented to it are presented as units. The analysis of words into parts is only an unreal attempt to study the real word. 'Ego' and 'egoism', 'pot' and 'potter', 'to live' and 'living' are different words. 'Egoism', 'potter', and 'living' are called complex words because attempts have been made by grammar to analyse these words into parts which really they do not contain. They are full words in themselves, they do not depend for their meaning on their constituents. There are people who do not know the rules of grammar; they are quite ignorant of the analysis of words into roots and prefixes but they use them properly and understand the meaning of complex words without knowing the meaning of the elements of those complex words. The analysis of complex words into roots and suffixes is only a creation of grammar. They are complex only in grammar; from the point of view of meaning and usage they are units.

- 
1. *katham tarh me śabdāḥ pratipattavyāḥ ?*  
*kincitsām nyaviśeṣavallakṣaṇam pravartyam.*  
*yenāpena yatnena mahato mahataḥ, śabdaughān pratipadyeran.*  
*Kimpunas tat ? utsargāpavādaḥ.*

M. B. *ibid.*

( 2 )

Like complex names compound names also stand for the unity of referend. Two or more names are joined to form a whole which can refer to one unit of referend. The word 'gold' when combined with the word 'smith' begins to refer to one whole which is neither gold nor smith. It is something unique. The word 'goldsmith' is although apparently a combination of two names but its referend is one. The reason is that constituents of the word lose their individual meaning and contribute to the meaning of the whole. They are combined to refer to one referend only.

Compound names like complex names are new names ; they are not products of their constituents. They get something new which the constituent words could not give. The word 'goldsmith' means 'a worker in gold and silver'. Neither of its constituent words can mean that. Nor they can mean such a worker if they are put separate in a sentence. They mean such a worker only when they are put together in a compound form.

The characteristics of compound forms are peculiar. Each of the constituting names does not mean separately and therefore being devoid of individual meaning it cannot be called a name or *prâtipadika* in the proper sense. Any suffix or preposition attached to it, therefore, disappears. Compounded names cannot be used separately. They are to be used together because they in their individual capacity are devoid of any meaning. They become like suffixes which are meaningless without any other word attached to them.<sup>1</sup>

Patanjali in the *Mahâbhâṣya* deals elaborately with this subject. He has given three different views regarding compound

1. kas tārthy ekārthībhāvākṛto viśeṣaḥ ? sublpō' vyavadhānam  
yatheṣṭamanyatarenābhisambandhaḥ svara it.



words. Compound words mean a unity of referend and if constituent words are used separately they will refer to different referends. The unity of referend is the essence of compound words. Secondly he says that constituents of compound words leave their meaning and contribute to the whole, while uncompounded words mean individually. The third view is that like sentence compounded words also mean freely and they are in need of each other. Let us now consider each of these views separately.

Pāṇini has said that compounding of words depends upon their capacity of being compounded.<sup>1</sup> The word 'capacity' in this sūtra is interpreted differently. Do words combine because in their combination they can refer to the unity of referend or do they combine because they need each other? In sentences words do not combine because each word means individually. So long as a word is used to mean individually it cannot be combined with other words. It retains its meaning. But when it is combined with other words it ceases to mean individually. It means something other than its own referend. The word 'goldsmith' may be taken as an example. The constituent words 'gold' and 'smith' do not mean what they used to mean individually. If one is asked to go to the goldsmith, he will not go to gold or to smith. He will go to a person who has the characteristic of both. Patanjali gives another example to illustrate this point. It is seen that a person while doing something for some other person leaves his own work. A carpenter while working for a king leaves his own independent carpentry. Similarly the word 'gold' employed to qualify 'smith' leaves its own meaning. But if the word 'gold' does not retain meaning at all in the word 'goldsmith' why does not a man, asked to go to a goldsmith, go to any smith as the word 'gold' does not mean anything here? Patanjali says that the word although leaves its individual meaning yet it does not totally leave its meaning.

---

1. samarthah padavidhiḥ. 2. 1. 1.

It retains some meaning which is not against the interest of the meaning of the word 'smith'. It qualifies the word 'smith' and therefore one does not go to any smith but to a *goldsmith* when asked to do so. In this case constituent words leave their individual meaning for the sake of the meaning of the compound. In the compound meaning one can discern the contribution of each constituent word.

Another view regarding compounded words is that they do not leave their meaning. They are combined to form a whole retaining their individual meaning. They are different from free words used in sentences because their combination is a new word. In each the meaning of all the constituents figure. The word 'goldsmith' although a combination of two words, is a totally different word. In the meaning of this word the meaning of constituting words is kept intact and compromised. According to the previous view words leave their individual meaning and contribute to the whole. Compound word is a new creation and not a combination of its constituents. According to the latter view words when compounded do not give birth to an entirely new word the meaning of which is a combination of the meaning of constituting words. The meaning of a compound word is the sum total of the meaning of its constituting words.

The third view is that words are combined because their referends need each other. The gold is in need of smith and smith is in need of gold to give a compact meaning. This need is present everywhere in language. In sentences each referend needs the help of another referend and that is the basis for the unity of a sentence.

The third view lacks in logic. It cannot differentiate a sentence from a compound word. It is against the convention in language. Words that are in need of the other cannot be compounded. If the word 'gold' has another qualification, say 'imitation', it cannot be compounded with 'smith'. 'Imitation-



goldsmith' is not a proper use because the word being in need of 'imitation' cannot be compounded with 'smith'. If it is compounded it cannot need any other word. Qualified words cannot be compounded and if compounded cannot be qualified<sup>1</sup>. Qualification can be used only for the whole and not for the part. We can use any adjective for 'goldsmith' but we cannot use any either for 'gold' or for 'smith'. This is because constituting words are fused together leaving their individuality and therefore cannot be qualified. Therefore need cannot be a determining factor for compounding words.

If we review the position of the two views given above we find one thing in common. Whether constituting words leave their individual meaning or they retain, they form a whole. Their referend is a unity. Compounded words refer to one whole and not to different referends as is done in sentences. Compounded words leave their meaning for the sake of one whole, or they combine their meaning to form one whole. In any case their difference is bridged over in compound. Compound words mean one referend, and therefore it is treated as one word. Constituting words do not mean individually.

The Nyâya and the Mīmāṃsâ schools do not admit a separate meaning in compound names. Compounded words mean separately as they mean in sentences. Words 'gold' and 'smith' mean separately and they are united to form a whole only in mind. They do not present one whole as their meaning. The cases where compound words mean something more than the collection of the meaning of their constituents is explained by lakṣaṇâ or transference. The word 'policeman' means 'a man belonging to the police'. 'Police' and 'man' put together cannot give the intended meaning. When they are compounded a new element of their mutual relation is introduced into the body of their meaning, which is apparently not the meaning of the word 'police' or of the word 'man'. It is

1. saviśeṣaṇānām vṛttir na vṛttasya ca viśeṣaṇam na prayujyate.

M. B., ibid.

the result of their combination. Grammarians take this fact as a strong proof for the support of their theory of *ekârthibhāva*. But the *Naiyāyikas* explain this by saying that the word 'police' in the 'policeman' does not mean 'police' as it means ordinarily but it means 'of police' or 'belonging to police'. This new element of relation is introduced not by the compound itself, but by the transference of meaning. Just as the word 'Ganges' sometimes means 'bank' so also the word 'police' here means 'belonging to police'. Every case of compound, where some new element is introduced into the body of the meaning, is explained by the help of transference. They do not accept that new element as the meaning of the compound itself<sup>1</sup>.

The absurdity of this position is apparent. Firstly, the *Nyāya* position accepts that some new element is introduced in the meaning of compound words, but it is slow to recognise it as the result of the compound. They accept this new element as the result of compounding words. But whether this element is owing to words compounded or owing to the whole, it is definite that this new element is introduced only when those words are compounded. The word 'police' according to this position, means 'belonging to police' only when it is compounded with the word 'man'. In its free use it never means so. Again the compound word embodies this meaning as a whole and not partwise; otherwise how can the word itself be meaningful. Thus the meanings of constituents become the meaning of the whole.

Secondly, in all cases of compounding transference is not possible. Take the example of the word 'barefoot'. It means 'a man having the feet bare'. In this case we have two new elements in the body of the meaning of the word which is not

---

1. (a) *Sabdaśakti-prakāśikā*. K. 43-44.

(b) *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*. p. 147-148.

(c) For the metaphysical reason of such view see Chapter III. Their view here is governed by their theory of relation between a word and sentence.



given by constituting words. We have the notion of a third entity which has bare feet and also the notion of relation, i. e. having bare feet. Neither of these two is given by compounding words. According to the position of Nyāya these are obtained by transferring words from their original senses to new senses. Now, which of these two words is transferred? Does the word 'bare' stand for 'a man having bare' or is it the word 'foot' which stands for 'a man having foot'? In the first case the whole would mean 'a man having bare is foot'. Because according to the rules a referend cannot be combined with the part of another referend<sup>1</sup>. Here 'bare' is only a part of the referend 'a man having bare' and thus cannot be united with another referend 'foot'. It can only be united with the whole. The second alternative is even worse. If the word 'foot' itself means 'a man having foot', what will be the fate of the word 'bare'. It will mean, if it will mean at all, 'a bare man having foot'. But this is not the meaning of the word 'barefoot'. Therefore, transference of meaning in compound words is not the universal explanation<sup>2</sup>.

Thirdly, according to the Nyāya school the whole is different from its parts. Parts contribute to the whole, but the whole is over and above its parts.<sup>3</sup> Atoms are not visible to our eyes but their aggregate is a visible body. The meaning of the compound word being a whole is though made of parts is different from its parts. It has something which its parts do not have and thus the saying that the meaning of a compound word is only an aggregate of its parts is against the accepted canon of the school.

—000—

1. padārthaḥ padārthenānveti natu padārthakadeśena.

—Vyutapattivāda.

2. Bhāṣaṇa, 5. 3.

3. tasmāt samuditāṇusamavasthānasyārthāntarasya jātivīṣe'abhivya-  
ktivīṣayatvād avayavyarthāntarabhūtaḥ.

—Vātsyāvana Bhā. 2. 1. 36.

## CHAPTER V

### VERBS

#### ( 1 )

As names are signs for static things, verbs are for dynamic reality. Space is static while time is dynamic. Time is the presupposition of change. One and the same thing cannot be at two different places at one and the same time. Some time must elapse to make this change possible. Things are said to stand in the relation of cause and effect because they are in time. A causes B; the coming of B from A is not simultaneous with the coming A. If they were simultaneous, no causation would be possible. It is the process of coming into existence from its cause that is presented by a verb in language. When it has come into existence, it ceases to change. But one cannot arrest the process itself and speak of it in language. It is the effect of the change that enables language call the process a verb. The process being purely a change can never be stopped unless it reaches its culmination. The verb 'to go' never presents the process itself, because the process itself is never visible. One traverses space from one point to another and this changing of place is called by the verb 'going'. But really it is the agent of 'going' that is visible and not the agent as changing one place for another. He has occupied one place or other at every time. We say 'He is going' because we see that the previous point in space has been left and another point is occupied. This change of place is not possible without some activity on the part of the agent and thus the activity is inferred.

'To cook' is a verb. But when analysed it is found that within the body of 'cooking' many other intermediary processes are involved. One blows the fire, puts the pot on it, pours raw grain into the pot, sits there, stirs the content of the pot,



and so many other actions he does. But while doing all that he is said to cook. Even sitting by the side of the fire-place is counted as cooking. Similarly in walking there are various efforts in the body of the man. The total of these physiological movements is given the name of walking. Verb therefore is a name for the collection of various activities directed to a result.<sup>1</sup> If we take these activities in isolation, without any reference to the result to which they are directed, no verb will be possible. What one could say would be only describing various movements. Similarly, if we take the effect alone without any reference to the activity by means of which it has been accomplished, that would be an unexplained occurrence and may be said to be static like things in space. It will be a substance. A verb, therefore, embodies both activity and the result thereof.

A verb cannot mean the effect alone. Cooking is not bread, it is the process of turning wheat into bread. An action directed to some result is referred to by a verb. A verb is a composite name for actions and their result. *Phala* and *vyâpâra* are, therefore, said to constitute the meaning of a verb.<sup>2</sup>

( 2 )

A verb is defined as 'bhâvapradhâna' by Yâska.<sup>3</sup> The word 'bhâva' is used in the sense of the result of action. It is the result which is predominant in the meaning of a verb; action is only secondarily meant. Action is directed to a result and the aim of the action is only to obtain the result. Another interpretation of the phrase 'bhâvapradhânamâkhyâtam' is stated in a quite different way. The word 'bhâva' is synonymous with action. Action is the chief factor in the meaning of a verb while other instruments only help to complete this action. This is the reason why one asks 'What

1. V. P. III. 8. 1.

2. Bhūṣaṇa K. 2

3. bhâvapradhânam âkhyâtam. Nirukta. 1. 1.

is he doing'? the answer is: 'He is cooking'. The question is about the activity and so is the answer.<sup>1</sup>

Patanjali deals with these two interpretations in detail. Verb-root is defined as meaning action. Action is some sort of movement and this cannot be demonstrated like a material body. It is inferred. All other conditions being constant, one is said to be 'cooking' in one case and 'not cooking' in another. That which is variable is the action. It is the action which makes the use of the word 'cooking' possible or impossible. Action is, therefore, the presupposition of change. It is that 'with the help of which one is here now and after that at some other place.' The sign of this action is that it can be used with the verb 'to do'. 'What are you doing?' The answer is 'writing.' 'What will you do?' or 'What have you done?' gets similar answers. Any sort of action can be combined with the verb 'to do' and this is enough to show that the action is the chief factor in the meaning of a verb.<sup>2</sup>

But when this definition of a verb is accepted such verbs as 'to be' or 'to exist' cannot be called verbs. They cannot be considered as standing for doing anything in particular. No body answers the question 'What are you doing?' by replying 'I am' or 'I exist'. These verbs cannot be combined with 'to do' and according to our previous definition they will cease to be verbs. Secondly, these verbs never mean some sort of action. 'To be' is not the same as 'to do' something. Being and doing are not related to each other. What is already complete and perfect (Being) can never be active. The reason is that Being is beyond time. It is changeless and thus beyond the reach of verbs. Verbs 'to be' or 'to exist' persent this fact.<sup>3</sup>

Patanjali therefore advances a second definition. A verb may be defined as 'bhâva-vacana'. The word 'bhâva' denotes positive existence. A verb means some existence ; it means the

---

1. See Durgâchârya on the above.

2. M. B. i. 3. 1. 1.

3. *ibid.*



existence of some result. Existence of some result is possible in those verbs also which are negative in result. 'To destroy' is to make something disappear, but disappearance also is the result of some action. In this sense it is said to mean some positive result. This is also signified by the verb 'to be' or 'to exist'. Being and existence indicate some positive result.<sup>1</sup>

In the previous interpretation also there is no logical defect. 'To be' or 'to exist' in a sense *means* action. Instruments in an action behave differently in different situations. The cooking of rice is different from the cooking of bread. Similarly 'being' is different from 'writing'. 'Being' means something static, but this also is a sort of action. One says about someone 'He has fever still' and by that he means that his fever has neither increased nor decreased. The use of the verb 'has' eliminates other possibilities and in this sense it can be called an activity and thus be associated with the past, present or future. Such questions as 'What are you doing?' are not directed to know the static action; they want to know some specific action and therefore they cannot be answered by saying 'I am' or 'I exist'. Where one is in doubt even about one's existence the answer to the question 'What is he doing?' is positively given by saying 'He is'. A verb, therefore, means both action and the result of that action.<sup>2</sup>

( 3 )

Maṇḍana Miśra defines a verb as meaning the result the notion of action being according to him, the result of the suffixes added to verbs. 'To go' means only 'to be in contact with the next point in space'. Suffixes add the notion of action to the meaning of the verb-root and the whole verb 'goes' means 'one person is acting in such a way that he may come in contact with the next point in space'. Where action has

---

1. *ibid.*

2. M. B. 1. 3. 1. 1.

ceased, no suffix need be added to the root ; it is used only when the result is not yet reached and thus the notion of action is necessary.<sup>1</sup>

A goes to B. A is a person who by his peculiar activity of coming into contact with next point in space goes to B, a point away from where A is standing. Going is, therefore, 'coming in contact with next point in space'. Contact is a relation and must have two terms. Here the contact is both in A and B. The result of action, contact, therefore, is equally present in B as it is in A. Thus according to the contention of Maṇḍana one can say 'B goes' with as much justification as he says 'A goes', because the result is equally present in B. Similarly 'to give' and 'to throw' will mean one and the same thing according to this position. 'To give' is 'to disconnect one's possession from the thing'. 'To throw' means the same thing. The result i. e. the disconnection of possession, is the same in both these and thus they will become synonymous. Thus the result alone cannot be the meaning of a verb.<sup>2</sup>

If action alone is accepted as the meaning of a verb and the result is taken as the meaning of the suffixes, the difficulty still remains. 'A goes to B' and 'A leaves B' are two examples. In the first example A departs from a point and goes to another point B. In the second example A departs from B only to join another point. In the first case action in A may mean departure, as he departs from a place where he was standing, moves to B, and in the second example the action in A means 'coming in contact' which is really the meaning of the verb 'to go'. Thus 'to go' may mean 'to depart' and 'to depart' may mean 'to go'. The verbs 'to go' and 'to leave', however should mean differently than what

---

1. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi p. 101.

2. Manjūśā, p. 531.



they are supposed to mean. This view, therefore, is not logically acceptable.<sup>1</sup>

( 4 )

Action and the result of action cannot be placed separately. Both are meanings of verbs. Action without any result is at random, and the result without some action is useless. Only their combination completes the meaning of a verb. They stand to each other in the relation of qualification (viśeṣaṇa) and qualified (viśeṣya). The result is the qualification of action. This is so because the result is produced by action. 'To go', therefore, means such action which produces the result of 'coming in contact with the next point in space'.

This view attaches more importance to action. Action is more important than its result. In 'I eat' the meaning of the verb is, in the first instance, 'putting something into the stomach'. It is the process of putting which is first and the result to which this process is directed comes second in the order of importance.

But this domination of action over the result is possible only when a verb is used in the active voice. In the passive voice the order of importance is reversed. In this case the emphasis shifts from action to the result of action. Action is made subordinate to the result. 'Rice is eaten by me' is an example of the passive voice. Here the verb 'to eat' is changed in its meaning. It no longer stands primarily for action, as it is used to stand in its active voice. The emphasis has shifted from action to the result. The result is more important and action is given a secondary position in the meaning of the verb. This change of emphasis from action to the result of action is

1. (a) *ibid*, p. 335-36.

(b) *vyāpāro bhāvanā saivotpādanā saiva ca kriyā, kṛṇō' karma-katāpatter nahi yatnōrtha iṣyate.*

*Bhūṣaṇa K. 5. and Sāra on it.*

the key to get at the heart of the change of voice. Therefore, where the verb is in the active voice the meaning of the verb would be 'action directed to a result'. But when it is in the passive voice the meaning of the verb becomes 'the result achieved by action'. But in any case action and the result of that action cannot be isolated from each other in the meaning of a verb<sup>1</sup>.

Voice is changed in the case of transitive verbs only. The transitive character of a verb depends upon the result and its location (âśraya), 'X carries a book' is an example of a transitive verb. Here the result of carrying is in the book (it is the book which is carried), while the action is in X. Though the action and the result thereof are meanings of one verb yet their locations differ. The bearer of action (vyâpârâśraya) is different from the bearer of the result (phalâśraya) and this is the peculiarity of transitive verb.

In intransitive verbs the bearer of action and the bearer of result are one and the same. In 'I sit' the result of sitting is in me and I am also the bearer of the action of sitting. In me both the action and the result coincide. In the case of intransitive verbs the change of voice is not possible. The reason for this is that in the change of voice the bearer of action and the bearer of result change their positions and this is possible only when they are different. In intransitive verbs both the action and the result remain in one, and thus they cannot be interchanged.<sup>2</sup>

## I

## SUFFIXES OF VERBS

## ( 1 )

The two parts of the meaning of a verb, action and its result, are the sources of the nominative and the accusative

---

1. Bhûsaṇa Sāra K. 2.

2. svārthavyâpâra-vyadhikaraṇaphalavâcakatvam vâ sakarmakatvam. ibid. K. 5.



cases. The bearer of action is called nominative and the bearer of the result is used in accusative case. The action and its result are the meanings of the verb itself while the bearer is denoted by the suffixes added to verbs.

There is a great controversy about the nature of the meaning of suffixes. The older school of Nyâya accepted the result of action as the meaning of the verb-root and animated action ( *kṛti* ) as the meaning of the suffixes added to those roots.<sup>1</sup> Every verb can be associated with the verb 'to do', because doing is possible only where life exists. Motion in inanimate things is not possible. Every verb presupposes the existence of some animate being. A suffix added to a verb means this animal motion and the complete verb would mean the result achieved by some animal motion. A nominative is that where action starts and the accusative is that where the result rests. In such examples where motion is attributed to some inanimate being, the use of verb is only in a secondary or metaphorical sense. 'The train is running' is an example where, according to the view, motion cannot be attributed to the train as it is not an animated being. It is only the motion in the driver of the train that is imposed upon the train and it is said to be running.

This view, as stated above, presupposes a wider theory of causation advocated by the school. Atoms are motionless and they require external motion from God or the *adr̥ṣṭa* (accumulated force of *karmas*). The theory of *adr̥ṣṭa* is advanced to explain motion in the universe. Otherwise, material atoms would have been static. Motion cannot belong to a nonanimate being; it is imparted to them from outside. Motion is an exclusive property of spirit. This same principle, when applied in language, gives birth to such theories as given above. In language the animate being is referred to as necessarily occu-

1. *jīvanayonyādi - nikhila - yatnagatam yatnatvameva tīṇaḥ śakyatā-vacchedakam* —*Sabdaśakti Prakāśika*. K. 97.

pying a position. Without it the use of language cannot be conceived. This animate being enters into language in the form of nominatives. Nominatives in language, therefore, should always stand for animate beings.<sup>1</sup> The agent initiates motion and aims at some result to be achieved by his motion. The whole set up of language depends, according to this view, upon the nominative and nominative is the chief factor in language to which other parts are subordinated. The nominative is the bearer of action, and he directs this action towards some result. Animate motion is the meaning of suffixes and the result is the meaning of the verb-root.<sup>2</sup>

The first thing that attracts our attention in this theory is the contention that inanimate beings cannot primarily be used as nominatives. They are so used only in a transferred sense. In our daily life we use inanimate nominatives without the slightest consciousness of the transference of meaning. Transference of meaning is a deliberate process. Both the speaker and the hearer are conscious of such transference. The word 'Gaṅgā' in the sentence 'The village is on the Gaṅgā', to take the stock example, is used to mean 'bank' deliberately. The user has to exercise special effort in using that word in a transferred sense. Where there is no such effort the word is ordinarily used. 'The train is running' or 'Fire burns' are examples where nominatives are inanimates and, according to the theory, are used in a transferred sense. But no one on the earth (including the Naiyāyika himself) ever exercises any special effort to understand the meaning of the words used as nominatives. Their meaning is understood in exactly the same way in which the meaning of animate nominatives is understood. The word 'train' or 'fire' means what it does mean in ordinary

1. In the last resort all effort and motion must stem from spirit. This doctrine has quite an Aristotelian appearance.
2. kartṛtvam ca caitraḥ pacatītyādaḥ kriyānukūla-kṛtīreva. tasyā evānukūlakṛtitvena kṛtitvena vākhyātavācyatā. ratho gacchati, kāsthā pacatītyādaḥ ca kriyānukūlavypārārūpe kartṛtve nirūdhā lakṣaṇā. Vyutpattivāda, p. 326.



discourse. Their position in nominative cases does not necessitate any change in their meaning. No transference is apparent in the cases where words standing for inanimate objects are used in the nominative case. Thus if the possibility of transference in such cases is rejected the whole contention of the Nyâya vanishes. If inanimate nominatives can be used in their primary sense, the nominatives cannot necessarily be regarded as the bearers of animate motion. Thus *kr̥ti* or animated motion cannot be the legitimate meaning of a suffix. A verb means motion in general. It includes both animal and mechanical motions.<sup>1</sup>

Animate motion cannot be the meaning of suffixes. But there may not be any harm in accepting action as the meaning of suffixes and the result as the meaning of verbs. The logic advanced in favour of this view is that verbs primarily mean action. What is primary in a verbal knowledge is the meaning of suffixes. Both root and suffix mean together but the meaning of suffixes dominate over the meaning of the root. The action being predominant in the meaning must, therefore, be the meaning of suffixes and not of verbs.<sup>2</sup>

This position does not appear very sound. If action is the meaning of suffixes and not of roots, a verb used without any suffix will not mean action. But when one says 'Go' ! who can deny that the word means only the result and not the action. The word is used here to emphasise action, and not the result. What the hearer is expected to do when that word is uttered is *to be* in contact with some other point in space. And this is possible only when some action takes place. Here this notion of activity is emphasised and the result is made subordinate. According to the view in question the notion of action would not have been possible here because it has no suffixes which are the only elements in verbs meaning action. Secondly, the notion of a verb without meaning action is

---

1. Manjūśā, p. 737.

2. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi p. 110-112.

against the usage of the word 'verb' in language. In ordinary language the verb always stands for activity. Action, therefore, cannot be the meaning of the suffixes. It must be the meaning of verbs.

We now propose to consider the rule which says that the meaning of suffixes predominates over the meaning of roots. If we try to find out the basis for this rule we have to examine the nature of suffixes and roots. The root is a general word with a wide meaning. It can be used in a variety of contexts and circumstances. Its confinement to a particular context and to a particular meaning is possible only when some check is put on it to restrict the wide meaning of the root. This check is provided by adding suffixes to the root. Suffixes limit the scope of roots. The root verb 'to be' means mere existence. It can be applied to any situation where we want to mean existence. It is applicable to past, present or future existences alike. It can also mean existence in one, two, three or more nominatives. But when this verb stands in its naked form it means nothing more than existence. To mean a certain particular existence there must be some suffix added to limit the general nature of verbs to be used in a particular situation. Truly speaking, the verb could not have been used in a language without some addition of suffixes which limit the meaning and makes it apt for a particular situation. Suffixes make the sense of verbs communicable, because communication is always the communication of the particular. This is the reason why the meaning of a suffix dominates over the meaning of verbs.<sup>1</sup>

But the importance of suffixes cannot be over-emphasised. The rule may be applicable in a majority of cases but it may not be a universal rule. The result always depends upon action, while action may not depend upon any result. The scope of action is wider than the scope of the result. There may be an action without any result, but there

---

1. M. B. 3. 1. 1. 1-2.



cannot be a result without any activity. Being an effect the result must have some cause and cause is always taken as active. Activity, therefore, is the chief element in the meaning of a verb to which the result is subordinate. But as no verb is possible without meaning action, action must be the meaning of the verb itself ; it can never be the meaning of suffixes. Action is the meaning of the root and is predominant. We are logically forced to accept this case as an exception to the rule.<sup>1</sup>

In the meaning of a verb, the result is a check to action. Action is a very general term, and in a sense it is the same in every case. It is named differently only because of some particular result associated with it. 'To go' is a verb because the result of 'coming into contact with the other point in space' is associated with action. An action associated with a result makes a complete verb. Action and its result are the meaning of the root-verbs and action dominates over the result. Everything other than action and its result is the meaning of the suffixes and not of verbs.

Action and the result of action cannot be the meaning of suffixes. Suffixes only mean the bearer of the action or the result, as the case may be. They may even mean qualities of action or result. We can know through these suffixes the time of action or the mode in which an act is done. We can, again, know through these suffixes the description of the bearer. The use of suffixes indicates the number and gender of nominatives and accusatives. We shall now consider these topics in brief.

## II

### TENSES AND MOODS OF VERBS

#### ( 1 )

All the suffixes of verbs are only qualifications either of action or of the result of that action. Neither action nor

---

1. Bhūsaṅasāra K. 2.

result is the meaning of the suffixes. They are meant by the verb itself. Meanings other than these two are supplied by the suffixes. The notion of time is one of the meaning figuring in a complete verb. Any verb is used only in time. A timeless verb is only conceptual. But is this time the meaning of the suffixes or of the verb itself? In order to answer this question we have to go a little away from our logical enquiry. We have to consider the nature of time as it is.

A verb stands for change, and change presupposes time. A change cannot be without time. A verb stands for change in time. Thus if change is to be meant in language it must denote or specify time, and this time is indicated in language by tenses. Tenses are, therefore, the time in which action or change takes place.<sup>1</sup> What is not present may have gone before or may not have yet occurred. The previous case is the case of past time and the latter is a case of future time. The past and future times are determined by the present time. Thus there can be three and only three kinds of time that can be used in language. But these three times are possible because there is something that changes. How could there be the notion of change if there is nothing to change?

Time presupposes something that changes in time. This change of something is in itself universal and can assume any time. For a change to occur a specific time is not necessary.<sup>2</sup> Change presupposes time in general. But this change in time makes the notion of specific time possible. The notion of past, present or future time is possible only when a change in time occurs. Thus the notion of time in general is the presupposition of verbs, while the cognition of specific time depends upon the thing changing.<sup>3</sup> Time is the presupposition of change and must be the meaning of the verb itself. But

---

1. V. P. III. 9. 3-5.

2. *ibid.* 10.

3. *ibid.* 37.



the specific time is the meaning of the suffixes because it is externally given.

Suffixes mean specific time but they do not give anything new, because time in general is presupposed by the verb itself. These suffixes only specify or determine the general time. They do not mean but only indicate time. Suffixes only limit the scope of time in general which is presupposed by verbs and present it in a determined form. The determination of time by suffixes makes the use of a verb in a particular tense possible. Suffixes specify the quality of action.<sup>1</sup>

The determination of time in general depends upon the present time. If there is no present one cannot have the notions of past and future. But, what is this present time? This may be defined as that moment where action starts and is not yet finished. Action is not one whole; it is series of movements. This series is called by particular names because of the result to which they are directed. Going, for example, is not one single action. It involves many intermediary actions all directed to a specific result. Every intermediary process contributes to the accomplishment of that goal. But an action cannot be analysed and seen in its primary units. They cannot be sensed. Only inference is capable of revealing the presence of action. The constituents of action are momentary; therefore, they cannot make a whole; the whole is inferred by the accomplishment of a particular result.<sup>2</sup> Thus what we call action in present time is logically impossible. There is no present. Everything is running rapidly. What we call as present has gone back and something new has come in its place. The consciousness of present time is illusory. There is no such time which can be called as present time. If present time is not possible how can there be a past or a future time?<sup>3</sup>

---

1. Manjūśā p. 830.

2. (a) V. P. III. 8. 4-9. (b) M. B. 1. 3. 1. 1.

3. Manjūśā p. 858.

If time is momentary how can an action take place in it ? The whole world is either static or illusory. Neither the agent nor the changing thing can stay for more than one moment. One cannot say 'The wheel is going round' or 'The arrow is thrown'. No action is possible if time is momentary. Motion is impossible in all the times.<sup>1</sup>

Thus what we see and say about changes in past, present or future is only by courtesy. Motion and change is not possible. But to explain the occurrences in the world we are forced to introduce the notion of time in language. The notion of time is only mental. Time is a mental construction, it cannot exist in the outside world. The division of time in past, present, and future is only a subjective division. It is not based on factual grounds.<sup>2</sup>

Verbs are names for change. Change is possible only when time is possible. But time is not possible in the sense of one eternal whole. It must be momentary and constantly flowing. What is taken as a group of time is only a construction. There is no present and, therefore, no past and no future. But we can construct in our mind some stable whole of time to which we can give the names of past, present or future. This constructed time is said to be the cause of change and enables the use of tenses in language.<sup>3</sup> Verbs mean time only in this constructed sense. An action is possible in all the three times. But to be used in language it must be specified as related to past, present or future time. Verbs mean time in general, but their specific nature is revealed by the addition of suffixes. These suffixes do not mean time as time is the presupposition of verbs themselves, but they limit the range of actions to a specific time. Suffixes

---

1. (a) V. P. III. 9. 84-87.

(b) *nāsti vartamānaḥ kāla iti. apicātra ślokaṃ udāharanti—na vartate cakram iṣur na pātyate na syandante saritaḥ sāgarāya. etc. etc. M. B. 3. 2. 123*

2. V. P. III. 9. 88.

3. (a) *ibid.* 68-69. (b) *Manjūṣā* pp. 858-64.



only indicate the time of action. Time is really the meaning of the verb itself, but suffixes are necessary to indicate the specific time in which the speaker wants to use a verb.

Tenses are, therefore, necessary in language. We cannot use a verb without specifying the time of action. Action is intimately related with time. But the time in general cannot be communicated and even if communicated cannot mean anything. For meaningful communication the time of action must be specified. Tenses in language serve this purpose.

( 2 )

Time is the presupposition of verbs. A verb cannot be without some time. A verb is either in past or in present or in future. It is always presented in a time specified by suffixes. But is there any use of verbs in which suffixes do not mean time? Does the use of verbs in imperative mood give the sense of specified time? When I say 'Go' ! no particular time is referred to by the verb.

With regard to the cases of command the possibility of past time is eliminated. What has already been done cannot be ordered to be done again. The command may mean either the present or the future time, but never the past. The 'oughts' in ethics and other commands from persons and sacred books etc. are always effective in present or in future. 'One should always speak the truth' is an 'ought' of ethics. One who is ignorant of the nature of these 'oughts' may speak as he likes ; when he comes across this command in some holy books he may repent for his lyings in past and try to conform to the command in future. He cannot revert to the past and correct his lyings. The command for a person is effective in the present or future times; it cannot be effective in the past. But the command itself is universal. It is a perpetual truth. The command to speak the truth is true in the past, present or future whether anyone knows it or not. But for a person who has known it, it is

effective only in present and future. A command is helpless with regard to what has gone before.

But even present time does not properly figure in commands. The present time is that which is contemporary of the knowledge of command. An order can be effective only after it is given. Howsoever immediate the obeying may be, it cannot be simultaneous with the knowledge of the command. In this sense command is always for the future. It is neither for the past nor for the present. 'Do it now' always means 'Do it in the immediate future'. The word 'now' stands for the immediately following time and not for the time contemporaneous with the utterance of the word 'now'. Such contemporary notion of time is always impossible. Thus commands stand for future.

The mood of verbs means 'a command to do an act in time to come'. These moods are indicated by the suffixes. Moods are, as such, the modes in which an act is done. Like time moods are also presupposed by verbs. An act can be done only in a certain way. The mode is inseparable from action and thus always presupposed by action. An act is always an act done in some particular way. And thus mood is a necessity in language. Verbs are always used in moods.

Acts are done in a specific way. This is why it is largely determined by the nature of results to be achieved. An act as such can be done in different ways and, therefore, verbs as such may mean modes in general. The speaker intending to refer to a specific mode limits the generality by using suffixes. Suffixes specify the mood in which a verb is used. The specific mood in which a verb is used is indicated by suffixes but the mood itself is the meaning of the verb.

Moods are not in opposition with tenses. A verb is used both in a specific mood and also in a specific tense. In imperative moods verbs are used in the future tense. The command is to be obeyed in the time immediately following



it. But there are commands which are beyond the bounds of specific time. They are commands for all time. 'Speak the truth' is an example which is used in the imperative mood. But this mood in itself is not associated with a specific time, yet it is not beyond time. It is to be obeyed in this world of time. It is associated with time in general; no specific time is necessary for it. The rule that a verb must be used in a specific time does not hold good in the case of universal commands. But even in these cases verbs necessarily refer to time in general.

( 3 )

Time and modes qualify action. An action is always presented in time and in a mode. These are inseparably associated with action. The action of the verb is, therefore, always qualified by time and mode which are called tense and mood respectively. It is necessary for verbs to be used in a tense and also in a mood. Suffixes added to verbs indicate the specific kinds of time and mode of action. Tenses and modes are the meanings of verbs, but suffixes indicate the specific nature of them. Suffixes depend upon the intention of the user. The user of language can use any suffix he likes to specify any time or mode of the verb he uses. Suffixes are like lamps that reveal the hidden nature of verbs. They help them come forward; they do not make them occur.

Suffixes have to perform a two-fold function. On the one hand they have to reveal the peculiarities of verbs to which they are added and on the other hand they have to make the verb related to other words in a sentence. Tenses and moods are the results of the former function. Secondly, they mean the bearer of action or of the result. Verbs, have a two-fold meaning. They mean an action directed to a result. But these actions and results are not baseless. They have a bearer in which the action or the result is located. The bearer is naturally a static body, a name. Thus verbs are always

associated with names. Verbs cannot mean anything without some reference to a name. This reference to a name is meant by suffixes added to the verb. Suffixes mean the bearer of action when a verb is used in the active voice and they mean the bearer of the result when verbs are in passive voice. But they cannot mean the bearer as such because the bearer of action is a totally different entity meant by names. Suffixes only mean a relation of location and not exactly the bearer. The relation of location is the same in two cases. In the active voice the relation of location is from action to a name, but in the passive voice this same relation is from the result to a name. Those names that are related to action, i. e. those who bear the action are called as agents and are used in nominative case. Those names that bear the result are called objects of the verb and are used in the accusative case.<sup>1</sup> We shall discuss the nature of cases presently. Here our aim is to bring out the role of verbal suffixes in language. Thus suffixes on the one hand indicate the mood and tense of the verb to which they are attached and on the other hand they relate the action or the result to a name by the relation of location. This relation of location is the meaning of these suffixes. Where suffixes are not used, they are presumed to exist because the verb cannot contain all those meanings in its body. If one uses 'go' in the present tense and plural number one thereby means that the verb 'to go' has a relation to its nominative which is plural, and it is in the present tense, the meaning of the suffixes is absorbed in the body of the verb itself. Here suffixes are to be used, but they are not used because of the convention of the language. In Samskrit grammar such cases are explained by introducing the usual suffixes and subsequently eliding them (lopa) in order to make the meaning of suffixes clear. Logically, suffixes are to be necessarily used with words; where they are not used they are presumed to exist. Words cannot be used without suffixes. In some cases, though words are used in language without suffixes, yet they

---

1. Bhūṣanasāra K. 2.



are the cases where the meaning of the suffixes is understood. Thus in such case of the use of words ( both names and verbs ) the use of suffixes is obligatory.

### III

#### COMMAND : THE MEANING OF VERBS

So far we have discussed the general nature of verbs and their parts. We have also discussed the contribution of each part of the verb to the whole meaning. But our treatment of verbs here will be incomplete if we do not discuss the well-known view of the Mimāṃsā. This school holds that in every verb command is implied. Action represents command. Any statement is a statement commanding to do a certain act. Even the statements of fact are meaningful because they indirectly command to do an act. The narrated story of the Rāmāyaṇa means not simply the fact of Rama's life, but it means that 'one should act as Rāma acted and not as Rāvaṇa'. Every use of verbs implies command. A verb cannot be meaningful if it does not command.<sup>1</sup>

This theory is in close conformity with the utilitarian ethics of the school. Acts are done for the benefit of the individual. If a thing does not either do good or harm to a man it cannot concern him. Any act which he does is for his benefit. He is active for his own good or for avoiding harm that is forthcoming. Anything that is neither good nor harmful does not concern the individual. One does not indulge in random actions. Those who act without such an aim are only lunatics. A sane person cannot do an act which is without any purpose.<sup>2</sup>

1. (a) vidhinātvekaṣvākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnām syuḥ Jaimini Sūtra. 1. 2. 7.
- (b) stuti-śabdās stuvantah kriyām prarocayamānā anuṣṭhātṛnām upakariṣyanti kriyāyāḥ, evamimāṇi sarvāṇyeva padāni kancidartham stuvanti vidadhāti. atah pramāṇam. Śābara B. ibid.
- (c) Prakaraṇapāncikā p. 104-105.
2. (a) codanā lakṣaṇo' rtho dharmah. Jaimini Sū. 1. 1. 2.
- (b) Codanā-iti kriyāyāḥ pravartakam vacanam āhuh...tayā yō lakṣyate, sorthaḥ puruṣam nihśreyasena saṁyunaktīti prati-jānīmahe Śābara B. ibid.

The same principle when applied in language gives birth to the view stated above. The attention of a man is attracted to a statement which concerns him. That which does not concern him is meaningless for him. A statement of fact is meaningless in itself because it does not produce any good to the individual to whom it is addressed. But if it contains some commands, some order to be obeyed for good, it is meaningful and thus concerns the individual.<sup>1</sup>

Command is that which makes one active. This command is always in the form of words. Words are the only commanders. Persons are secondarily said as commanding. A command does not depend upon the person who commands ; it rather depends upon the words that he utters. Words are true intrinsically ; they are known to be false afterwards, if some incompatible occurrence is found.<sup>2</sup> A person is not trustworthy because in a majority of cases his utterings have been found conflicting with facts. But this does not make his statement false *ab initio*. This only leads the hearer to infer a particular statement also as false. Personality, therefore, is not necessary to make a statement true or false, trustworthy or untrustworthy. A statement of command by its very nature is true and in this sense words are the only commanders.<sup>3</sup>

A command is not obeyed immediately. Before it is executed a complicated psychological process occurs in the person to whom it is addressed. I ask my brother to read a book. He hears me ; understands the meaning of the words uttered by me. He then realises the command as good and beneficial for him. And when he finds that what is commanded is within

---

1. Kāryam eva hi sarvatra pravṛttāv ekakāraṇam. Prakaraṇapancikā, Vākyārthamātrkā II.

2. Sāstradīpikā 1. 1. 5.

3. (a) Jaimini Sūtra 1. 1. 29.

(b) For an elaborate discussion on the nature of command as meaning of a verb see Prakaraṇapancikā-Vākyārthamātrkā pp 188-196.



his reach and there is no harm in obeying the order, he executes my order. There are, thus, three mental factors in the execution of an order :

1. its helpfulness,
2. possibility of its execution, and
3. harmlessness.

When a person gets satisfactory answers to the questions he commences to perform what is commanded. If any of the three is answered in the negative he cannot perform the order. If my brother realises that the reading of the book is not helpful for him at that time, or that he cannot read the book commanded as it is beyond his capacity or that it would be harmful for his health to read the book at that time, he cannot obey my order.<sup>1</sup>

When the scope of free thinking is lessened by emotional or other pressures a man may execute an order against his will. A robber can take the bunch of keys from a person on the point of a pistol against the strongest will of the owner. All the three factors may check the performance, yet the person is forced to obey the order of the thief. Such cases are exceptions to the rule, but in normal cases commands involve these mental processes.

Rules of morality are framed on the basis of these factors. They are good for the people, their performance is within the reach of the person for whom they are intended and they are not harmful. Any religion acting contrary to these rules is not a religion but only a biased and self-interested view of the founder of that religion. All religions agree on this fundamental point. Thus apart from the abnormal situation in which error, compulsion and lack of foresightedness are

---

1. Bhāṭṭachintāmaṇi, p. 83.

included, in normal life the nature of every order or command involves a psychological process of the type given above. And these imperatives are conveyed by words and not by persons.<sup>1</sup>

Command is called *bhāvanā* in Samskrit. It can be defined as the imperative which is helpful for attaining a goal, not harmful and within the reach of the performer. It is always in the forms of words. It is, therefore, called as verbal command or *śābdi bhāvanā*. It is the imperative initiated by words and depending upon words.<sup>2</sup> There is another type of imperative which depends upon the *meaning* of the commanding words and not upon words themselves. It is called command-in-action, *ârthi bhāvanā*.<sup>3</sup> The former means the latter. An order is given, there is a command in words. One who follows the order translates that command into action. That is called as command-in-action. The latter is meant by the former.<sup>4</sup> This division of command is based upon the speaker-hearer attitude in language. The order which is conveyed by the speaker through language is translated into action by the hearer. The former is incomplete till it is translated. A command-in-word is useless unless practised. These two *bhāvanās* taken together form the meaning of command. A verb necessarily means these two types of command.<sup>5</sup>

There is no logical necessity forcing the acceptance of command-in-action. Command is meant generally by verbs used in imperative mood. It is known as soon as a verb is uttered. There is no need to accept another command-in-

---

1. Bhāttachintāmaṇi p. 84.

2. *sā ca śabdaśritatvāt śabdaśaktiḥ śabdavyāpāratvācca śabda-bhāvanetyucyate.*

ibid p. 90-

3. Ibid p. 91.

4. *arthabhāvanaiva śabdabhāvanā-bhāvyā ityarthah.* ibid.

5. *arthabhāvanāviśeṣaṇatvenaiva śabdabhāvanāyā anvayaḥ.*

ibid p. 93.



action just as no one accepts two meanings of a name. There is no division of the meaning of a name into verbal and actual meaning. Similarly there need not be any such division of command. What is command-in-words becomes command in action when actualised. There is no logical ground to give a separate status to the command-in-action in the meaning of commands.

The whole misunderstanding is based on the conception of the imperative or command. An imperative is effective only when carried out in practice. That practicability is the test of the imperative, no one will deny. But there is no guarantee that every imperative must be carried out in practice. But the Mīmāṃsā school accepts that every imperative must be carried out in practice in every case. This is the reason that an imperative, unless carried out in practice, is not complete, and therefore the introduction of command-in-action becomes necessary. But as language in itself is not a guarantee for practicability, it cannot and must not go beyond the meaning of words. Language cannot command practicability; it is concerned only with the communication of meaning. It completes its function when a meaning is communicated. It is not concerned at all with the question whether that meaning is practicable or not. It is the duty of law to see that an order is executed. Language never bothers about it. The conception of command-in-practice (*ārthī bhāvanā*) is a gratuitous conception from the point of view of language. Mīmāṃsā cannot hold this when it deals with language.

Again, it is not justified in saying that verbs mean only in imperative mood. We do get meaning from such uses of verbs which are not in imperative mood. A statement of fact is always meaningful in its apparent form. It does not require a translation in imperative mood for being meaningful. Every one understands the meaning from such uses. It is a grave violation of experience to deny meaning in such

uses of language. No one ever translates these statements in the imperative language to get at their meaning. They are meaningful in themselves.

Again, if for a moment we accept that verbs are meaningful only when translated in the imperative mood, we are not out of difficulty. As a rule the translation and the translated must have the same sense. Their meaning is identical. If there is any change they are independent statements. To take an example from the scriptures. There is a text 'They are peeling barley'.<sup>1</sup> According to the Mīmāṃsā school this sentence is meaningful only when translated into 'Peel barley'. The latter is the correct version of the former statement. But are these two statements identical from the point of view of meaning? No sane person will call them identical. They are two different statements. The former describes the fact as it is, and the latter prescribes what ought to be done. To say that the former statement does not mean anything is against experience. Thus the statement of fact has a meaning and its meaning is different from the meaning of verbs used in the imperative mood. Both of them are equally meaningful and their meaning is different from each other. One cannot be converted to the other, and if converted their meaning is lost. It is, therefore, logically wrong to say that verbs are significant only in imperative mood. Every use of the verb current in language is meaningful in its apparent form.

#### IV

#### CASES

So far our enquiry was confined to the study of verbs in themselves. We have analysed verbs into roots and suffixes. We have further studied the possible analysis of the meaning of root-verbs and suffixes. And with this our enquiry into the nature of verb and its meaning virtually ends. But if we

---

1. *brīhīṇ avahanti.*



do not consider verbs in relation to names our enquiry into the nature of verbs will be incomplete. In this section we shall try to consider the relation of verbs to names.

We have seen that the suffixes perform two-fold function. They indicate the time and mood in which a verb is used and they mean the relation of 'location'. Suffixes relate verbs to names. According to the voice of verbs suffixes mean the bearer of action or of result. The location of action is called the nominative and this nominative is related to verb by the suffixes. The location of result is similarly called the accusative in case. The bearer of action is the source (place) where motion initiates and the bearer of result is that where action produces a result. 'A breaks the pen'; here the action of breaking is in A and this action in A operating on the pen results in the breaking of it. 'A' is nominative and the 'pen' is the objective of the verb 'break'.<sup>1</sup>

We have said that the change of voice is possible only in transitive verbs. The active voice can be changed into passive without effecting any fundamental diviation in the meaning of the verb. This change of voice is only a shifting of emphasis from the nominative to the accusative. In the active voice the emphasis is more an action and its bearer and in the passive voice the emphasis of verb is on result and the bearer of result. In the former case the result is subordinated to action and, therefore the nominative is predominant. In the second case action is subordinated to the result and thus the accusative predominates. In the case of intransitive verbs action and its result reside in the same bearer. Here the accusative is not different from the nominative and thus the change of voice is not possible.

The place of nominative and accusative in language depends upon the verbs. Verbs are used to unite different names and to give the sense of unity. If the verb is removed

---

1. Pāṇini, 1. 4. 54 and 1. 4. 49.

from language, names will be disunited and they will not yield any meaning. All names are, therefore, to be used in relation to verbs. This relation of names to verbs is called 'case' ( Kâraaka ) in grammar.<sup>1</sup> Every name stands in relation to verbs directly or indirectly. A name through its relation to a verb helps in the accomplishment of the result of action, or facilitates the action itself. Patanjali defines a case as that which acts.<sup>2</sup>

Everything in the world has some power to make some action possible, says Bhartṛhari. A substance, if left without some power, cannot make change or action possible. An act is done because of the power in the thing itself. This power in things is called instrument for action. This power is expressed in language by 'cases'.<sup>3</sup>

According to the types of power of things there are types of cases. Nominatives and accusatives are directly helpful for action and to get at the result. They are bearers of action and the result of action. In the primary sense they are helpful for verbs. Other cases are helpful in action or result through nominatives or accusatives and they are thus cases in a secondary sense.

Nominatives and accusatives are bearers of action and its result respectively. But they bear these only when they themselves are firmly established. An agent ( nominative ) must take his stand on something before he can enter into action to get at some result. Similarly the result of action can take place only in that thing which is firmly placed. 'He sits on the mat' is an example where the agent of the sitting ( nominative ) is active on a locus 'mat'. The mat is the

- 
1. *Evam tarhi sāmānyabhūta kriyā vartate, tasyā nivartakam kārakam. M. B. 1. 4. 3. 23.*
  2. *Mahatyāḥ samjñāyāḥ karaṇe etat prayojanam anvarthāsamjñā yathā vijñāyeta, karoti kārakamiti-M. B. Ibid.*
  3. *V. P. III. 8. 2. and 25.*



bearer of the bearer of action and is thus associated with the verb 'to sit' through the nominative. Similarly in 'He cooks rice on the stove' the bearer of the result is 'rice' which is put on the stove. The stove is the bearer of the bearer of the result of cooking and thus indirectly connected with the verb. These secondary bases of action and the result of action may be expressed in a separate case in language. We call these as the locative ( *adhikaraṇa* ).<sup>1</sup>

Again, an agent may operate on the object without the help of some instrument or he may use some instrument to get at the result. The instrument used to get at the result by the agent is related to action through the agent and it may be used in a separate case. In grammar we call this case the instrumental case.<sup>2</sup>

The motion in the agent may be rigid motion or locomotion. The rigid motion is confined only to the nominative. But if it is locomotion it requires some other body. It presupposes a point from where the motion starts. In locomotion two distinct factors are found. One is the agent himself in which the motion inheres and the other is that base from which the motion in the agent starts. But again, that from which the motion in the agent starts may be interested in the departure of the agent or may be neutral. In the former case the base itself becomes another agent in the motion and is used in nominative case. In the latter case it is used in the *apādāna kāraka* or ( ablative case ). An example will illustrate this clearly. 'Leaves fall from the tree'. The action is in the leaves that are said to fall. This action is not rigid but locomotion. They require a base of departure. The 'tree' is that base from which the locomotion in the agent (leaves) begins, and hence it is helpful in the action through the agent and may be used in a separate case. This is an example where

---


1. Pāṇini—1. 4. 45. and *Kāśikā* on Ibid.

2. Ibid. 1. 4. 42. and M. B. on it.

the base itself is neutral in departure. But in the case where two trains collide and then depart from each other, each train is interested in departure and is helpful in locomotion. They are both agents in departure. We, therefore, say 'Trains depart' and not 'One train departs from the other'. If we say 'Trains depart from each other' we mean that one train is not mindful of the others' departure. One is indifferent in the departure of the other and thus is said to be in the *apâdâna kâraka*<sup>1</sup>.

Again an action may be done to get at some immediate result. 'Bring the pen' means that the act of bringing is so done that the pen is immediately at hand. But in some cases this immediate result is instrumental to get at some other result. 'Give this pen to X' is an example where the result of giving is in the pen, and it is thus used in the accusative cases. Pen is the immediate bearer of the result of action. But this result in the given example, is instrumental to get at another result. The object of giving is 'pen' and the giving of pen is for X. The bearer of the result (pen) points to another bearer X. X is helpful in the accomplishment of the result of giving through pen and thus may be used in a separate case. This case is called 'the dative' in grammar<sup>2</sup>.

We can now present the division of cases in the following way :



1. (a) Ibid. 1. 4. 24. and M. B. on in. (b) V. P. III 7(4) 5-7.

2. (a) Pāṇini. 1. 4. 32. and M. B. on it. (b) V. P. III 7(3) 1.



In these six types of cases, nominative and accusative are directly related to verbs. Karāṇa and apādāna are helpful in the action through kartā or nominative. Sampradāna helps in the achievement of result through the objective. Adhikarāṇa may be helpful both in action and its result by providing the basis for kartā and karma.

We have obtained six cases by placing nominatives and accusatives in different relations to verbs. But are there more relations possible between names and verbs? Certainly there are other relations possible between a name and a verb through nominatives and accusatives. The father of the agent helps in action by giving birth to the agent. The master helps the action of his servant. Are these relations also to be included in the category of cases? Pāṇini says that they are not to be called cases.<sup>1</sup> The main reason for this is that any relation other than these six are very remote helpers in the accomplishment of a result. Potter's father cannot be the cause of the pot that the potter makes. India cannot be the cause of the victory of its team in an international game. The potter's father or India can be the cause of the potter or the team but not of the action of the potter or that of the team. Four of the six cases help in action and result through either the agent or the object. But such other relations as the relation by birth, by subordination etc. do not help in achieving the result actively either directly or through agents and objects. An instrument is active in getting at the result. X is helpful actively in the giving of the pen. The tree is actively associated with the falling of leaves and the mat and the stove actively help in sitting and the cooking of rice. The father of the potter cannot be so active in the production of the pot as any of the instruments that the potter uses are. Thus any other relation than these six are not possible between a verb and a name, according to Pāṇini.<sup>2</sup>

---

1. Pāṇini 2. 3. 50.

2. (a) M. B., 2. 3. 3. 50.

(b) V. P. III. 7 (6) 1-2.

Pāṇini has given the maximum possible number of relations between a name and a verb. There cannot be more than six cases in any established language. But there may be less than six cases according to the usage in language. But there is a lower limit also for the number of cases in a language. No language is possible without the use of at least two direct cases i.e. nominative and accusative. The nature of verbs makes it impossible to reduce the number of cases to less than two or to eliminate the use of cases at all from a language. Language may vary in the use of cases from two to six in number. Logically, cases cannot be more than six and less than two in number. Languages adopt these cases according to their convention and usage.

Suffixes are related only to nominatives or accusatives as the verb is used in active or passive voice. They follow the number and, in some cases, the gender of these nominatives or accusatives as the case may be. Number and gender in verbal suffixes have nothing to do with action or result. They figure only in the bearers of these actions and the results. To secure uniformity in language the number and gender of names are imposed upon verbs through suffixes. Number and gender in suffixes indicate the number and gender in the bearers of action or in the bearers of the result. They do not mean anything of the sort in the verb itself.<sup>1</sup>

## V

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter we considered the nature of verbs. Verbs ordinarily mean action but these actions are directed to a result. Owing to this result a particular action is called by a particular name. Thus in the meaning of a verb the action and the result are the two fundamental elements. But action

1. ekatvavṛttibhāvābhyām bhedābheda-samanvaye.  
saṁkhyās tatopalabhyante saṁkhyeyāvayavakriyāḥ.  
V. P. III. 8. 41.



is change and change presupposes time. Therefore, every verb stands for a process in time. The time in general presupposed by verbs is particularized ( determined in a particular mode ) by the speaker according to his intention of referring to the occurrences in the past, present or future. Suffixes indicate the time of verbs and mean a particular time. An action is done in a certain way and that is the mode of action. Mode is invariably associated with action, and its particular phase is indicated by the speaker with the help of suffixes.

Apart from indicating the time and mode of action suffixes mean something more. By their very nature suffixes relate other parts of speech with verbs. They mean the relation of 'bearing'. Suffixes relate the action with the bearer of action when a verb is used in the active voice. They relate the result with the bearer of the result when a verb is used in the passive voice. The former is called the nominative and the latter accusative of the verb. Other names used in a sentence are related to verbs through these two and by combining these we get six types of relation that are possible between a name and a verb. A language cannot use less than two and more than six relations that are called cases. Verbs cannot mean number and gender. These are properties of names, and suffixes added to verbs indicate these in order to secure uniformity in language. A complete verb is a combination of the root and suffixes and produces a complex meaning. The function of logic is to analyse them and see them in their primary units. In this chapter we have shown this.

Thus far we have analysed names and verbs and their meaning. We have considered the various components that contribute to the meaning of the whole. What we have done thus far is only an analysis of speech. But speech is not names nor verbs but a combination of names and verbs. It is a whole. We shall now proceed to show how these names and verbs are united to form a whole.

---

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ŚĀBDABODHA

In the preceding two chapters we have discussed the nature of parts of speech. We have now to consider how these parts are united to form a whole. We have said in the beginning that metaphysical consideration about the relation of parts to the whole has been the determining force in the realm of language. We have also said that anvitābhīdhānavāda and abhihitānvayavāda spring from these considerations. The view about the relation among words in a formal sentence is called anvitābhīdhānavāda or abhihitānvayavāda as the case may be. A similar relation obtains among the meaning of words in a sentence. This view about the relation of the meaning of words *inter se* is called samsargatāvāda by the Nyāya and prakāratāvāda by the Mīmāṃsā.

#### I

Each word has a meaning. A vibhakti or case-sign is added to it in order to show the relation of the word to other words in a sentence. The relation is meant by these vibhaktis or suffixes appended to names or verbs. Words, according to the Mīmāṃsā, are independent of any relation to other words. When they are used in a sentence ; suffixes are added to them. These suffixes mean the particular relation in which a word stands to the other words of a sentence. The Nyāya holds that words have a perpetual relation to other words. They have implicit reference and thus the principle of relation is contained in them. Vibhaktis have only a secondary function. They merely indicate the particular relation of the word with other words. They do not mean that relation ; they only indicate it. For



the Mīmāṃsā suffixes are vācakas ( directly meaningful ) and for the Naiyāyikas they are dyotakas ( indicative ).

The consequence of this difference between the two views is far reaching in logic. In the view of Mīmāṃsā, which we shall call prakārtāvāda, the relation being the meaning of suffixes is one term in the śābdabodha ( verbal knowledge ) like other terms. In the sentence, 'nīlo ghaṭaḥ', the suffix after 'nīla' ( visarga ) means 'non-difference'. There are three distinct terms : 'nīla', 'non-difference' and 'ghaṭa'. 'Non-difference' is as valid a term as 'nīla' or 'ghaṭa' is. All the three are united in our verbal knowledge when the sentence ( nīlo ghaṭaḥ ) is uttered. It is clear that the relation also has become a term in Mīmāṃsā and is thus open to objections. Nyāya, therefore, holds that a relation cannot be a term among other terms. It is distinct from its terms and is inherent in them. The relation is existent in the verbal knowledge, but it is not of the same nature as the terms are. The relation is inherent in words and is specified by suffixes. Suffixes are added by the intention of the speaker in order to make the word mean a particular relation. The consciousness of a relation depends, therefore, on the intention of the person using a sentence and not on the use of the suffixes as the Mīmāṃsakas would hold. All relations of words *inter se* is called ākāṅkṣā-bhāsyā by the Nyāya.<sup>1</sup> This view is designated as samsargatā vāda.

The intention of the speaker plays an important role in language. The whole of language depends in a way upon the speaker. But in the samsargatā vāda the intention (ākāṅkṣā) is taken in a slightly different manner. Suffixes are not used out of any necessity, because they have no meaning of their own to contribute. They are used to indicate a particular relation which is meant by the word to which they are appen-

1. śābda-bodhe caika-padārthe para-padārthasya samsargāḥ samsarga-maryādāyā bhāsatē.

ded. The speaker according to Nyāya, wishes that a particular word should stand in a particular relation. He then employs a particular suffix to specify that relation. The use of a particular suffix is expedited not by any necessity on the part of suffixes themselves because they have no fixed meaning, but by the time-honoured convention which makes a particular suffix associated with a particular relation. The visarga after *nīla*, in the abovementioned example, does not necessarily mean 'non-difference' as the Mīmāṃsā would hold but only expresses the wish of the speaker that he wants to use the words '*nīla*' to mean something non-different from '*ghaṭa*'. In other words, the relation is not apparent in a sentence; it is determined by the intention of the speaker. But the prakāratāvāda holds that relation is apparent in a sentence. According to the former view it is supplied by the words themselves; according to the latter it is given from without, from suffixes that are different from the words to which they are appended. The samsargatā vāda and the prakāratā vāda are logical correlaries of anvitābhidhāna-vāda and abhihitānvaya vāda respectively.

In the Samskrit language adjectives correspond in number, gender and case to those of nouns and pronouns they qualify. In '*nīlam ghatam ānaya*' ( Bring the blue jar ) the suffix '*am*' in '*nīlam*' is the same as in '*ghatam*'. This '*am*' is the sign of a word used in the accusative singular case. *Ghaṭa* being an object of bringing is used in the accusative case. *Ghaṭa* is ordered to be brought. '*Am*' indicates this meaning. But does this '*am*' after *nīla* also indicate this same meaning? Certainly '*nīla*' is not to be brought with '*ghaṭa*', it only qualifies the '*ghaṭa*'. Is '*am*' then merely an unmeaning mark? The suffix after the adjective has a purpose to serve. It is used to show the correspondence of the adjective to a noun or pronoun. This correspondence shows that '*nīla*' is not different from '*ghaṭa*' to which it qualifies. According to the Mīmāṃsā the suffix means 'non-difference', but according



to the Nyāya it merely indicates that the word 'nila' is non-different from 'ghaṭa'.

The quality is non-different from the qualified. Blue is not different from the jar which it qualifies. This much is accepted by both the camps. They differ only on the mode in which this non-difference is meant. But what is this 'non-difference'? It may be analysed as the 'absence of difference'. Difference of blue is absent in the jar, in other words, the absence of blueness and jar do not co-exist together. These are not different. Here 'difference' stands for the 'other'. The jar (qualified) contains nothing other than blue-ness. This may also be expressed as 'the jar is not non-blue'. If we desire to express is symbolically we may use small letters for the quality and capital letters for the qualified. We may thus express this as 'A is not non-a'.<sup>1</sup>

This analysis does not go very far. The universal attributes have no absence and thus it would be illogical to say of their non-difference. Knowability, for example, is the attribute of all jars. There is not a single jar in the world which is not knowable; therefore to say that 'jar is not un-knowable' is illogical. There is not a single instance of the coexistence of absence of knowability and the presence of jar. And in order to eliminate this the sentence 'The jar is knowable' is used. The use of an adjective in language aims at eliminating the other. 'Blue' is used to eliminate non-blue. In the present case the adjective 'knowable' is invariably associated with jar and there is no possibility of the elimination of unknowable jars by the use of the word 'knowable'. Thus either the adjective 'unknowable' is useless, or it is a tautology. At least in this case the suffix after the adjective does not mean or indicate the absence of difference.<sup>2</sup>

1. bhedo' 'bhāvaśca viśeṣaṇa-vibhakter arthaḥ. viśiṣṭa-lābhastv-akāṅkṣādi-vaśāt. ibid. Ch. I.

2. atha prameyo ghaṭa ityātau prameyatvā-vacchinna-pratīyogitāka-bhedāprasiddhya.....viśeṣaṇa-vibhakter abhedarthakat-vasambhavaḥ. ibid. Ch. I.

The conception of non-difference, therefore, requires to be interpreted differently. It is said that the suffix after adjectives means or indicates the identity of qualification with the qualified. Identity is defined as 'the absence of otherness'.<sup>1</sup> Every qualification presupposes at least two individuals in which it may reside. Otherwise the use of qualification would be tautologous and useless. Exclusion from (itaravyāvṛtti) the other is the sole function of adjectives. That which is not in the other must be such a thing which resides only in one individual.<sup>2</sup> Individuality is the meaning of or indicated by suffixes. 'Blue' and 'jar' refer to one and the same individual. The absence of otherness of 'blue' resides in that particular jar which is called 'blue'. In other words 'blue' and 'jar' are one ; they cannot be separated.

Qualification and the qualified are taken to be one individual. A qualified individual is different from other undividuals with other qualifications but belonging to one and the same class. Blue pen is different from white, black or yellow pens. The adjective 'blue' is the principle of differentiation in the class of pens. The class of pen, for example, can be divided into black, blue, white, yellow etc. because of these qualities being attributed to the individuals falling within that class. A qualification presupposes a class having more than one individual as its member. At the same time an individual is necessary for a qualification. If there were only 'penness' and not this or that pen such qualities as black, white, yellow etc. cannot be attributed to the whole class. The reason for this is that there is no 'other' from which a class ( say 'pen' ) is to be differentiated by means of

---

1. abhedas tādātmyam.

ibid. Ch. I.

2. tacca sva-vṛttiyasādhāraṇo dharmāḥ. asādhāraṇyam ca ekamātra-vṛttitvam. tacca svasāmānādhikarāṇya-sva-pratīyogī-vṛttitvobhaya-sambandhena bheda-viśiṣṭam yat tadanyatvam ityekamātra-vṛttidharma eva viśeṣaṇa-vibhakter arthaḥ.

ibid. Ch. I.



adjectives. This explains another characteristic of qualifications. Qualifications differentiate between individuals, and not among classes. 'Blue' in 'blue pen' can eliminate only other pens but not dogs or chairs. The function of adjectives is confined within one class. It excludes other individuals only from that class which it qualifies.

There is no difference between a qualification and the qualified. A quality is the part of an object. If that quality were to be separated from that object the object would cease to be what it is. An unqualified object would become a class in itself. If we separate 'blue' from 'pen' pen would become something like a class having no differentiation of individuals in it. Adjectives or qualifications are the principle of individuation. Nyâya regards the relation between a qualification and a qualified as eternal. According to Nyâya they cannot be separated. They are born together. We cannot at any time separate 'blue' from 'pen'. We can only conceive of such difference in our mind. Therefore, the relation between them is called identity. This relation of identity is indicated by suffixes added after adjectives.

The Mīmāṃsakas do not believe in the existence of such eternal relation. But at the same time they admit that the qualities cannot be separated from individuals as long as they last. The use of adjectives in language refers to these qualities. But adjectives being parts of a sentence do require a formal relation by way of suffixes. At least in language a separate word is used for an adjective. If that word were not there the word, standing for the object qualified, would have been used by itself. But in that case the meaning would be different. 'Bring a pen' and 'bring a blue pen' are two different sentences having two different meanings. Qualifications may or may not differ from the qualified metaphysically, but in language they have separate and independent existence and thus they require a relation that can bind them together. Suffixes,

therefore, supply this relation between adjectives and nouns or verbs. The concord between adjectives and nouns or verbs is, therefore, necessary in language. Adjectives must be used to correspond to words which they qualify.

The Mimāṃsā deserves credit for separating language from metaphysical considerations. Substance and quality may exist inseparably but in language separate words are required to mean separate entities. One cannot mean both by one word. (We are not talking here about those words which include in their very connotation qualifications also.) These words stand separate from each other, and in a sentence they are united by the intention of the speaker and also because of other factors to be accounted for shortly. Their union is external to their nature. It is imposed on them by the use of suffixes. Suffixes unite these words in a sentence and help to give fuller meaning.

But this view is not free from defects. If suffixes are relations between words, then how are these suffixes themselves united with words? If suffixes have their own meaning how is this meaning related to the meaning of words to which these suffixes are related? They necessarily require another relation through which they can be united to the respective words and meanings. In the example 'nīlaṃ ghaṭaṃ ānaya' the suffix 'am' after 'nīla' unites 'nīla' with 'ghaṭa'. But this 'am' also has a separate meaning which is not contained in either of its terms (nīla or ghaṭa). How is the meaning of 'am' (identity) related to 'nīla' to which it is appended? 'Nīla' and 'am' have two independent meanings as 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' have. If 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' require a relation that can bind them together, 'nīla' and 'am' also would certainly require another relation to get themselves bound. This infinite regress would not stop until the relation is made internal to terms and not external as the Mimāṃsakas held. If that is the case, 'am' cannot have its own meaning. Moreover, that 'am' has not



meaning is proved by the fact that no one uses only 'am' to mean something. Therefore, suffixes do not seem to have separate meaning. They only indicate the relation as the Naiyāyikas have taken them.<sup>1</sup>

## II

FACTORS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF  
SENTENCES

A sentence is used to convey some meaning to the hearer. This is done through the use of words. The hearer understands the meaning of words used in a sentence and forms a verbal knowledge which is technically called śābda bodha. Śābda bodha is a total knowledge arising from words. But words used in any combination would not yield that knowledge. Words used only under certain conditions would yield some meaning. Hence we now set out to investigate those conditions.

How are sentences formed? A speaker intending to communicate something to the hearer uses words. These words are powerful to convey the meaning intended by the speaker and the totality of words used has a sense of completeness. If words used in a sentence do not satisfy the hearer by supplying full meaning and thereby leaving the hearer in a state of complete suspense about the full intention of the speaker, then those words are inadequate. An example of this may be found in the sentence 'Here comes a man of police king please go away'. Here the word 'king' has no relation with other words in the sentence and thus leaves the hearer in a state of suspense about the whole meaning of the sentence. The word being unrelated to other words in the sentence arouses question in the mind of the hearer. The hearer asks : to which word is this related? If this question is not answered, the sentence would remain unmeaning to the hearer.

---

1. na hi saṃsargo' bhidhiyate pratiyate ca vākyāt.

Nyāyamanjari. 6.

The reason for this is that each word in a sentence is related in a definite way to other words in that sentence. Each word has an integral relation with and is in need of other words in order to convey full meaning. If other words are not supplied or if the hearer is left in suspense about the meaning of an unrelated word he cannot have the meaning of a sentence as a whole. In other words each word, in a sentence needs the help of other words for a complete meaning.<sup>1</sup> Each word in a sentence leads the hearer to ask : to which other word is this word related? If this question is answered by the use of words in that sentence the sentence is complete. This sense of incompleteness of words is very important in the formation and understanding of sentences.<sup>2</sup>

This 'incompleteness' does not inhere in words. How can words themselves be complete or incomplete? This belongs to the meaning of words. The meaning of words is incomplete and needs supplementation. Patanjali says that words cannot stand in need of supplementation but their meaning is in need of other meaning to supplement it. When one says, the 'king's man' the man is owned by the king or the king owns the man. They need each other.<sup>3</sup> But ultimately

1. anyathaiva pravartante pratyakṣādyudbhavaḥ dhiyah. artham pūrṇam apūrṇam vā darśayantyaḥ purāḥ sthitam. anyathaiva matih śābde viśayeṣu vijṃbhate. pratipattur anākāṅkṣa-pratyayotpādanāvadhī. ata eva padamloke kevalam na pravyujyate. na hi tena nirākāṅkṣā śrotur ādhiyate matih. Ibid. 6.
2. (a) vākya-samaya-grāhikā cā' kāṅkṣā, sā caikapadārtha-jñāne tadarthānvaya—yogyasya-rthasya yajjñānam tadviśayecchā. 'asyānvayyarthaḥ ka ityevam rūpā puruṣa-niṣṭhaiva.

Mañjūśā.

- (b) ākāṅkṣā ca pada—niṣṭhā tatpada-vyāptireka-prayuktānvayanubhāvakatva-rūpā. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi. p. 65.

3. kā punaḥ śabdāyor vyapekṣā? na brūmaḥ śabdāyoriti kim tarhi arthayoh. iha rājñāḥ puruṣa ityukte rājā puruṣam apekṣate mamāyamiti puruṣopi rājānam apekṣate ahamasyeti.

M. B. 9. 1. 1. 1.



the need of supplementation or âkânkṣâ resides in the man who hears a sentence and not in words or meanings. To need is a mental quality which cannot remain either in words or in meanings. They cannot need anything because they are devoid of consciousness. They are said to stand in need of the other only in a metaphysical or secondary sense. Words and meanings are taken as sâkânkṣa because they arouse âkânkṣâ in the hearer. The âkânkṣâ aroused by them in the hearer is transferred to them. Akânkṣâ belongs only to a conscious being.<sup>1</sup>

Akânkṣâ may, therefore, be defined as the consciousness of incompleteness arising by the absence of the use of a particular word in a particular sentence.<sup>2</sup> This consciousness of incompleteness may arise by the use of a word and in that case that word may be called sâkânkṣa. Or this may be due to the absence of a particular meaning in a sentence and thus the meaning is said as sâkânkṣa. This âkânkṣâ is very essential for the sentence. This points to the whole meaning without which parts are not complete. If words are always left as sâkânkṣa no meaning would ever be possible in a sentence. But at the same time each word used in a sentence has âkânkṣâ for other words, otherwise the unity of the sentence would be lacking. A collection of nirâkânkṣa words will not be called a sentence.

The intention of the speaker to use a word in a particular context is regarded by some philosophers as another factor for the verbal knowledge. It is necessary to know the intention of the user of a particular word. If the intention of the speaker

---

1. Mañjû-â. ibid.

2. (a) Pada-vyatireka-prayuktô vaktus tâtparya-viṣaya-saṃsargâ-vagama prâgabhâva âkânkṣâ.

Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi. P. 66.

(b) Mañjūṣâ.

ibid.

is not known the meaning of a sentence would be unintelligible. This becomes more important when a particular word has two or more different meanings. The word 'minute' for example may mean 'the sixtieth part of an hour' and also 'a brief note'. It is the duty of the hearer to ascertain the particular meaning of the word in which that word is used. This is done by examining the context in which a word is used. One cannot grasp the intention of the speaker directly; it can be known only by his use of a word in a context. Context is therefore a determining factor of the meaning of sentences<sup>1</sup>.

But the knowledge of the the intention of the speaker through the context does not seem necessary for verbal knowledge. A word may yield meaning to a hearer but the speaker himself may not have any intention to speak that word in a particular context. The repetition of human words by parrots gives meaning, but the parrot does not have any intention to use a word in a context. Moreover that the knowledge of the intention of the user is not necessary for verbal knowledge is also proved by the fact that a word when used without any context gives some meaning and hence the knowledge of the context in which the word is used is not necessary for meaning. If some one utters 'minute' the hearer asks is it used to mean the sixtieth part of the hour, or to mean 'a brief note'. If meaning totally depends upon the knowledge of the definite intention of the speaker no meaning would be possible and thus such question would not arise at all. Hence the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is not necessary for verbal knowledge<sup>2</sup>.

Only such words can be united in a sentence the combined meaning of which is capable of existence in our experience. To say 'Irrigate by water' has meaning because irrigation by water is possible. If someone says 'irrigate by fire' the sentence

---

1. *tātparyam tu tatpratīticchayā vaktrānusaṁhitatvam.*

*Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi p. 69.*

1. *Mañjūśā. Ibid.*



would become meaningless as fire cannot irrigate. To see by ears is not possible and therefore the sentence expressing this would be meaningless.

The hearer of a sentence must know that words used in a sentence are capable of being mutually coupled<sup>1</sup>. But this is not always the case. A man may know the meaning without knowing that words are capable of being related. It is said therefore, that the knowledge of *yogyatâ* is not necessary for verbal knowledge but the conviction of the hearer that words are not capable of being put together because of their uncompromising meaning prevents a sentence from being meaningful. If a man, who does not know that ears cannot see, hears the sentence 'See through years' he gets the meaning of that sentence. But if he is convinced that 'seeing' cannot be combined with 'ears' he is prevented from having the meaning of that sentence. Words in a sentence can have meaning only when the hearer knows that they are not incapable of being mutually coupled<sup>2</sup>.

But the strongest conviction of the hearer about the incompatibility of the meaning of words will not prevent him from having meaning. He may know that ears cannot see but this does not prevent him from understanding the meaning of the sentence 'See through ears'. This is the reason that one ridicules the speaker and says 'See this foolish fellow, he asks us to see through ears' ! His conviction does not prevent him from having a meaning. Conviction against capability has nothing to do with the verbal knowledge. *Yogyatâ* is not the

- 
1. *yogyatâ ca anvaya-prayojaka-dharmatvam. asti ca payasâ sincatîtyatra sekânvasya-prayojaka-dharma-jalatvasya payasi satvâd yogyatâ, na tu vahninâ sincatîtyatra.*

*Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi. p. 66.*

2. *vastutastu na yogyaâtjñānasya kāraṇatâ kim tu vahninâ since-tyādau bādha-darśanena yogyatâ-niścayaḥ prati-bandhakaḥ.*

*Ibid. p. 67.*

necessary cause of verbal knowledge. It may be necessary for the verifiability of such knowledge<sup>1</sup>.

Proximity of words is also regarded as the cause of verbal knowledge. If a word is uttered to-day and another tomorrow they cannot give a meaning. For verbal knowledge to arise words must be in close proximity<sup>2</sup>. This also is a formal cause. If words uttered after long intervals are coupled with the remembrance of the context etc. they yield meaning. The hearer can connect those words and thus they may have meaning inspite of their being separated by the long interval of time<sup>3</sup>.

Tātparya, yogyatā and āsatti are regarded as the cause of the verbal knowledge both in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. According to the Mīmāṃsā words have their independent meaning and they are put together in a sentence because a speaker with intention to convey some meaning has put together some words in a particular context and in close proximity and the meanings of these words are not incompatible with each other. Words are not connected with each other intrinsically. They are connected with each other in a sentence because of the four factors. If we remove one of these factors words in a sentence would become isolated and they will lose meaning. The meaning of a sentence

- 
1. śabda-prayojye bādhajñānasya pratibandhakatvāt. tadabhāvajñānasya kāraṇatvācca.

kincaivam vahninā sincatī tyato bodhābhavet tadvākya-prayoktuḥ adraveṇa vahninā katham sekam bravīṣi ityupahāsaḥ śrotrbbiḥ kriyamāṇo' sangataḥ syāt.

Manjūśā.

2. āsattistu avyavadhānenānvaya-pratiyogyupasthitiḥ.

Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi. p. 68.

3. āsatyabhāvepi padārthopasthitau ākāṅkṣājñānavatobodho vilambenaiva bhavati iti na tadbodhe tasyāḥ kāraṇatvam.

Manjūśā.



depends upon these factors.<sup>1</sup> In Nyâya these factors are regarded important because they bring out the latent relation of words to each other. Words although intrinsically related are used separately in language. Their relation to each other and thus their meaning is determined by the knowledge of the context in which they are used by the speaker and also by the knowledge of the absence of incompatibility in their meaning. Proximity and âkânkṣâ also help to determine exact meaning of words. The function of these factors is to produce the verbal knowledge by determining the relation of words to each other. A particular sentence depends for its meaning on these four factors.<sup>2</sup>

That these factors are not necessary for the meaning is shown above. These are not causes of the verbal knowledge as both the schools hold. It is contrary to our experience to hold them as causes of verbal knowledge. They are regarded as cause in these two schools because of their metaphysical bias (anvitâbhidhâna and abhihitânvaya vâdas). They only help to bring out the latent meaning. If we look down upon the verbal knowledge as a product of a whole, these factors become superfluous. If a sentence has no real word in it and yet produces knowledge in us it is because of the sentence itself and not because of any other factor.

Âkânkṣâ and âsatti only express the unitary character of a sentence. Words are in need of other words to supplement them, because words themselves are inadequate. They are dependent upon a whole. It would be wrong to say that because words need other words they are united. Âkânkṣâ is not the cause of verbal knowledge but an effect available after the analysis of the verbal knowledge. The unitary character of verbal knowledge is formally expressed by âkânkṣâ. Proximity also is necessary because of the inseparable relation of words in a sentence. If we separate words

---

1. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi P. 65.

2. Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā. K.13.

and break the continuity we thereby impair the unitary character of sentence and thus we fail to have verbal knowledge. Proximity is not the cause of verbal knowledge; it is the product of the unitary character of it.

Similarly *yogyatā* of words with each other presupposes some internal unity among them. It does not stand as a cause of verbal knowledge because we understand the meaning of such phrases as 'hair's horn is red' and 'a barren woman's child is beautiful'. There are some philosophers who regard that in these cases we do not have a verbal knowledge in its propositional form (*śābda bodha*) but we have only the knowledge of the meaning of words constituting such sentences (*padārthopasthiti-mātram*). But are the meanings of words constituting the sentence inter-related or are they isolated and independent? If they are inter-related we have *śābda bodha*, and it will be absurd to maintain the arbitrary distinction between *śābda bodha* and *padārthopasthiti-mātram*. If each word has a separate meaning and the unity among them is lacking, the apparent unity of meaning in these cases would be regarded as illusory. But from the point of view of experience no such distinction is necessary. We never regard the meaning of the sentence as illusory. The only justifiable distinction between such sentence and other normal sentences would be that the meaning of the former is unverifiable. Other sentences are verifiable. *Yogyatā* may be a condition not of meaningfulness but of verifiability. It may affect the truth value of a sentence but not its meaning.<sup>1</sup>

The intention of the speaker to use a sentence in a context is but imperative in language. If words are not used in a fixed sense to mean a fixed thing and in a fixed context, they would create anarchy in the realm of human experience.

---

1. (a) *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*. p. 69.

(b) *Mañjūṣā*.



Each word would mean differently to different people and thus uniform communication would become impossible. It is necessary to follow the time-honoured convention about the use of words in a language. The convention associated with a particular word should be strictly followed otherwise the very purpose of language would be lost. In this sense tâtparya must be regarded as a prerequisite for the meaning of words. But one thing must be remembered in this connection. The tâtparya is determined not by a particular person using a particular word but it is determined by a long convention associated with that word. Every person is not entitled to give his own tâtparya to each word he uses; in that case communication would become chaotic. He must follow the time-honoured convention in order to make himself intelligible. This time-honoured convention is not different from the meaning of a word. It is a part of it. It is known by the user when he begins to learn the meaning of words. But that which is very remotely connected with an occurrence cannot be regarded as its cause. Space cannot be regarded as the cause of the production of a pot because it causes the pot remotely. Cause is that which is immediately associated with the affect. Tâtparya is a presupposition of all meaning. But meaning is not immediately produced by tâtparya. Tâtparya may be regarded as a very general and remote cause of meaning and not an immediate cause.

Words in a sentence have yogyatâ and tâtparya because the sentence has an inherent unity. If words do not have interrelation before-hand in a sentence tâtparya and yogyatâ cannot impart one to them. They only show what words in a sentence are interrelated. They are united not because they have yogyatâ and tâtparya but because they are united they have tâtparya and yogyatâ. We infer the existence of a cause from an effect and not *vice versa*. These four factors indicate that a sentence has unitary character. They do not bring about unity among words of a sentence. They only

make one infer the existence of unity among the words constituting a sentence. Neither in their united capacity nor individually do they make the verbal knowledge possible. They only describe the unitary character of verbal knowledge.

Any attempt to describe meaning as the product of factors external to language would be illogical. Language is not a heap of words cemented together by a speaker at his will. It is rather a designed expression of truth by the speaker. Our verbal knowledge deals with truth in the form of propositions. This truth is not constituted by external factors. It is one whole expressed in languages. A sentence expresses a truth and words constituting it are united because of this truth, and this truth alone gives unity to words in a sentence. Any analysis of our verbal knowledge must not overlook this fundamental point. Any attempt to give independence to words without considering the nature of truth (which is unitary in character) would be illogical. And thus the theory of *yogyatā* etc. as factors engendering the knowledge of words is not convincing.

Verbal knowledge is an expression of reality which we have called the proposition. This knowledge is taken as a construction out of parts but the existence of parts is not possible without a whole. If a whole is accepted as existing prior to the parts, these parts become mere abstractions. The question of *samsargatā vāda* and *prakāratā vāda* is, therefore, as superfluous as that of *anvitābhīdhāna vāda* and *abhihitānvaya vāda*. With this the consideration of various factors leading to the formation of verbal knowledge also becomes redundant. If parts are not real, all attempt to study them and to form philosophical judgments about them would be unreal. But this need not prevent us from recognising the role of parts in getting the whole expressed. Parts have value not by themselves but because they are parts of a whole. It is through these unreal parts that the real whole is expressed. The value of the various *vādas* and the



various factors mentioned above lies only in this. We do not regard them as final pronouncement on the real nature of meaning. They are only of hypothetical value.

### III

Each word in a sentence has a different place and it has its own function. There is a principal word in every sentence and other words only qualify that. In the sentence 'Bring a blue pen' the word 'blue' qualifies 'pen'; 'a' also is an adjective of 'pen' and this 'pen' is to be brought. All these words in the sentence are meant for the verb 'bring'. This subordination of all words to one word in a sentence is necessary to maintain the unity of a sentence. If words in a sentence support two or more principals, the sentence will be split into as many independent sentences as there are principals. The subordination to one principal may be taken as a mark of the unity of a sentence.

But what is that which is predominant in a sentence? Is it a name or is it a verb? Names in all the case-endings ( vibhaktis ) cannot be the principals in a sentence, because by their very nature they are subordinate to the nominative. Only a nominative is free in action and thus according to the Nyâya philosophy all words in a sentence are subordinate to the nominative. The Mīmāṃsakas on the other hand do not subscribe to this view. They hold that even nominatives are subordinate to verbs and, therefore, verbs are the principals in sentences and other words only support that verb. We shall not enter into the detailed arguments that each school advances against the other. We shall consider very briefly only the main arguments advanced by each school.

It is well known that the Nyâya philosophy accepts causation as an external force. It is not inherent in the thing changed, but is given from without. Atoms do not combine

out of some necessity inherent in them, but they are activated by God or adṛṣṭa. Any occurrence must be owing to a certain external element. But this external element must also be a conscious being. Unconscious matter cannot cause anything because activity required for causation is the attribute of living beings. Yatna (effort) is possessed only by conscious beings. They alone can be the true agents of any action. This principle is applied with regard to language also, and it is held that nominatives are the principal words in a sentence and other words are subordinated to it. Thus the sentence 'X is cooking' would produce a knowledge of a 'cooking X' and not that of 'cooking being done by X'. This is the reason, it is stated in support of their view, that a verb must follow the number and person of the nominative. A verb must follow the lead of the nominative and it must qualify the nominative in verbal knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

The Mīmāṃsakas do not accept this view and refute the very basis of the Nyāya philosophy. They do not accept that causation is external. They do not recognise any person as the first initiator of this universe. The cause of change is inherent in nature itself. Occurrence is spontaneous and does not wait for a person to initiate it. It is independent of the person. A nominative is only a person or a thing where the change has occurred. Activity is more important and this makes a person agent. If activity is not there a person cannot cause anything to happen. All words in a sentence support and qualify the activity. Our verbal knowledge centres round the activity and not around the nominative.

A logical difficulty also prevents us from accepting the nominative as the principal word in a sentence. Some times we say 'See ! the train is moving'. This sentence has two

1. jīva-yonyādi-nikhila-yatnagatam eva tiṅaḥ śakyatāvachedakam. prayatnatvameva tiṅaḥ śakyam na tu pravṛttitvam. pacatityataḥ pākakṛtimān ityeva pratiteḥ.



verbs and according to the Nyāya there must be two nominatives as there are two activities viz., 'seeing' and 'moving'. Thus the sentence must be split into two. The sentence is, according to the Nyāya, a confused statement and it need be stated as two different sentences. 'The train is moving' and 'You see it'. But this is not the case. The person using this sentence does not want his hearer to see the train but to see its movement. The import of the sentence seems to be that the movement of the train is important and not the train itself. If the speaker wanted the hearer to see only the train he would have told 'See the train' and not 'See, the train is moving'. But really here 'moving' qualifies 'seeing', and it is 'seeing' which is the principal word in the sentence. The whole sentence is a statement of one fact and it does not need to be split into two.

The division of cases (kārakas) depends upon the verb in a sentence. They are all related to the verb of a sentence. Adjectives qualify nouns and pronouns and, therefore, they also depend indirectly upon verbs. Prepositions etc. qualify the activity or the result of that activity and, therefore, they are also dependent on verbs. There is nothing in language which does not depend upon the verb. Verb is the principal and other parts are subordinate to the verb<sup>1</sup>.

We have said that this verb has a composite meaning — the result and activity, and we have also said that the activity is predominant and the result is subordinated to the activity. All those elements in a language which are subordinate to the verb are subordinate to the activity and not necessarily to the result of that activity. In the world of our experience change

1. (a) Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi p. 110-111.

(b) anekārtha-pratipādaka-subādiṣu kriyā-padam vinānvayābodhā-jananāt. Kriyānvayam vinā kārakatva-vyāghātācca.....  
ataḥ sarva-kārakāṇām bhāvanānvayāt siddham bhāvanāyā  
mukhya-viśeṣyatvam.

Ibid. p. 112.

has more importance. If there is no change our communication would be restricted. We communicate only happenings in ourselves and in our surroundings. That which does not happen cannot be communicated. Even when we say something as existing we attribute some activity to the thing that exists. Something is called as agent because it has some activity; if it does not have some activity it will be useless. Language needs verbs which stand for activity, and we need them as the most important factor in language. All other parts of our speech are subordinate to verbs (activity). Those who do not recognise this do not perceive the essence of language and their view is contrary to experience<sup>1</sup>.

The sentence which is the unit of language is an organic whole in which parts cohere and are subordinated to the principal. Our verbal knowledge is the knowledge of some occurrence leading to a result and initiated by some one in a certain way through instruments. In this knowledge all parts play their role. Parts produce in their combined capacity one knowledge in the hearer in which all parts are distinctly presented but at the same time they are inseparably joined together. If we view parts in the light of the whole, the consciousness of parts in our knowledge becomes illusory. But if we understand the whole as engendered by these parts, we are prone to recognise the role of each part in building up verbal knowledge.

The knowledge that we get from the use of a sentence is always in the verbal form. In our knowledge-situation we have an object which is known and also are conscious that we know an object. If we are not conscious that we know we do not have any knowledge. The consciousness of the fact of one's own knowing is as necessary for knowledge as the content of knowledge. But as soon as one is able to say that one knows

---

1. phale pradhānam vyāpāraḥ tiñarthas tu viśeṣaṇam.

Bhūṣaṇa k. 2 and commentary on it.



certain object the knowledge of that person would become expressible. And expressible knowledge must be in a form. Words constitute this form of knowledge.

It is said that one may know an object yet may not find words to express the knowledge of that object. It may happen because either the knower may not be able to form a judgment or he may have some vague words in his mind which are not suitable to express the knowledge adequately. In the former case there is no knowledge because the knower is unable to say something true or false. If truth or falsity cannot be ascribed to it, it is mere sensation. New born babies have only sensations because they are unable to form a judgment. Those persons who say that they cannot describe their particular experience mean to say that they do not find suitable words which can make their expression very clear. But they do have some words in their mind. They may give imperfect description if pressed to do so. If there is a knowledge which can be true or false it must be expressible. It must have a verbal form however inadequate it may be.

The verbal knowledge also being a knowledge has got a form and this form is also meant by sentence along with the referends. The form of a sentence also is the meaning of a sentence. This is the reason that 'no' and 'on' are two different words. They have the same letters but their forms differ. Bhartṛhari, therefore, says that no knowledge is possible without words, our knowledge is always accompanied by words.<sup>1</sup> Words are also the meanings of words ; sentence is also the meaning of a sentence ; words figure in every Śābdabodha.

---

1. (a) na sosti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte. anuviddham  
iva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāṣate.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE NATURE OF MEANING

#### I

#### INTRODUCTION

In the last part an attempt has been made to study the meaning as expressed in language. We have analysed speech into finer elements and tried to examine their contribution to the whole of meaning. Names and verbs have been divided into roots and suffixes and their meaning has been assessed. But while doing that we made no attempt to see what meaning is in itself. While dealing with names the most that we have said about the nature of meaning is that it is the unity of the referend. But what is that referend we did not make any attempt to see. Similarly, while examining the nature of verbs we contented ourselves by saying that a verb means an action and the result of action ; a suffix means the bearer of action or the bearer of the result of that action. But what is action or change and what is the nature of the result achieved and what again is the nature of nominatives and accusatives has not been discussed. We took them for granted. We mainly concentrated our enquiry on the expression rather than on the content of expression or its referend. We took for granted that an expression means something, but what is the nature of the thing meant we did not consider. We postponed these considerations for another occasion. In this part of our study we propose to consider the nature of meaning and the referend.

What does a name stand for ? Does it stand for an individual or for a universal in which the individuals parti-



cipate? Or, again, does it mean an individual qualified by the universal? And is the universal possible? If not possible, words would refer to individuals in themselves excluded from all reference to the other. But do words mean such a exclusive individual? These questions presuppose words as the unit of language. But words cannot be the proper units of language as has been already shown. What is then the referend of a sentence? In order to answer these questions we propose to begin our metaphysical enquiry into the nature of referend.

But before we try to examine the nature of referends we have to examine the nature of meaning itself. We took for granted that a word means a referend; but we never ventured to ask 'How is a word related to a referend'? Has a word something peculiar in itself which makes the knowledge of a referend possible? or, in other words, is it intrinsically related to a referend or is it related by mere convention? Let us now begin to examine the nature of relation between a word and its referend.

## II

### MEANING : A PRODUCT OF CONVENTION.

Words are uttered by the speaker to convey some meaning to the hearer. Communicability is the sole purpose of words. Words that do not convey any meaning are not words. They are mere sounds. Words have the power of communicating meaning to others. They are endowed with such power (śakti).

A word is uttered and its meaning is known. But any word heard at any time does not produce the consciousness of meaning in the hearer. Words are meaningful only to those who have known the relation between the word uttered and its referend and have recalled the knowledge of that relation. This relation between a word and its referend is

called the power of words. This power of words produces the consciousness of meaning only when known, not otherwise.

Fire has the power to burn. If its power to burn is taken away, fire will not be what it is. Similarly, a word when deprived of its power to communicate will be only a cry. But as the power of burning is latent in fire and is known to exist only when it is recognised to be there, similarly the power to mean in a word is effective only when known to exist there. If one does not know what power the word 'cow' has to convey, the word is as good as nothing for him.

This power of words is called *virtti*.<sup>1</sup> This exists in words and through them conveys the meaning. It may be conventional or direct or non-conventional or transferred. A word has direct power for a particular meaning when that meaning is immediately presented to one who knows the power of that word. The word 'cow' has, for example, the direct power to mean a particular object usually known by that word. This relation between the word 'cow' and the object known thereby is the usual relation coming from a time unknown. By a long convention associated with the word the object is known. Therefore, the object is a conventionally associated meaning and is thus the direct meaning of the word 'cow'. Contrary to this direct meaning we have a transferred meaning of words. The word 'Ganges' usually stands for a particular stream of water. But when the word is used in a context in which the usual meaning of the word is incompatible with the context, its usual meaning is suppressed to give place to a new meaning transferred from other words. The word 'Ganges' in 'the house is on the Ganges' may mean 'the bank' and not the 'stream'. This transferred meaning of the word is not conventionally associated with the word; it is given by the context. It is not its normal meaning. Transference of meaning is possible only in an abnormal use of words. Both these two uses of

1. *Saṃketo lakṣaṇā cārthe padavṛttiḥ*.

<sup>1</sup>Saktivāda, I.



words yield meaning. They are the types of the power of words.

A word has a particular meaning because a long convention has made the word associated with that particular meaning. Every word that we utter has an acknowledged convention to mean an object in a community. Every one using that word in a language acknowledges the convention associated with the word. If this convention is not acknowledged in a language, that language will cease to mean. If the word 'pen' is used to stand for 'man' and the word 'man' for 'horse' in English, the particular use of these words will be unmeaningful. Words have a fixed association in a language which does not admit of any interference if the language is to be meaningful.

Change of meaning of words is affected in a language by gradual recognition. A word may change its meaning in a language, but this change is very slow. One cannot change the meaning of a word without preparing a background for that change. The preparation for such change takes time and gradual recognition by people using that language. Thus meaning is not a rigid association of words with objects ; it is flexible, but this flexibility is not exercised everytime by everyone.

New names get their meaning from persons first using them. A child gets a name from his father. New scientific names get their initial meaning from persons who have invented something new. Such new names get their currency in a language by constant use of them by people. When once they get their currency they acquire a convention and are used in language as other words are used. Thus every word used in language has a beginning of its association with a referend.

The beginning of convention is not arbitrary. There is someone to start the cycle of convention in language. There must be someone to say that a particular word would mean

a particular referend from now on. There are words and there are objects; they have nothing in common which can join them together. They are, therefore, dependant on some extrenal factor ( agency ) that can connect them to start them their association. We can illustrate this by the example of the name of a new-born child. A daughter is born. Her father sees her, he appreciates that innocent new born creature who has no name. He sees her many times, talks about her with her mother and with other people. But he feels difficulty in referring her only as 'baby' because that is a general word. He needs a particular name for her which can distinguish her from other 'babies'. He gives her a name. That name is associated with that baby by the father himself. The father has started the convention about the child. He uses that name and others following him call that baby by that name. The name of the baby gets currency in language. This example shows that there must be someone to start the association between a name and an object.

The first man who came on the earth found himself among innumerable things. He saw them and appreciated them. When he met with his life-partner, he felt the need of communication. He found himself speaking. He began to name things he saw. Thus was the beginning of the first language on the earth.

The first man of the creation gave names to things. But why did he call the spade as spade and not as horse? Was he trying, then, to immitate some pattern? Certainly words uttered by him were not arbitrary. They were based on some principle. He only followed that principle. Man is a conscious rational being. His rationality necessitates him to communicate with others. This communication is not possible without language and thus language is an integral part of human nature. It concretises the knowledge. The stock of knowledge that a language presents is not arbitrary. It embodies and foreshadows the entire face of knowledge that can be expressed through it. The first



language on the earth, therefore, must be a language capable of expressing any knowledge. It must be a perfect language. This cannot be the creation of an imperfect moral being. The creator of the Universe who is Almighty and Omniscient has bestowed upon his creatures an infallible and complete stock of knowledge and with it also an instrument to get at and communicate it to others. Language is not man-made it is the gift of God. The first man on the earth did not create a language but followed the language already created by God.

God wished: 'this word should mean this object'<sup>1</sup>. He made a word as a symbol of a particular thing. God is eternal, his association is eternal. That which is eternally associated with a word is its usual direct meaning<sup>2</sup>. God associated a word with a referend in such a way that when the former was presented the knowledge of the latter occurred.

A word means and a referend is meant. When the former is presented, the knowledge of the latter occurs. Words are antecedents and the knowledge of the referend is the consequent. Words cause the knowledge of referends. This causation is possible because of the will of God. God wants that a word should engender the knowledge of the referend. Words have the will of God in the form of 'power to mean'. The 'power to mean' in words is bestowed by God. The meaning of words depends upon the permanent, eternal will of God<sup>3</sup>.

1. īśvarasamketāḥ śaktiḥ.

-ibid.

2. atra īśvarapadasya nityatvapariçāyakatayā nityasamketāḥ śaktir ity evārtho bodhyah.

-Haridāś on ibid.

3. tayā cā rtha-bodhakam padam vācakam. Yathā gotvādiviśiṣṭa-bodhakam gavādir padam. tadbodhyo'rtho gavādir vācyah. sa eva mukhyārtha ity ucyate.

-Śaktivāda, I

Modern names and new scientific terms are not associated with their referends by God. They are human creations and thus their association with referends is not eternal. These names are not meaningful names in the sense in which other names are. They are different from those names that are eternally associated with their referends in this respect that their association with referends is not eternal. They mean directly but not eternally. They are technical terms and not general terms<sup>1</sup>.

This position about the nature of the power of words is advocated by the Nyâya school of Indian philosophy. This presupposes the fundamental metaphysical position of the school about the nature of causation. The power of words is the cause of the knowledge of referends. Words and objects are given. They have nothing in themselves that can unite them together; they require an agent who can bestow some power in one to be united with the other. God as an external agent unites them by his will. His will gives words power which yields the knowledge of referend. This power is neither inherent in the nature of words nor in the nature of things; it is external to them both and yet unites them by the relation of convention.

Atoms are motionless. They are incapable of producing the universe. They are static and require a dynamic force to start them functioning. This dynamic force cannot be in the atoms themselves, as they are material. Matter, by its very nature, is inert, incapable of self-motion. Spirit is the only existence which is dynamic. Motion belongs to spirit. Only a spiritual being can initiate motion in matter. God gives motion to the atoms. Motion is external to matter. Atoms depend upon God for their motion. The universe is a creation

---

1. *tatradhunika-samketah paribhāṣā*.

—*ibid*.



of atoms, but for its creation it depends upon God. God moves the atoms to create the universe<sup>1</sup>.

If we examine the position of the school about the meaning of words we find it in close conformity with the general position about causation advocated by the school. Words cannot cause the knowledge of referends because they are devoid of any principle of causation. For their meaning they depend upon the will of the speaker who is conscious being. The will is external to words but causes the knowledge of referend through its union with words. Words only when united with the will of the speaker are meaningful. Every meaningful words bears the will of the speaker and thus means a particular referend. The mortal being has a beginning in history. And speech is associated with the existence of human being in the world. We cannot conceive such a being who had no language for communication. He cannot create a language himself because he has no pattern on which his creation would begin. He has to depend upon the convention and for the first man on the earth this convention came from God. God started the association of a particular word with a particular referend. The first man on the earth used the convention from God. God is eternal, His will is eternal. The relation between a word and its referend is eternal.

Language in the real sense is not miraculous. It has a definite beginning. It is an occurrence in human history and as such presupposes some conscious starter. It cannot grow automatically as the blade of grass shoots forth from the crest of the earth. It is a deliberate conscious pursuit of the human mind. It cannot grow without a person who deliberately starts it. Some conscious being is required to bring a language into existence. One may not accept the introduction of God as the starter of language but this makes one point

1. paramāṇupādānasya jagataḥ puruṣa-karmāpekṣā, īśvaro nimittakāraṇam.

very clear. It rightly emphasises the role of the conscious being at the beginning of language. God is the symbol for a conscious being. It is the will of some conscious being that has brought language into the world. Some prominent expounders of the school, therefore, accept usage as the starter of language.<sup>1</sup> It is immaterial whether the usage is from God or from any other being. Thus the meaning of a word depends upon convention and usage.

### III

#### MEANING AS IMPERSONAL AND ETERNAL RELATION

##### ( 1 )

The view of Nyāya is not appreciated by the Mīmāṃsā school. It advances reasons for this. God is omnipresent and thus is his will. It should be present anywhere and everywhere where a language exists. It would be illogical to say that the will of God is confined only to the words in Samskrit. The Nyāya says that words in Samskrit alone are blessed by God and, therefore, only those words are meaningful. It may be so either because God did not know the existence of languages other than Samskrit or else He avoided other languages purposively. The first alternative is an attempt to question the bonafides of God. God cannot be ignorant. In the second case His partiality to Samskrit is manifest. Why did He choose to bestow meaning upon words of Samskrit alone and not upon others? No one can give an answer. Again, if the position is accepted for arguments sake one has to explain the meaning of non-Samskrit words as illusory. It is by illusion or transference that a non-Samskrit word means. It is like the rope which by illusory perception appears as snake. The rope is rope and not snake; non-Samskrit word is a mere sound and not a meaningful word. And this is ridiculous. Either all languages are meaningful in the primary

---

1. Sabdaśakti Prakāśikā, 1. 20.



sense or none is. No discrimination among them is possible.

Again, God by His will associates a word with an object. God is eternal, His will is eternal. Words are eternally related to their referends. The word 'gau' means always the object known by that word. It cannot be separated from its referend. If it can be separated from its referend to stand for another referend, as in transference, its relation with that referend is not eternal. It can be changed. But if the meaning of a word is changeable, it is not eternal and, therefore, not divine. Thus universally recognised fact of the change of meaning cannot be explained by the theory.

The theory gives modern names a different position from those names that are universally recognised in a language. Modern names are creations of human being and thus they are not eternally meaningful as other words are. But why are modern names not related with referends by the will of God? Did He not see them? or did He purposively abstained from giving those words a meaning? In the first case his God-hood is questioned and the second alternative is not a logical answer. If God himself, through men using modern names, gives meaning, no distinction between a universally recognised name and a modern name is possible. For those, again, who do not accept the existence of God no meaning will be possible because no one is there to impart meaning. Thus the introduction of God to explain the meaning of words is not based on logic.<sup>1</sup>

This does not rule out the status of the starter of meaning of words. A particular word has a beginning somewhere. It is not from nowhere. It may not be a divine creation, but it must be a human creation. The meaning of a word depends upon convention and usage.

---

1. See also S. V. 19, 42-113 for a fuller discussion on this point.

But is this convention one and same for different persons using a word or is it different with different people? If the convention is one for different people it must be eternal, because one and the same thing cannot be used by different people. This is possible only when the thing is eternal and indivisible. If it is different for different people the knowledge of the meaning of one and the same word will differ with different people. Again, if one person has known the convention about a word from one source he cannot know the meaning of the same word uttered by a different source because the convention being different in two cases one cannot be helpful in the case of others.<sup>1</sup>

One knows a word having different connections with different referends from different sources; when that word is uttered by a speaker in one sense the hearer may get an entirely different meaning. If a word has different independent relations there is no guarantee that the referend in each case will be identical. Therefore, convention cannot be different with different persons.<sup>2</sup>

If different conventions about a word are said to relate the word with one thing because they all resemble in some respect, they must participate in a universal. A word means a particular referend because the relation between them resembles other such relations on the strength of a universal relation. But if words are said to mean because they refer to a universal, the position of the Nyâya school becomes ridiculous. The universal is beginningless and this will make the relation itself a beginningless relation. And this is against the conventional theory of relation between words and their referends. Thus the relation between a word and its referend is not a relation originating in convention.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. S. V. 19. 13-15.

2. *ibid.* 16-19.

3. S. V. 19. 25-27.



Again, according to the Nyāya theory, there is a time when a word is without any reference to any referend. The man first using that word makes a relation between them. But how does the man know that there is a power in words which refers to an object? If he knows this on the analogy of other words how the creators of the meaning of those other words knew that? In this way there will be no end to the question about the beginning of the relation. One has to accept the relation between a word and a referend as beginningless, otherwise one cannot get out of the riddle. The Nyāya view is not logically acceptable.<sup>1</sup>

( 2 )

Meaning cannot have a beginning. It must be eternal. There is no God to start the meaning in words. Words by their very nature have power to mean. There is no one to impart them meaning. Meaning is intrinsically presented without the help of an initiator. History does not say that words were given meaning by someone. If there would have been someone to impart meaning there must have been some trace of such a person imparting meaning. We do not anywhere find any such mention of a person who could have started meaning in words. Thus the power in words is beginningless.<sup>2</sup>

The power of words is something unique. It belongs, as all powers do, to different category. Seeds are the cause of plants. Seeds have the power to produce plants. But when some insect has bitten the seed it is incapable of growing plants. There is, therefore, some hidden power in the seed.

1. (a) avyatiṛekaśca. Śābara. B. 1. 1. 5.

(b) S. V. 19. 131-132.

2. katham punar idam avagamyate apauruṣeya esa sambandha-iti? puruṣasya sambandhurabhāvāt...yadi hi puruṣaḥ kṛtvā sambandham vyavahārayet vyavahārakāle avaśyam smartavyo-  
bhavati. — Śābara B. ibid.

which is not sensed yet it exists there. It produces the plant, but is incapable of growing into plant when bitten by an insect. The biting of an insect takes away the power to grow the plant from the seed. 'But why', asks a Mīmāṃsaka 'the seed is yet incapable of growing the plant after biting by an insect is over?' The seed had the power to grow plant when biting was not there (when it had not been bitten) and again after it has been bitten the biting is again non-existent and thus the seed must grow the plant. Non-existence of biting in both the cases is the same; only in the former case biting had not occurred and in the latter case it is over. If seed has been the cause of plant it must grow out of a bitten seed also. Therefore non-existence of biting cannot be the cause of the growth of plant from the seed. The seed itself must be the cause of such growth. The seed bitten by an insect has no power to grow and thus the plant is not caused by it. Thus the power is a unique existence in things which is not removed by other causes. It is present in the nature of the thing itself. Power is not separate from things causing another things. Power is intrinsic in the cause itself.<sup>1</sup>

Words are said to have power to mean. The power to mean is inherent in words. It is not given from without and is not shaken by any external force. Words mean intrinsically. No one has imparted this power to words. Words are meaningful by their very nature. There is no word which is not meaningful.

When a word is uttered some people recognise that power, others do not; if the power is intrinsically present in words why does not every one that hears the word recognise its power at once? It is because some people have not acquainted themselves with that power of words. Although the power is present, yet by its mere presence it cannot be meaningful

---

1. Śastra Dīpikā. 1. 1. 5.



unless the person hearing a word also is acquainted with the power of that word. Acquaintance with the power of words is a necessary condition for the knowledge of the existing power. Acquaintance does not impart the power to words. It only reveals it. The power is recognised by someone and not by others because of the fault of the person hearing that word and not because of the absence of such power in that word. A white thing is presented to people but those who are blind do not see it because they have lost the organ of seeing. Similarly those who have lost the organ of knowing the power of words do not recognise such power.<sup>1</sup>

The means to know such power is provided by convention and usage. A person asks another, 'Bring the pen' and there is a third person who hears the words of the person and also sees the other person bringing the pen. The third person infers that the action and its initiating knowledge in the second man is owing to those words uttered by the first man. He finds that a sentence is meaningful. He analyses the sentence and by concomitance knows the meaning of words falling in the sentence. This use of words and action associated with those words makes the knowledge of the meaning of those words in a third person possible. Usage reveals the latent power of words to others. Similarly dictionary, grammar, analogy and sayings of trustworthy persons facilitate the revelation<sup>2</sup> of the power of words in men. These do not make the power; they only reveal it. They all presuppose the power of words.

The role of convention and usage cannot be totally undermined in knowing the meaning of words. They are very helpful for languages to exist. Any theory about the origin of the meaning of words cannot ignore them. The conventional theory of language attributes meaning to them alone. Meaning

---

1. S. V. 19. 30-39.

2. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, P. 74.

has a beginning from conventions. The eternalistic theory, on the other hand, does not attribute the origin of meaning to them, but it gives them a place in the scheme. They reveal the eternal power of words. Our concern in language is only with those words whose meaning is revealed to us and not with those which are only potentially meaningful. A word whose meaning is not revealed to a person is not a word at all for him.

The Mīmāṃsā theory is an attempt to keep the sanctity of the Vedas intact. If words are meaningful by their very nature and they are eternal, as they maintain, the Vedas are impersonal and eternal. Again, they maintain, that only Samskrit words are endowed with the eternal power, and are to be used in ritualistic practices. They are called *sādhū* or correct words. These words alone are meaningful in the primary sense. Words belonging to other languages are not meaningful as they are not eternally endowed with the power to mean. They are meaningful only because they are mistaken for perfect words, their meaning is illusory. Samskrit words are the only meaningful words in the world.<sup>1</sup>

The Nyāya school also agrees with Mīmāṃsā in this respect. Both of them regard only Samskrit words as primarily meaningful. The only difference between them is that the former calls them as the creation of God while the latter calls them eternal. Both of them are determined to call non-Samskrit words as unmeaning in the primary sense. The reason behind this is the concern to keep the sanctity of the Vedic culture.

The conception of correctness or *sādhutva* depends upon grammar. Grammar dictates the use of words in language. A word cannot be used in a language unless it is in conformity with the grammar of that language. Ungrammatical use of words is not permissible if the meaning in language is to be kept intact. Every use of any language is determined by the grammar

---

1. Śāstradīpikā. 1. 3. 9.



of that language. But the Samskrit grammar has a peculiarity which is lacking in other grammars. Besides determining the nature of language Samskrit grammar determines the use of words producing merit. As it says that a particular word is to be used in a language so also it says that a particular word when used produces merit, but other words do not. It determines the use and the merit that is achieved by the use of that particular word. The determination of the merit of the use of words is the sole property of Samskrit grammar.<sup>1</sup> Other grammars determine only the use of words and not the merit. Samskrit words alone are which words which produce merit when used. The use of other words do not produce merit, therefore, either God has not imparted meaning to them or they are not eternally associated with the power to mean. Meaningfulness and correctness (sādhutva) go together.

We may have no objection in saying that Samskrit words alone produce merit when used. But we are not prepared to accept that meaningfulness and correctness go together. A word may be meaningful and yet be imperfect in the sense that it is not meritorious. If the conception of meaningfulness is such that it must be associated only with meritorious words, it is not acceptable to a reasoning mind. To regard other words as meaningful only in a secondary sense is too much. Every word, whether it is from Samskrit or from any other language is meaningful in one and the same sense. They may not be meritorious but they are certainly meaningful. To deny their meaning is to shut the eye against facts. Meaning is not the monopoly of Samskrit words alone.<sup>2</sup>

God cannot give meaning to words because languages are not eternal. They are born, they have a beginning and an

---

1. Lokatorthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate.

M. B. 1. 1. 1.

1. (a) Manjūṣā p. 63-100.

(b) V. P. I. 149-157.

end. But again meaning is not something produced in words by the person using them for the first time, because while doing this he presupposes the fact that words have meaning. If he did not know of such a fact he would have never ventured to utter words. Meaning is, therefore, eternal in words. Words are always possessed of meaning. Meaning is not external to words.

Meaning is a relation from words to objects. It is the power of words. We have seen the nature of the relation but we have not examined the nature of things to which words are related. The relation is not abstract; it is from a definite word to a definite thing or referend. When we speak about the meaning of words we do not mention only the relation in general but also the direction of relation. We now propose to consider the nature of the referend with which a meaningful word is eternally related.

---



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE NATURE OF REFEREND

We have defined meaning as relation of a word to a referend. Meaning is, therefore, the meaning of something and it is also something in itself. Meaning cannot hang in the air. Being a relation it has two terms on which it depends. The meaning of a word is something which can be conceived as existing. All schools of Indian Philosophy nearly agree with the conception of meaning as a relation from words to objects but they widely differ about the nature of things that are meant by words. In this chapter we shall try to see the various views which have been expressed regarding the nature of the referend. First of all, we shall state the Nyâya view of meaning and then the Mimâmsâ criticism of it and also the statement of this school itself on the subject. In the second part of this chapter we shall introduce the Buddhist and the Jaina views on the nature of referend. While presenting these views in the order mentioned above our aim will be to be as faithful to the views concerned as possible.

#### I

### REFEREND AS THE INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATING IN THE UNIVERSAL

Words have been divided into names and verbs. They are related to referends. But what are these referends? When we utter a word, 'cow', some object is presented before our inner eyes. This object is known as cow because it participates in some general characteristic by virtue of which that object is known as cow. The object is cow by virtue of 'cowhood' in

which it participates. Every known object must function under the general notion of the universal and thus our knowledge of referends is a knowledge in which universals along with individuals necessarily figure. Apart from universals and individuals participating in it we have also the images of things. The word 'cow' presents the image of the creature which is a particular but participating in the universal cowhood. A word may, therefore, refer to individuals or to universals or to images. We have three alternatives before us and we have to decide which of them or all of them or some of them is the proper referend to which a word refers<sup>1</sup>.

A word must mean an individual. The individual alone is capable of being manipulated by our action. It is only a particular pen that can be brought, given or destroyed. This cannot be done with the universal pen. The notion of number, gender, person etc. can be meaningful only with individuals. Individuals must be the referends of words. But an individual without any reference to the universal in which it participates cannot exist. A particular pen is pen because it has something which makes it known as a pen. It has something common with all pens. An individual devoid of universal reference is impossible. Moreover, it is not in every case that words refer to individuals alone. Law provides : 'man is not to be killed'. If the word 'man' here means a particular man and not man in general, a person may kill all men he comes across except any one particular man. But this is not the case ; the word stands for men in general and means a universal and not an individual. But whether a word refers to an individual or to a universal it necessarily presents the image of the thing referred to. A word cannot mean without referring to the images of things. Images are invariably presented by words. Images must be the meaning of words<sup>2</sup>.

---

1. Nyāyasūtra 2. 2. 58.

2. Ibid. 2. 2. 59-64.



The case for including images, universals or individuals in the body of referend of a word is cogent. Gautama, the founder of the Nyâya system, thinks that all these three taken together constitute the meaning of words<sup>1</sup>. Every word refers to all these three and not to any one of them alone. In some cases, the individual is prominently meant but the other two qualify that individual; in others, universals are dominant in referends and the other factors are subordinated to it. Similar is the case with images<sup>2</sup>. Thus manipulation of individual is possible because words refer to these individuals. But they are referred to as belonging to a class, and having a particular form or structure (âkṛiti). Words mean universals, but these universals are ultimately inherent only in things. They are known only as residing in things. If the law prescribes that men are not to be killed it means every individual belonging to the class of humanity is not to be killed. If this is not so, the killing of universal man being impossible, the law prohibiting such action would be futile. Images (âkṛti) are meanings because an individual cannot remain without any particular form. Image is the means through which a universal is recognised. Thus our reference in a language is to all the three taken together and not to one or two of them. In each case of meaning all the three are invariably present. In some cases, one is dominant and in others, others. But they are not completely absent.

The universal alone cannot be the meaning of a word. A word is said to be in the masculine, feminine or neutral gender because it corresponds to things that it refers to. Again, the number of names depends upon things to which they refer. But a universal cannot have any gender or number, and thus cannot be the meaning of a word.<sup>3</sup> Again

---

1. vyaktyâkṛtijātayastu padārthaḥ

—Ibid. 2. 2. 65.

2. pradhānāṅgabhāvasya niyamena padārthatvam.

—Nyâya Bhāṣya—ibid.

3. tathā ca linga-vacana-siddhiḥ.

—M. B. 1. 2. 3. 64.

commands and actions are not possible with universals. A universal cow cannot be ordered to be confined.<sup>1</sup> Thirdly, a universal is one and thus cannot be present at different places. One and the same thing cannot be at different places at one and the same time. It cannot therefore be found in different individuals.<sup>2</sup> Again, if it is one, the destruction of one individual having it would destroy all individuals having the same universal. When one says 'the dog is dead' all dogs would die and no dog would be found in the universe from that time.<sup>3</sup> Thus universal cannot be the meaning of a word.

Objections about genders and numbers have been answered in our previous discussion on these topics. They do not depend upon the nature of the referend. They rather depend upon the nature of words themselves.<sup>4</sup> Thus there is no objection in taking the universal as the meaning of words. Similarly one cannot work with mere individuals. A pen which has no resemblance and relation with anything in the world, which is devoid of any sort of common characteristic with other things and which is unique in itself, cannot be the object of our knowledge. If different individuals do not have anything in common, even the consciousness of them as individual would then become impossible. Our knowledge is relative. We know a thing as one because it is not two. The notion of a thing is based upon its contrast with other things and is simultaneous with the notion of it as something. If I do not know other things how can I know this particular thing as thing? To know a thing as thing we have to know the other which is thinghood. Thinghood is not different from things. Things are born with their class-characteristics. Our action is not possible with universals. We have to take the

—ibid.

—ibid.

1. codanāsu tasyārambhāt.

2. na caikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapat.

3. vināśe prādurbhāve ca sarvam tathā syāt. kim? vināśyicca prāduṣyacca śvā mṛta iti śvā nāma loke na pracaret.

—ibid.

—ibid.

4. linga-vacana-siddhir guṇa-vivakṣānityatvāt.



help of individuals which are not apart from their universals. Universals are manifest in individuals. It may not be available as something over and above individuals falling within its fold but it is different from them. Individuals may perish, but their class characteristic does not perish with them. Dogs may die, but the class of dogs will never vanish from the earth. Individuals may remain at different places, but thereby the unity of universals is not impaired. Universals are necessary presuppositions of individuals and thus of our knowledge. Individuals or universals taken in isolation cannot be the meaning of words. Words mean both.<sup>1</sup>

The view of the school regarding referends is like this. The individual, the image and the universal are the meaning of words. Universals and individuals are not separate from each other. The knowledge of universal is not necessary before an individual is known. Both of them are known simultaneously. There is no question of priority of one to the other. Similarly for the knowledge of universals one is not expected to know all the individuals in which those universals are present. Both of them are inseparably united and thus they stand as referends of words.<sup>2</sup>

The conception of universals in this view is that every individual is born with universals. Universal is objective; it exists in things. It is presupposed by things and is expressed in things. It is not to be found existing in isolation from

1. jātimad-vyaktimātram asya hi viṣayo na cātra buddhipariplavaḥ.

2. vyaktyakṛti-jātayas tistro' smākam padārthaḥ. guṇapradhāna-bhāvas tu kvacideva kasyacit, jātimad-vyaktyabhidhāne dvividham apyasya tantryam nā sambhāvati śabdānām. na tāvad vyaktijñāne janayitavye tadartham jātijñānam pūrvam apekṣante śabdā iti sambhavati. dvayorapy-eka-jñānavedyatva-niyamena paurvāparyāyogāt. nāpi viśeṣavācakaṁ padam vinā jātiśabdānām buddhipariplavāt tadvinīścayāya viśeṣa-śabdāpekṣāya svātantryam.  
—ibid.

things. It is not like things in which it resides. It is not a collection of things in which it resides nor is it an organic whole of which individuals are parts.<sup>1</sup> It resides in things. Things participate in it. It inheres in things.<sup>2</sup> It is necessarily associated with individuals. Individuals are the base of the universal. Any reference to universals is to a universal manifest in individuals and not to an abstracted universal. Any reference to an individual is necessarily to an individual participating in the universal. Every word means an individual and a universal. It does not mean one of them alone.

## II

## THE REFEREND AS UNIVERSAL

The referend of words was stated as a combination of universal and particular. They are united by the relation of inherence or *samavāya*. Universals inhere in individuals. They qualify individuals. The knowledge of an individual qualified by the universal involves the knowledge of the qualified and qualification. Every qualified knowledge presupposes the knowledge of qualification. The knowledge of the individual is possible only when the knowledge of the universal is given. Without that an individual cannot be known. But the universal is not to be separated from individuals. They are eternally related. The relation of inherence is an eternal relation. They are not available separately from the individuals with which they are united. If an individual is destroyed, its relation with the universal is not destroyed. The universal is present in other individuals by the same relation. Therefore, if one dog is dead all dogs of the world

- 
1. na ca gotvam avayavī na samudāyāḥ. Nyāya Vārtika 2. 2. 65.
  2. katham tarhi gotvam goṣu vartate ? āśrayāśray -bhāvena. kaḥ punarāśrayāśray-bhāvaḥ ? samavāyāḥ, tatra vṛttimad gotvam. —ibid.



are not destroyed because only the individual is dead, its relation with universals remains intact.<sup>1</sup>

Prabhākara objects to this conception of relation between a universal and an individual. If an individual is destroyed where does the universal present in it go? Either the universal also is destroyed or the universal is gone away from it. The universal is eternal and thus cannot be destroyed. Any particular case is explained by considering the relation between the universal and the particular as non-eternal. The relation of inherence is non-eternal and therefore when an individual is destroyed its relation with the universal also is destroyed. The destruction of relation or of the individual does not destroy the universal itself.<sup>2</sup> The universal does not go anywhere. It remains there, only the base in which it was manifest has disappeared. Therefore universal is not eternally related to individuals. The knowledge of the qualified presupposes the knowledge of the qualification and when they are not separable from each other the knowledge of the qualified is not possible. If one does not know what is blue how can he know a thing as blue. Before a person has the knowledge of a blue thing he has already the knowledge of blue colour. The blue colour is separate from things. The universal is separate from things in which it is manifest. It is known through perception and is presupposed in the knowledge of individuals. The relation between the universal and the individual is non-eternal. When the individual is destroyed its relation to the universal is also destroyed.<sup>3</sup>

But the Bhāṭṭa School does not agree with the views of Prabhākara. The relation between universal and individual is

---

1. avināśonāśritatvat.

—M. B. 1. 2. 3. 64.

2. Prakaraṇapāṇcīkā. p. 26.

3. jñatīśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣajñānagocārā. pūrvākārāvamārśeṇa prabhākaragurormatā.

—ibid. p. 17.

natural. It is not casual.<sup>1</sup> One is not the cause of the other. They are intimately related. The knowledge of an individual without any reference to the other is not possible. Similarly the knowledge of the universal without any reference to an individual is valueless.<sup>2</sup> It is as good as nothing.<sup>3</sup> Therefore the universal is always available in individuals. There is no universal as such. No one finds such a universal, as one finds space.<sup>4</sup>

The universal is all-pervasive but it is found in individuals alone. Individuals are competent to manifest this all-pervasive universal. Each individual has a peculiar power to manifest the relevant universal and therefore each individual is not capable of manifesting each and every universal. But individual as individual cannot be the object of our knowledge. One cannot expect to know a thing without knowing the universal in which it participates. But the knowledge of an individual qualified by the universal does not presuppose the knowledge of qualification or universal. The knowledge of the meaning of a word may presuppose the knowledge of the relation between them but the knowledge of individual does not presuppose the knowledge of the relation between universal and individual. The knowledge of individual as qualified by universal is a perceptual knowledge<sup>5</sup>. It is given as one whole. In order to know a pot one is not required to know the various components of the pot, so also the knowledge of a qualified individual does not require the knowledge of the universal beforehand. One knows the whole first and then he tries to discern individuals and universals in it<sup>6</sup>.

---

1. sv. bh vikaśca sambandho jātivyaktyor na hetumān.

—S. V. 16 31.

2. S. V. 16. 6.

3. ibid. 16. 10.

4. pindesveva ca sāmānyam nāntarā grhyate yatah. na hyākāśavad  
icchanti sāmānyam nāma kiñcana. ibid. 16. 25.

5. Ibid. 16. 40.

6. ibid. 16. 44.



An individual is a body having parts. When one is asked : what is a cow? the reply is that cow is a body having some peculiar parts. Parts themselves make the body and the body itself is known as cow because it is not different from 'cowness'. The body having those peculiar parts is the seat of 'cowness'. The parts, the whole and the universal in it are identical because they all are known as cow. Cowness and cow are one<sup>1</sup>.

It is said that universal is one and yet resides in many. But this is not possible, one and the same thing cannot be at different places. Again, individuals are said to differ from each other, but they are said to be one because of the universal in which they participate. Things that are different by their very nature cannot be one. One cannot be many and many cannot be one. To call one as many and many as one is a contradiction in terms. But this is not an objection which can prevent universals from being accepted.

Two different knowledges are involved in the case of an individual. The knowledge of the universal and the knowledge of the individual exist in one and the same thing. It is seen that two different elements reside in one and the same place and, therefore, they are not contradictory. They are at one and the same place. There is no contradiction in saying that one and the same thing can be both individual and universal. The words 'individual' and 'universal' are relative. One and the same thing can be big in comparison with a small thing and can be small in comparison with a big thing. Individuality can be attributed to many individuals taken as one. We call the collection of trees as 'jungle'. The 'jungle' is one body, an individual, but resides in many individuals. Similarly, a universal can be taken as one individual. One and the same thing can be an individual and a universal according to the context<sup>2</sup>.

---

1. *ibid.* 46-47.

2. *ibid.* 53-56.

The same universal when taken as non-different from individuals is known as individual. The universal is there but it is known as non-existent. Again, when individuals are taken as one, the universal is manifest. Only the universal is then known. In the former case individuals are known as different from each other because of the universal which makes them differ and in the latter case they are known as one because of the universal. In both these cases the role of the universal is important. Words always mean the universal as residing in individuals. We can communicate only with such words which refer to things which, though individual, participate in the universal or to the things which are universals themselves. In any case words mean universals which are not different from individuals. We cannot mean the Universal<sup>1</sup>.

Really there is only one universal and this manifests itself in various individuals. It is existence and it is manifested by various universals and individuals. Different universals are manifestations of one existence. It is capable of being manifest in various ways. Things manifest various aspect of one universal. It is like a thing having many colours and presenting different colours when seen from different angles<sup>2</sup>. One thing manifests only one particular aspect of the Universal existence because of the peculiarity of existence itself. Things cannot manifest the entire face of existence because they are momentary, they have to express only a part of the whole and thus they are presentations only of a particular aspect. They are by their very nature capable of manifesting only one aspect of the universal. Things differ because of their own peculiarity. Fire burns and the sky does not because fire has the power to burn and not the sky. Things have power to manifest only one aspect and not the other because of their peculiar nature<sup>3</sup>. But all that exists necessarily manifests the universal. The universal existence

---

1. *ibid.* 59-61.

2. *ibid.* 58.

3. *ibid.* 26-29.



is available only in individuals. We cannot find a universal apart from the individuals in which it is manifest. Words mean the expressions of universals and not the universal in itself. Words by their very nature mean only parts of the whole existence.

Individuals are not different from universals. They are universals in a relative sense. Every individual is a collection of parts. The notion of individuality is relative. One and the same thing can be both individual and universal. Words mean only this universal aspect of things. They are effective only with this. When one asks another to bring a pen, the pen that is brought is not an individual pen, it is a universal in essence. There is no such thing as pure individual. Proper names also mean universal things.

The conception of universal advocated by the school is different from the Nyâya view on the subject. The universal for Nyâya is many. There are as many universals as there are classes of things. Again, universals differ among themselves. They are not universals because of any other universal. Things are individuals in which universal inheres. The relation of inherence is eternal. When things are destroyed the relation is not destroyed. Things can never be separate from universals. The Mīmāṃsā school accepts the conception of universal as identical with existence. The existence itself is manifest in various ways which are lesser universals or *aparasāmānya*. Individuals are nothing but universals particularized. Individuality and universality are relative. Everything is a universal or individual in relation to something other. The highest universal or existence is universal in relation to lesser universals. Words can express only lesser universals. They mean only universals. They cannot mean an individual. This view is very close to the Vaiśeṣika conception of the universal<sup>1</sup>. Kumārila accepts this view

---

1. Vaiśeṣika sūtras. 1. 2. 4-5, 7-17.

and states his doctrine against the attack of the Buddhists. The conception of universal in Nyâya and Mīmāṃsā appears to be fundamentally the same. The difference between them is only a minor difference because even the Naiyâyikas have accepted the position of the Vaiśeṣikas about the nature of universals.

The contention of the Nyâya that individuals are necessarily meant by words is nothing but saying that the universal is manifest only in individuals and the Mīmāṃsā has no objection to this. The saying of the Mīmāṃsā that individuals are manifestations of universals is not contrary to the position of the Nyâya. The propositions that "universals are manifest in individuals" and "individuals are manifestations of the universal" are fundamentally the expressions of one and the same truth. The difference is only a difference in emphasis. One emphasized manifestation and the other the manifest. Both of them recognise the manifestation of universals.

Thus the Nyâya, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vaiśeṣika schools of Indian philosophy have elaborately discussed the nature of universals. They have accepted this as the necessary referend of words. Words cannot mean without referring to universals.

---



## CHAPTER IX

### THE NATURE OF REFEREND (CONTD.)

#### I

#### MEANING AS NEGATION

In the preceding chapter we have tried to present the case for universals, as given in Nyâya and Mimâmsâ schools of Indian Philosophy. We have seen that there is no fundamental difference over the subject between them. They all agree that referends of words are necessarily universals. Universals are presuppositions of our knowledge. Without them we cannot know a thing even as thing. They inhere in things and they remain while things are destroyed. Universals are eternally present in things. Things are born with universals. They are not added to them *ab extra*.

Buddhists have objections to the view about the nature of referends. In accordance with their basic stand point, they cannot accept anything which is permanent. They advocate the theory of impermanence (anâtmavâda). Universals which are regarded as objective existents and are said to persist while individuals perish is against their tradition. They have severely criticised the theory of universals. For them, the referend is not a permanent universal, but a unique individual devoid of any reference to others. Words mean this individual negated from others. The meaning is negation of the other which they have called the theory of Apoha. We shall first state the criticism against the theory of universals and then try to present the theory of Apoha. The criticisms of the Apoha theory and their examination will be given at the end of the present discussion.

( 1 )

It is said in defence of universals that they are necessary for our knowledge of things. Without them individuals will become disjoined and scattered and their knowledge will not be possible. Universals provide a bond to unite different individuals under a class on the basis of similarity. But similarity does not make the introduction of a universal in things logical. Different drugs can cure a disease. They all have power to prevent the disease but that does not mean that they have some universal in them which makes them effective in one and the same case. If there is one universal in all of them why one drug is quick in effect, while the other is slow ? The universal is the same and it must work alike in all uses of the drugs containing that universal. Quickness and slowness in effect prove that these drugs are separate from each other and yet have the peculiarity of curing a disease. Uniformity does not necessitate the introduction of universals<sup>1</sup>.

Universals are regarded as different from the base in which they reside. They are taken as pre-suppositions of the existence of individuals. But no such universal is seen. What is seen is the shape, size, colour etc. of the individual; and the universal does not contain these shape, size and colour. The shapeless, sizeless and colourless universal cannot be known through the shape, size and colour of the individual. The knowledge of one thing cannot make the knowledge of an entirely different thing possible, e.g. the knowledge of words cannot produce the knowledge of colour. They are totally different. The knowledge of an individual having shape, size and colour cannot produce the knowledge of a shapeless, sizeless and colourless universal<sup>2</sup>.

---

1. T. S., 723-726.

Pramāṇa vārtika p. 179.

2. T. S. 739.



Again, universal is one in different individuals and different parts of an individual contain one universal. The word 'cow' has three letters c, o, and w and the universal cowness resides in all the three taken together. When the word is uttered the universal in it manifests itself gradually with the manifestation of letters. And with the last letter the knowledge of the universal is complete. But, if it is one and eternal its gradual emergence is illogical.<sup>1</sup>

There are six categories accepted by the Nyāya school. They are categories because of a universal residing in all of them and thus taking the universal category into account the number of categories would become seven and not six. Again these categories are known as categories because of another universal but how is the universal itself known as residing in the categories? This will require another universal to connect the universal category with the six categories. This will lead to an infinite regress.<sup>2</sup>

Again, do universals reside in individuals? They are eternal but are manifest in individuals which are momentary. When individuals perish where does the universal exist? Momentary individuals cannot be the bearers of eternal and permanent universals. They are said to reside in individuals through the relation of inherence. But the relation of inherence itself is impossible. Inherence is defined as a relation between the container and the contained. Threads make cloth. Cloth is said to reside in threads. The relation of threads makes a cloth and this relation among threads is, therefore, a unique relation that is different from both threads and cloth. Universals are said to be contained in individuals by the relation of inherence which is different both from individuals and universals. Thus universals are related to individuals through an eternal relation of

---

1. *ibid.* 743.

2. (a) *ibid.* 744-747.

(b) *Pramāṇa-Vārtika-Vṛtti*, p. 163.

inherence. But, if universals reside in individuals through the eternal relation of inherence, individuals must also become eternal because they are eternally related to universals. But individuals are perishable, they are not eternal. Thus if one term of the relation is destroyed the relation also vanishes. The relation cannot persist without the terms that are related. It is said that though one individual containing that relation is destroyed yet the relation itself resides in other individuals and, therefore is eternal. But this will not lead us out of difficulty. Is the relation present in individuals, which are not destroyed, identical with that which was present in those individuals that are destroyed? or is it an entirely different relation? The present relation of inherence cannot be the same as the relation in non-existing individuals because if the relation is intact the related must also persist and no destruction is possible. Thus the relation in existing individuals cannot be the same as in destroyed individuals. If the existing relation in individuals is different from the relations present in destroyed individuals, the relation of inherence becomes non-eternal. Thus universals cannot reside in individuals eternally.

But do universals reside in individuals at all? If universals are said to reside in individuals what about imaginary individuals and creations of fancy? Individuals existing only in imagination or such other individuals that are fancied to exist but do not actually exist are individuals; but they cannot contain universals because they can reside only in actuals and not in non-existents.<sup>2</sup> Similarly the universal cannot be said to reside in the negation of a thing (abhāva). Universal resides in pots and not in the absence of pots also, because that is non-existent and cannot contain the universal which is existent. But then how the absence of a particular pot is known without a universal absence? The

---

1. (a) T. S., 854-866

(b) *Pramāṇa Vārtika* p. 277-281.

2. T. S., 749.



universal pot cannot help in the knowledge of the absence of pots<sup>1</sup>. Udyotakara, the author of the Nyâyavârtika, has replied to this by pointing out that though universals are related to individuals through inherence, yet the absence is related to individuals through the relation of qualified-and-qualification. Absence is the qualification of individual. But the relation of qualification presupposes a third principle. The word 'police' qualifies 'man' because of the relation between them. Here there cannot be any relation between a thing and the absence of the thing. Thus the knowledge of the absence of a thing would be impossible according to the person advocating universals as the necessary conditions of knowledge<sup>2</sup>.

Universals cannot be eternally related to individuals. For what is the possible relation between them ? Is an individual born and is subsequently related to a universal ? A universal cannot come in contact with the newly born individual. There is no movement in the eternal universal. The universal cannot be taken as already present there because before an individual is born there is no base in which it could reside. The universal cannot be present before an individual is born nor it can come to be attached to an individual after it is born. An individual also cannot be born simultaneously with universal because it is called eternal. Nor can the birth of an individual be associated with a universal because in that case the individual and universal will become different. They will require another relation to be related and there will be no end of relations. If both of them are identical, the distinction between universal and individual will not be possible. And there is no other way in which universal can reside in individuals<sup>3</sup>.

It is said that individuals contain a part of universals. But this saying implies that the universal is organic. Only

---

1. *ibid.* 780.

2. *ibid.* 780-790

3. *Pramāṇa Vârtika*. p. 302.

a part of universal resides in an individual but is this part also a universal or not? If it is universal then one universal resides in only one individual and thus the saying that one universal resides in many individuals is wrong. If these parts of universals are different from universals, then how are the universals said to reside in individuals?<sup>1</sup> And without being organic one and the same thing cannot be said to reside in different individuals. If it is inorganic it will be like an individual and cannot exist in different individuals as one individual cannot remain at different places at one and the same time.

The orthodox schools have said that the universal is one and exists in every object; past, present or future. Objects are manifestations of one universal. Individuals are relative to universals. But this does not help us out of difficulty. If one and the same universal resides in different individuals, individuals in X may produce the properties of Y because both of them at least have one universal in common. A cow may possess the properties of pen, because cowness and pennes do not differ fundamentally.<sup>2</sup> Again, it is said that individuals are relative universals. But what makes a universal relative? The universal cannot contain the principle of relativity in itself. It must come from the individuals themselves. Individuals, therefore, are said to represent the universal according to their own capacity. The same universal is present in different ways because of the peculiarities of individuals. But does the peculiarity of the individual transform the universal or does it only manifest the universal. If the universal is one and eternal it cannot be transformed. Peculiarities of individuals cannot change the real nature of an eternal universal. If they embody the universal in transformed ways, the universal would be neither one nor eternal.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. *ibid.* p. 304 and Kārṇagomi's commentary.

2. *ibid.* p. 305-206.

3. T. S. 1748-1752.



If peculiarities of individuals only manifest one and the same universal, as a mirror reflects the image of things without touching them, the whole creation would become illusory and this is not admissible to the schools.<sup>1</sup> The conception of universal as one or as many is not tenable logically. The conception of universals as something objective, as one other thing among things is bound to lead to logical inconsistencies that are unavoidable.

## ( 2 )

Words mean objects is the view advocated by the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools of Indian philosophy. They have introduced the notion of universals in philosophy to prove their position. They say that words correspond to objects ; if there are no objects how can words mean ? The affirmation and negation by words is the affirmation or negation of objects. If words do not correspond to objects, they are unreliable and false. To be true and reliable words must correspond to objects. But we have seen that words cannot mean universals. The only course that is open for us is to accept individuals as the meaning of words. Words mean individuals. The notion of sameness and that of a class in things is illusory. There is nothing like universal in things. Things are totally different from each other. One is by its very nature different from the rest of the world. They may have similarity with others by virtue of some action that they may perform, but that does not make for the acceptance of the universal in them. Similarity is not identity, and similarity does not imply something common. Even the similarity is created by people using various things for the purpose. Different drugs are called similar because they are all effective in a disease. The effectiveness has created the notion of similarity, but positively there is nothing common in drugs.

---

1. *ibid.* 1776.

Things differ from each other by their very nature. There are no two things identical in the world. If words refer to a referend which is unique in itself they mean something which is different from others. The meaning of a word is not a universal manifest in individuals ; it is rather an individual different from the rest of the world. But do words mean individuals which are unique in themselves ? Universals are denied. There is nothing which can be common in individuals of a class. Thus the knowledge of an individual ; devoid of any common notion is not possible. One cannot know different individuals without placing them under the notion of something wider. Even the knowledge of a thing as thing is not possible without the knowledge of thinghood which is not there. Thus words cannot mean anything in the sense in which orthodox schools have said. Words do not *touch* objects. Words and objects are totally different. Words do not mean any object. Objects are beyond words. What words mean are not objects, and objects are not meant by words. There is no correspondence between a word and an object.<sup>1</sup>

Thus our verbal knowledge is illusory because it takes the help of an unreal universal for being meaningful. Words mean only in a secondary sense. They are said to correspond with objects only in a different way. The knowledge of objects in a dream corresponds with objects. But neither objects nor their knowledge is real. Words are said to correspond with objects only in this sense. Thus our mind fabricates a universal in things. The fabrication of such a universal is owing to the uniqueness of the so-called referends. A particular type of referends differs from other types, and that is the reason that a particular universal is *imagined* to exist in particulars. The notion of universal depends upon the negation of the other. This universal is known as different from other universals and not similar to other universals. Universals are also known as


---

1. T. S. 869-870.



different from others. Persons having wrong notions of the nature of universals confuse them with particulars. But particulars cannot be what others are. They are negations of the other particulars. Words meaning particulars have necessarily to show that to what they refer is different from others, and is known as different from others. The base in which an imagined universal manifests is also something which others are not. Words in short have the main function of negating the other. Buddhists have called 'negation of the other' as the true meaning of words<sup>1</sup>.

The negation may be of two types; negation for affirmation and total negation. One may negate everything in order to affirm something. But the second type of negation is pure negation. This negation is the negation of everything. There is no implied affirmation in it. The former type of negation i.e. the negation for affirmation may either be the negation of the notion of things in the mind or it may be the negation of physical things. One may negate the notion of universal which is mistakenly taken as existing in things in order to affirm the notion of unique particular or he may negate the physical universal with a view to affirm a unique particular. In the former case there is no physical object. What is taken as physical is really mental, and negation only makes the notion of one individual clear by eliminating the universal in it. In the latter case the unique particular is affirmed by negating universals in it. Thus we have three types of negation:



1. Kamalaśīla on T.S. 868.

When a word is uttered no one eliminates or negates everything. Words do not mean total negation. They also never mean a unique physical particular because when a word is uttered that particular is not presented to our eyes as it is presented in perception. Words neither present a total negation nor negation to affirm a unique physical particular. They only mean a mental particular by negating the other. Words mean mental particulars which are different from other mental creations like universal etc. Words mean a unique mental object which is wrongly taken as existing in the world outside. This object is not meant as participating in universal but as different from what it is not. Thus this type of negation is the proper meaning of words<sup>1</sup>.

Apoḥa is not total negation as has been taken by some critics. It is negating the other and this is obviously to affirm what remains after negation. That which is affirmed is mental and not physical. Words do not *touch* the physical object. What is physical is beyond words. Words always mean something mental; the negation is the negation of mental objects<sup>2</sup>.

( 3 )

The statement of the Buddhists that words mean negation of the other is an object of vehement criticism of almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. Here we cannot advance all those arguments that have been advanced against the theory but we may take some very important types of arguments and see how they are answered by the Buddhists.

It is said that words perform a twofold function. They negate the other and also affirm something. But our experience does not prove this. We never affirm and negate when a word is uttered. Again, if negation is the first product of

---

1. T. S. 1004-1011.

2. *ibid.* 1017-1018.

(b) Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts. *Apoḥasiddhi*, p. 3.



verbal knowledge the utterance of the word 'cow' would produce the knowledge of not-cow. But that is also against our experience, therefore negation is not the meaning of words.<sup>1</sup> But it may be replied that words mean something positive, and only afterwards the notion of its negation from others arises in our knowledge. The word 'cow' means cow, but when that meaning is before us, it by its very nature is known as different from what is not cow. A thing can be known only when it is differentiated from the mass of things. It must be known as different from that which it is not. Thus words do not perform a double function as has been apprehended; the negation of the other is only implied by words, it is not meant.<sup>2</sup>

Kumārila has opened his attack against the theory of apoha by saying that apoha is nothing more than another name for universals. The word 'cow' means not-cow and this implies that it means cow which is acceptable to the Mīmāṃsā school. If that is the meaning of apoha, Buddhists have said nothing new.<sup>3</sup> Again, the positive thing which remains after the negation of its opposite must be a universal because no one can know a mere particular, thus what we know is only a universal.<sup>4</sup> It is a different question that this universal is actual or mental; the point is that there is a universal which is the meaning of words and not necessarily the negation of the other.<sup>5</sup> Buddhists reply to these objections by saying that the mental universal is acceptable to them. The physical object is a projection of that mental universal, and words do mean such universal. But this universal is unreal because it is a construction of our mind (vikalpa) and thus this position is different from that of the opponent who advocates a physical, real universal.<sup>6</sup>

But if there is no actual universal and words continue to mean the negation of the other, words 'cow' and 'white cow'

---

1. Bhāmaha

2. T. S. 1019-1021.

3. S. V. 17. 1.

4. *ibid.* 17. 3-10.

5. *ibid.* 17. 38-39.

6. T. S. 1022-1025.

will become synonymous, the reason is that both of them mean the negation of non-cow.<sup>1</sup> But when negation amounts to non-existence and in both the cases it is the same as the opponents mean to say, it may also be said that the negation in both the cases is different as well. If a non-existent thing can be called identical, it can equally be called different also. Thus 'cow' and 'white cow' cannot be synonymous. As one can imagine the identity of non-existence of the opposite of 'cow' and 'white cow' one can also imagine the difference between them. There is no logical fallacy in it.<sup>2</sup>

Universal is perceptible in individuals. The cases where it is seen are taken as belonging to one class and where it is absent then, those things do not belong to that class of things. But negation cannot be perceived, it can either be inferred or can be known through words. But inference and words can work only when they correspond with something. When a word does not correspond with an object it is meaningless. According to the Buddhists there is nothing to which words correspond. Thus they would become meaningless.<sup>3</sup> But Buddhists have a reply to this. Words and inferences correspond with unique particulars. 'No-non-smoke' and 'not nonfire' do coincide. Both of them are found together. Thus inference is possible. Words correspond with these unique particulars in the sense that those particulars are different from non-existent particulars and are also different from eternal objects and to these particulars words correspond.<sup>4</sup>

Apoha is non-existence of one in the other. X, Y and Z are three terms. The difference of X is in Y and Z and the difference of Z is in X and Y. This difference is not something positive like universal existing in terms. Then how are we able to say that Y and Z are different from X or X and Y are different from Z? This can be said only when there is

---

1. S. V. 17, 42-46.

3. S. V. 17. 71-75.

2. T. S. 1030, 1032.

4. T. S. 1052-56.



something positive in X and which is not found in other terms. In other words negation is negation of something and when there is nothing like that the negation is futile. Again, 'cow' means not non-cow but when one does not know the cow itself how can one be expected to know non-cow. Negation presupposes affirmation and thus one first knows cow as something positive and then one knows it as different from non-cow.<sup>1</sup>

Those who accept universals maintain that cowness cannot be found in horse because horse by its very nature is unable to manifest cowness. It can only be found in X, Y or Z which are particulars. X, Y and Z are different from each other but they alone are able to manifest cowness and not A, B or C. As cowness is manifest only in particulars of a particular class so also without accepting any universal one can maintain that all particulars are cows. Thus the negation of the other is facilitated.<sup>2</sup> If one does not have the notion of cow, how one can consider it as not non-cow. Every object is by its nature different from others. People have, for their convenience, arbitrarily introduced words to mean them. People know these things through words. They need not know anything except words to mean things. In those things where that word is not applicable, one knows difference. That thing where the word 'cow' is not applicable is non-cow. For that a third thing is not necessary. To know non-cow one is not expected to know cowness. Words themselves produce the notion of otherness where they are not applicable.<sup>3</sup> Non-cow is that where the word 'cow' is not applicable.

Apooha is non-existence and a unique particular is something which exists. How are they united? Existence cannot qualify non-existence. There cannot be any relation between them. Again, if even any relation between them is granted it cannot be anything but qualification. Negation would qualify

---

1. S. V. 17. 77-81.

2. T. S. 1058-1060.

3. *ibid.* 1063-1065.

a thing. Cow means an object qualified by the negation of non-cow. But if that knowledge is a qualified knowledge one must know non-cow when the word is uttered, but no one ever knows this negation of non-cow when the word is uttered. The knowledge of qualification invariably precedes the knowledge of the qualified. Thus the negation cannot be the proper meaning of words.<sup>1</sup> To this objection it may be replied that really there is no such thing which is qualified by negation. Words do not touch objects. Words mean only mental objects, and there is no harm in saying that really there is no object which is ever qualified by negation. There are two types of objects, one is external and the other is mental. Words really do not mean external objects. They mean only the mental objects. Only in a loose way the word is said to mean an object. These mental objects can be qualified by negation and there will be no harm. The second part of the objection also does not hold good because negation is not different from a thing. Negation qualifies a thing from the very beginning of the existence of that thing. Negation of the other is absorbed in the very nature of a thing. There is no difference between qualification and that which is qualified.<sup>2</sup>

Again does a word negate an existent universal or a non-existent thing? If it negates the universal, universal is accepted as something existing. Because that which does not exist cannot be negated. The other alternative is false because to negate that which does not exist is futile. Similarly the negation of a negative word must be something positive because the negative of negative is positive. It cannot be negative and thus apoha of a negative term would affirm something positive. If negation of negation is not affirmation, then it must be negative because there is no middle ground between affirmation and negation. In that case cow and non-cow will mean the same thing because they both will mean something

---

1. S. V. 17. 86-89.

2. T. S. 1066, 1067, 1069, 1075.



negative<sup>1</sup>. These objections have been answered by saying that words do not negate a universal. They negate particulars. But that too is by courtesy. Ultimately words do not mean even particulars and thus there is no negation also. If there is any sort of negation it is of particulars and not of universals. Even if universals are negated their negation does not prove their existence. The attempt is made to prove the existence of a universal by saying that if no universal existed it would not have been negated. But conversely, non-negation cannot be the proof for non-existence of universals, an existence (universal) is possible without being negated. This negation cannot provide a valid reason for accepting universals. Similarly to the second part of the argument we have to say that no non-existence is not non-existence, therefore non-existence cannot be negated. Negative terms are not further negated because they are already negated.<sup>2</sup>

There are certain technical difficulties raised against the theory of apoha. If a word means only negation of the other how can adjectives and nouns be meaningful in language, because there is nothing to be qualified by that adjective. Words meaning negation and not things cannot be used in gender and number, as these depend upon things and not upon non-existence. Again what would be the negation of the word 'negation' itself? These questions cannot be satisfactorily answered by the Buddhists and therefore they have to accept the referend of words as something positive<sup>3</sup>. But the searching eyes of the Buddhists do not leave these objections unanswered. Where adjectives are used they combine with nouns to form one whole. The negation is the negation of both of them taken together. Words do not depend on referends for their number and gender. They are properties of words themselves and thus there may not be any positive universal as the referend of words.<sup>4</sup>

---

1. S. V. 17. 95-97.

3. S. V. 17, 115, 116, 135, 145.

2. T. S. 1078-1082.

4. T.S., 1098, 1122-1141.

Udyotakara, the author of the Nyâyavârtika, has elaborately discussed the merits of the apoha theory. He says that if negation is the meaning of words what would be the negation of the word 'all'? There is nothing beyond 'all' which can be negated<sup>1</sup>. Again it is maintained that the word 'cow' means 'not non-cow'. But how did this notion of cow arise whose negation is made by the word 'cow'<sup>2</sup>? Is the meaning of the word cow, for example, something positive or is it only a negation? Is not non-cow cow itself or is it non-cow? If it is cow there is no quarrel about the meaning, but if it is non-cow it will be ridiculous to say that the word 'cow' means 'non-cow'<sup>3</sup>. Again, is negation one and the same in every case or is it different in different cases? In the former case the negation will become a universal which resides in all instances of particular negations and in the latter case it will be innumerable like object and cannot be apprehended<sup>4</sup>. Thus negation can not be the meaning of affirmative words, however, this can be accepted as the meaning of words.

A man uses a word in language in some context. It is not used at random. There is some purpose for the use of words. One who uses the word 'all' in language uses it in some context. No one uses the word without using any other word with it. It is always used with some other word. When one says 'all men have gone' he means that only the men in question have left the place and not all men from this world have left this world. Only a lunatic can say so. No one ever wants to negate all men. Total negation is not possible. It is possible only in some context and therefore the word 'all' has a negative force<sup>5</sup>.

1. na hyasarvam nāma kincid asti yat sarvapadena nivartyeta.  
—N.V. 2.2.67.

2. yasya punarvidhīyamānaḥ padārtho nāsti tasyādyam  
pratipattimantareṇa katham pratiśedhaḥ? yāvaccetaram na  
pratipadyate tāvaditaram na pratiśedhayati. —ibid.

3. ibid.

4. ibid.

5. T S., 1185-1188.



Again, we have maintained that words first mean something and the negation of the other is only implied in meaning. Words do not first negate and then affirm. Thus the second objection raised here is groundless<sup>1</sup>. To the third objection of Udyotakara it is said that what is meant is only a construction of our mind. That is neither an existent nor unreal. We take them as existing but ultimately we cannot find them. The notion of identity or difference arises only when things are existing. But when they are non-existents the question of identity of cow with 'not non-cow' and 'non-cow' is futile<sup>2</sup>. Similarly, the question that whether negation is one and the same or is it different in different cases is groundless because there cannot be the notion of oneness or difference in the case of non-existent entities. That which does not exist cannot be said either as one or as many.

Thus, ultimately there is nothing which can mean and nothing that can be meant. Everything in the world is momentary. Our dealing with words and their meaning is only imaginary. Our mind has projected itself to create things but those things do not have any stability<sup>3</sup>. The Buddhists uphold that words do not mean objects outside of our mind, nor do they produce the knowledge of such an objective world. Words only mean imaginary things. Really words never mean anything<sup>4</sup>. Words are said to have meaning but that meaning is illusory. It is like a man seeing two moons through defective eyes. Our verbal knowledge is illusory and there is no real referend of words.<sup>5</sup>

The negation advocated above is not the direct meaning of words. Words first mean something positive and negation is implied by that positive meaning. The word 'cow' first

---

1. *ibid*, 1192-1194.

2. *ibid*, 1189-1190.

3. *ibid*, 1090, 1091, 1093, 1094.

4. *ibid*, 1118; 1121.

5. *ibid*, 1211-1212.

means cow and then by implication eliminates what is not cow. In this sense alone the word is said to mean not non-cow. The direct meaning of words is something positive and negation is implied in it, it is not the meaning of words. The meaning of words would be something positive. Then how is it said that a word means apoha? Words, therefore, cannot mean something positive first and then its elimination form others.

Ratnakirti gives, therefore, a new definition of apoha. He says apoha is not something positive nor is it something totally negative. Words mean something which at the same time is eliminated from what it is not. We do not mean something positive first and then negate afterwards, nor do we mean pure negation and then by implication affirm something. Both affirmation of something and its negation from the rest are simultaneous. The word 'cow' means a cow which is at that very time is not non-cow. If negation is not simultaneous with affirmation a man asked to confine a cow may confine a horse. But as cow is known at the same time as different from non-cow no one confines a horse<sup>1</sup>.

Vācaspati Miśra has advocated that words mean objects that participate in the universal. These particular objects are by virtue of their participation in a universal different from other particulars and, therefore, one person asked to confine a cow does not confine a horse<sup>2</sup>. But this explanation is not logical. The universal is taken as a particular universal and not universal in general. Cowness resides in cows and not the universal. But the knowledge of cowness rightly depends upon the knowledge of particular cows and the knowledge of particular cows depends, in turn, upon the knowledge of cowness. Particulars and universals are inter-dependent. There is no way out of this circularity except admitting that this cowness is a construction of the mind

1. Apohasiddhi, in Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, p. 3.

2. Nyāyavārtika Tātparya Tīkā, p. 341.



which, when a particular object is seen, is projected upon it<sup>1</sup>.

If a word means at one and same time a positive and a negative element, how can the two coincide? Affirmation and negation are opposed and cannot reside in one and the same knowledge. But this is not an insuperable objection. One knows a place where there is no jar. He knows the place as 'jarless'. He has a positive knowledge qualified by the absence of jar. The same logic can be applied here also<sup>2</sup>. Thus words mean something which exists and which is at the same time different from what it is not. Really the conception of meaning and the meant is illusory because there is nothing to mean and nothing to be meant.

We find three distinct stages in the development of the apoha theory. We have references that probably Diñnâga, the founder of the mediæval Indian logic, introduced this theory in logic. His theory was rather negative. He advocated apoha as total negation of the other and accepted the existence of something positive only by implication. The criticism of such theory is found in Udyotakara who elaborately refutes the conception of total negation as the meaning of words. But the major criticism of the theory came from Kumârila who did not leave any possible argument to refute this theory of total negation. He thoroughly examined the theory in all its implications and proved it as an utter logical failure. Śāntarakṣita, in his earnest zeal to defend the theory modified the view of Diñnâga. He advocated that words mean something positive and negation of the other is given only by implication. This was just the reverse of what Diñnâga had said. This view of Śāntarakṣita was more Brāhmanic than Buddhist. There would have been no objection in accepting that words mean something positive first. Even Buddhists did not like the conception and began to evolve a new view

---

1. Apohasiddhi, p. 5.

2. *ibid.* p. 5.

on the subject. In Ratnakṛiti's Apoha Siddhi we find a third view which advocates that words mean something unique which is at the same time different from others. Negation and affirmation are simultaneous. Words negate the other and at the same time affirm something. The nature of the referend is such that it is known as something different from what it is not. The knowledge of a unique particular as something different from what it is not is one whole, it does not admit of parts. We cannot divide 'something' and 'different from others' and say that one implies the other.

The theory mentioned last is a modified view on the subject. But all these theories have advocated that the referend is a unique particular which does not admit of any element which is other than itself. But when referends are admitted to be like that logically they cannot be known, nor words can mean such particulars. The phenomenon of meaning is upheld as illusory and it is emphatically maintained that no relation between meaning and meant is ever possible. What one says about meaning is possible only when one projects one's mental universal on things-in-themselves. Universals although illusory, have been a great factor in our knowledge-situation and the Buddhists have accepted the role of universal in our relative knowledge. Our knowledge by its very nature cannot function without universals. They took the help of universals and condemned it.

Any one who advocates the existence of objective universals is bound to meet somewhere some opposition which he cannot overcome. The role of universals in our knowledge cannot be undermined but our logic cannot properly lead us to accept universal as a thing among other things. Buddhists are right in condemning such universal. The merit of apoha theory lies in this that it has opened our eyes to the fact that objective universals are not possible and at the same time universals are necessary for our knowledge.



## II

## THE JAINA CONCEPTION OF REFERENDS

Buddhists have refuted the conception of meaning as something true. For them words mean something negative, and really those negative referends cannot be meant by words. Words do not touch things. There is no real relation between words and referends. The Jainas do not accept the theory of apoha on those very grounds which Kumārila and Udyotakara have given.<sup>1</sup> They maintain that words really mean something which is not unique like the particulars of the Buddhists. Things according to the Jainas are not unique. There are universals. For the Jainas words mean something which has universals. Referends are combinations of universal and particular. Words do not mean only universal or only particular. They mean a combination of the two.<sup>2</sup>

But they are against an eternal and one universal. Universals are not eternal. They are as momentary as particulars are.<sup>3</sup> For this they have translated the arguments of the Buddhists against universals.<sup>4</sup> They accept a positive, real universal which resides in things. Things have universals. But the conception of universal in Jainism is quite different from the conception of universals in other schools. They say that universal is of two kinds, vertical and horizontal. The horizontal universal is called the uniformity of pattern. All cows have a uniform pattern of body. And this is the source of horizontal universal.<sup>5</sup> This is one universal which

---

1. Prameya Kamala Mārtanda Ch. III.

2. 'samayaśca sāmānya-viśeṣātmake' rthe' bhidhīyate na j tyādi-mātre.  
—ibid. Ch. III.

3. taccānityāsarvagata-svabhāvam abhyupagantavyam.  
—ibid. Ch. IV.

4. ibid. Ch. IV.

5. sāmānyam dvedhā, tiryag - ūrdhvatā - bhedaṭ. sadṛśa-pariṇāmas tiryak khaṇḍamundādigotvavat.  
—ibid.

is present in all individuals and is destroyed when the individual containing it is destroyed. But it is the source of uniform knowledge because of similarity, because it is found in every individual. The vertical universal is defined as that which exists in individuals for all time.<sup>1</sup> The former is the uniformity of content. Pattern and content are born and perish with individuals, but an individual so long as it exists cannot get rid of a particular pattern and some content. An individual can never be conceived as without a pattern and without a matter.

But an individual is not only a combination of a pattern with a matter. It is something in which the pattern and the matter are found. The individual is of two kinds. It may be an individual where different qualities emerge and go away.<sup>2</sup> The soul is an example of this type of individual. In one and the same soul joy, sorrow etc. emerge and vanish. By the emergence of different qualities the individuality of soul is not shaken. But at different times it is known as joyous or sorrowful soul. The souls differ only qualitatively. They retain the same matter and pattern. The other type of individual is that where the same pattern and quality are combined in a different way. Cow and buffalo are made of the same matter and have an identical pattern. But they are different because the combination of matter and pattern varies in them<sup>3</sup>. In the former case matter and pattern remain the same while the qualities differ and in the latter matter and pattern being the same their combination differs. An individual which is a combination of a universal (pattern

---

1. parāparavivarta-vyāpi dravyam ūrdhvatā.

—ibid.

2. viśeṣaṣca paryāya-vyatireka-bhedāt. ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinaḥ pariṇāmāḥ paryāyāḥ.

—ibid.

3. arthāntaragato visadrśapariṇāmo vyatireko, gomahiṣādivat.

—ibid.



and matter) and a quality is the meaning of words. Words refer to such an individual<sup>1</sup>.

This conception of universal is a novel attempt to explain our knowledge of the individual. Individuals devoid of any universal character cannot be known and that universal cannot be something eternal because then no act will ever be possible. It cannot be a mental construction because then our entire knowledge would become illusory. The only way left is to accept a positive universal which is not eternal. The universal resides in many individuals and is born and perish with it, yet it is the cause of the notion of uniformity. The word 'cow' is used for different individuals who have a uniformity of pattern and matter. Where that particular combination is not available the word 'cow' cannot be used.

Words are related to such objects naturally. They manifest objects like a lamp revealing objects hidden in the dark. The only difference between a lamp and a word is that the former does not require the help of a person to reveal objects but the latter requires a person who can make a convention about the relation of a word with a particular object<sup>2</sup>. Words follow referends and they mean objects which exist in the world outside.

### III

We dealt in this Chapter as well as the preceding one the nature of referend giving an estimate of the various views advocated by four prominent schools of Indian philosophy. The whole position about the nature of referends can be divided in two different stand-points. Referends are either positive universals or they are only imagined 'universals'. If words mean at all

2. tāvevam prakārau sāmānyaviśeṣāvātmā yasyārthasyāsau tathoktaḥ-  
sa pramāṇasya viśayaḥ na tu kevelam sāmānyam viśeṣo vā.—ibid.

1. (a) Pramāṇa Naya Tattvālokaṅkāra 4, 12.

(b) Kṛtasamayā eve dhvanayo' rthābhidhāyikāḥ.

—Prameya Kamala Mārtanḍa Ch. III.

one has to accept the role of universals in language. One who relegates universals to the position of unreality also accepts it as unreal real so far as one is a thinking being. Language cannot function without universals. What words mean is necessarily universal. What is meant is universal. Meaning is not possible without universals. The problem of meaning is really the problem of universals.

---



## CHAPTER X

### SPHOTA : THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE OF MEANING

In the beginning of our logical enquiry of meaning we have maintained that the primary unit of language is the sentence and not words. It is the sentence that governs the import of the meaning of words. Without this unifying principle at the root of words, words will scatter and wither away. This primacy of the sentence in the meaning-situation is of far-reaching importance from the metaphysical point of view as it is from the logical stand-point.

In the preceding two chapters we have examined various theories advanced by the schools of philosophy to explain the metaphysical nature of meaning. Meaning as a relation of words to individual objects participating in the universal, which is objective, is advocated by the Nyâya school. This contention is challenged by the Mîmâṃsâ school as illogical on grounds which we have elaborately discussed before. This school replaces the Nyâya contention of an individual participating in the universal by pure universals. The meaning of a word is a relation of words to universals. But these universals again were taken as objective, existing in the world outside as other objects are. This permanent and objective universal was rejected by the Buddhists, who on their part maintained the relation of words to unique individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) which are by their nature different from others. These fleeting individuals, although devoid of any universal and permanent element, are presented as appearing to have some such element in them. They, in other words, maintained that though universals are unreal yet they necessarily figure in our knowledge of the outer world. Their existence is asserted, but not in the sense in which the two orthodox schools accepted

it. Universals are conceptual. They are unreal constructions of our mind. But they are necessary for the proper functioning of our knowledge.

These views never gave due importance to the unit of language (sentence) that it deserved. They confined their enquiry to the meaning of words. We have seen that all of them accepted a sentence as a construction of words constituting it. They never recognised the independence and primacy of sentences in the meaning-situation. For all of them a sentence could present nothing more than the total meaning of words constituting it.

The theory of Sphoṭa as advocated by the Grammarian school gives priority to sentences and establishes beyond doubt that words are only partial sentences; they are meaningless without reference to a sentence. Words in themselves are abstractions and unreal. The science dealing with mere words is the science of unreals. In this chapter we shall try to state and explain the theory of Sphoṭa as advocated by the Grammarians without entering into any controversy about their existence. In the subsequent chapter we shall try to see some objections advanced against this theory and examine their validity.

## I

### CONCEPTUALITY OF WORDS AND OBJECTS

#### ( 1 )

Spoken words are momentary. There is succession of letters in words. We cannot pronounce all the letters of a word simultaneously. In the word 'go', for example, says Patanjali, when one pronounces 'g' sound he cannot pronounce the 'o' sound. Therefore, says he, the process by which one letter is pronounced ends with that letter and for another letter to be pronounced an entirely different process is



required.<sup>1</sup> We cannot pronounce two letters in the same breath. The apparent simultaneity of letters in a word is illusory. The word does not exist as a unit. It is an illusory combination of different letters which do not exist beyond a moment. There cannot be any combination of what is non-existent with what exists. In the word 'go' we cannot have a combination of 'g' with 'o' because at the time when 'o' exists 'g' is non-existent. The consciousness that 'g' is prior to 'o' is not possible on this very ground. The notion of priority arises only when two things exist simultaneously. There cannot be any consciousness of priority when there is only one thing. Togetherness of letters in a word is impossible and therefore, the word as such cannot exist.<sup>2</sup>

When a word is impossible how can it be said to *mean* something, how can it become a seat of the relation that proceeds from it to an object? A non-existent entity cannot become the base of something. A broken pot cannot contain water, says Nāgeśa. Therefore words as they are spoken cannot cause the consciousness of meaning in the hearer<sup>3</sup>.

It may be said that although the letters of a word are momentary yet each letter leaves its impression on the mind of the hearer and as soon as the last letter of a word is pronounced the consciousness of meaning in the hearer arises. At the time when the hearer hears the last letter he recollects the impression of previous letters and combines them together to form one whole. It is this recollected whole that gives birth to the

---

1. ekaikavarṇavartinī vāk. na dvau yugapad uccārayati gauriti. yāvad gākāre vāg vartate naukāre, yavad aukāre na gākāre na visarjaniye. yāvad visarjaniye na gākāre naukāre. uccarita pradhvamsitatvāt. M. B. 1. 4. 4. 109.

2. (a) naṣṭavidyamānayoḥ sambandhinor avyavahitottaratvasya sambandhatāyā vaktum aśakyatvācca.

—Manjūśā p- 164.

(b) V. P. II. 16.

3. Manjūśā, ibid.

meaning-consciousness. There is no ground to object that a combination of the non-existent with the existent is possible, as in this case every letter is preserved in the impression. The impression of various letters forming a whole is called a word. A word, therefore, does not exist in the outside world. It exists in the impression<sup>1</sup>. Similar is the case with sentences.

This explanation is not free from objection. This theory cannot explain the notion of the identity of words. A word, say 'cow', is uttered for the first time before a man who has no previous knowledge of the meaning of that word. The stranger having heard that word for the second time at some other place says 'Oh! this is the same word that I heard at such and such a place.' He identifies the two. This consciousness of identity of the two pronounciations of a word heard at different times is not caused by the notion of similarity present in these two impressions. The notion of similarity must have some common ground in objects which are similar. If this common ground is taken as the universal residing in the two, the whole quarrel comes to an end. It is the universal in the impression that causes the notion of similarity. Now let us ask, whether this universal resides in the impression of letters or in the impression of words. In the former case, one has to accept as many universals as there are letters in a word. The consciousness of identity in the previous example will be the consciousness of the identity of letters and not of words. He will identify each letter of the word 'Cow' heard in the past with each letter of the word uttered at present. Thus what one will get will be the consciousness of identity of letters and never of words. The second alternative is even worse. No impression of a word as such is possible in the mind of the hearer according to this

- 
1. (a) antyavarṇapratyayāt pūrvavarṇa-pratisandhāva-pratyayāpekṣādarthapratyaya iti. —Nyāya Vārtika. 2.2.60.
  - (b) anityaśāśau varṇapratyayaśceti anityavarṇapratyayah sakalavarṇāvagāhīni smṛtiḥ sā ca prācaḥ pratyekavarṇānubhavanāpekṣyāntyā bhavati. —Tīkā on the above.



theory. The impression on the mind of the hearer is the impression of letters and not of words, because he has never heard a word. If it is accepted that although what is heard are letters but the impression caused by them is a single whole, we have no objection. The reason is that by this very logic the opponent is forced to accept what is contrary to his contention. The Nyâya school which has advocated the impermanency of letters cannot say that impermanent letters cause the permanent impression of words. If he accepts this he must also accept, in order to avoid the folly of advocating the inconsistent notion of the birth of the permanent from momentary, that letters *appear* to hint at something which is real. Letters are apparent, while words are real. There are no letters in a word. But once this doctrine of Appearance and Reality is accepted the position of the Nyâya becomes ridiculous.

We have seen that without accepting a whole parts are meaningless. This same logic can be applied to prove the existence of a real sentence over and above words constituting it. As letters are only apparent and words are real, so also, words are only appearances of the real sentence. There are no letters in a word and there are no words in a sentence<sup>1</sup>.

This discussion has brought another fruitful result. Letters cannot be real, they only help in the manifestation of the word which is mental or conceptual. Words exist only in our mind. They do not exist in the outside world. Sentences, similarly, do not exist as a pen exists, but they exist in a different sense. They exist in the mind<sup>2</sup>. Words and sentences are ideal.

---

1. pade na varṇā vidyante vākyeṣvavayavā na ca.  
vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana. V.p. I. 73.

2. evam tarhi :

buddhau kṛtvā sarvāśceṣṭāḥ kartā dhīras tatvan nītiḥ  
śabdenārthan vācyaṁ dṛṣṭvā buddhau kuryātpaurvāparyam.  
buddhiviṣayam eva śabdānām paurvāparyam.  
iha ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakāri bhavati  
sa paśyati asminnartho' yam śabdaḥ prayoktavyaḥ  
asminstāvacchabbe' yam varṇas tatoyamiti. M.B. 1. 4. 4. 109.

In this conceptual word we can have the notion of succession of letters. A man divides this word into letters, and these letters are conceived to be following an order. The conceptual word, when expressed in a particular language, takes the form of letters<sup>1</sup>. Only in this sense a word may be said to consist of letters. Ultimately there are no letters in a word and no words in a sentence. The order of letters in a word and the order of words in a sentence are orders only in an expressed word or a sentence. The conceptual word or sentence has no such order.

( 2 )

Words and sentences are mental. The objects with which they are related are equally mental. They cannot be physical. We say 'A pen is there'. If the word 'pen' used in this sentence, says Nāgeśa, asserts its existence in the world outside, what is the use of introducing the verb 'is' there ? Do we not then duplicate our meaning ? By the word 'pen' we mean that there *is* an object called 'pen' because every name is the name of something that *is*. Again, take the sentence, 'There is no pen'. The word 'pen' means that there *is* something called 'pen' and the word 'no' negates the existence of that 'pen'. How are then these two words reconciled ? Existence and non-existence, being opposed like light and darkness, cannot be attributed to one and the same thing. Thirdly, if names are the names of things that exist in the world the use of such words as 'mirage' 'barren woman's child' etc. which do not stand for something that is outside our mind would be meaningless. Thus we have to accept that objects primarily exist in the mind and only in a secondary sense in the world of experience. We use 'is' with 'pen' because the word 'is' confirms the correspondence of the mental pen with the physical pen. The existence of pen is negated because pen although existing in the mind does not exist in the world outside. We use such words as mirage, etc. because conceptually they are possible<sup>2</sup>.

1. V. P. I. 76-77.

2. (a) Manjūśā p. 240-241. (b) Nyāya Vārtika 4. 1. 50.



'I wish to have a pen'. This desire to have a pen is caused by the pen itself. The desire in the soul of a man and the object so desired must be on one and the same 'plane, otherwise no desire would ever be possible, for a desire to arise both the desired and the person desiring must be on a par. This is possible only when the object of desire is also in the man who desires and not outside.<sup>1</sup>

Here we are not going to advance all those arguments that are advanced by Asanga and Vasubandhu to prove the mental existence of objects. But for our convenience we may consider some of them. Objects of the world do not exist outside of thought. External objects depend on thought like the hair seen floating in the atmosphere or like the pereception of double-moon. Spatial and temporal determinations of objects, experience of one object by many or fruitful action are all equally experienced in dream; therefore, they cannot be the determining factors of their objectivity. Perception is no guarantee of the reality of objects existing outside, because objects are equally perceived in dreams. Memory only implies consciousness of objects and not real objects.<sup>2</sup> The dream-experience is real as long as the dream lasts. It is unreal only when the dream is over. Objects experienced in the world are objects experienced in a long dream which is broken after a great effort of disillusionment on the part of the experiencer. The Real is, therefore, mental; Vācaspati Miśra in the *Bhāmatī* accepts this and says that the conscious being makes a jar first by painting name and form in the mind and then the external jar is produced. One is said to produce a jar because the jar first exists in the mind and then is produced externally. No one can say that what is not in the mind can be produced<sup>3</sup>. It is not the impact of external world on the mind; it is the creation of mind itself, because in

---

1. Manjūśī, *ibid*.

2. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, *Vimśatikā*, 1-7.

3. *Bhāmatī* on B. S. 1. 1. 2.

dreams we have experience of objects but objects are not externally presented<sup>1</sup>.

The world that we externally experience is a total error. It is like seeing water in mirage, like experiencing silver in conch-shell or like seeing cause of fear in a rope-snake. The whole world outside is only an error<sup>2</sup>.

Many pots are made out of the same clay. Clay is one, while pots are many. One who knows the clay knows the reality of the pots, says the Chândogya Upaniṣad<sup>3</sup>. 'Pots differ because different words are used for them. In reality they are all clay. There is no real transformation of clay into pots. They are mere words. Similarly soul is the only reality which is manifested in the outside world. As one and the same space seen through different conditions as being different is really not many, as water in mirage is nothing but the barren earth so also the whole creation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed is nothing but the Cosmic Soul<sup>4</sup>. Unity is real, diversity is unreal<sup>5</sup>. Before this unity is realised, the diversity is real; as dream is real before waking. Everything that occurs during dream is as real as we experience them in the world outside; but after the dream is over, the whole fabrication of the mind vanishes and the dreamer realises that what was seen was only unreal<sup>6</sup>. There is no chariot, no road, no contact with the chariot in dream. But one

1. Yogavāsiṣṭha, 5. 48. 49-53.

2. Parmārthasāra, 22.

3. (a) Chândogya Up. 6. 1. 1.

(b) S. B. 2. 1. 14.

4. S. B., 2. 1. 14.

5. mithyā-vijṛmbhitam ca nānātvam, ibid 2. 1. 14.

6. tasmāt prāgbrahmaṭāpratibodhād utpannaḥ sarvo laukiko vaidikaśca vyavahāraḥ. yathā suptasya prākṛtasya janasya svapna uccāvacān bhāvan paśyato niścitameva pratyakṣābhi-matam vijñānam bhavati prākprabodhāt, na pratyakṣābhāsa-bhi-prāyastatkāle bhavati, tadvat.

—S. B. 2. 1. 14.



creates them in the mind, says the Bṛhadâraṇyaka<sup>1</sup>. This dream experience is the source of real effects in life. "When one sees women in dream, he is to get wealth in real life. When one sees a black person with black teeth in dreams, that dream of such person is the cause of his death," the *Chândogya* says<sup>2</sup>. There are instances that prove that dream is real so long as it lasts and is the source of fruitful results in life. But they are devoid of any reality from the waking point of view. Dream is only a fabrication of the mind. It is not real. Similarly, says Śāṅkara, this world of experience is the creation of the mind. It has no reality. It is only the fabrication of a higher mind. Before this higher Mind is realized all this creation before us seems to be real. It is annihilated as soon as the Brahman is realized. The dream-experience is contradicted every day, but this world-dream is contradicted after a great labour and time<sup>3</sup>.

Thus the whole objective world, like a long dream, is said to be the creation of mind. It is not outside of man, it is in man. The whole objective world is mental.

This world cannot be said to be totally real because, its experience is sublated ; the real however is real for all time. It cannot be said to be totally unreal as we experience its existence through our senses and enjoy it. Things of the world even affect our life. They cannot be both real and unreal, because the two are totally opposed. One cannot say what it is. It is indescribable<sup>4</sup>. Indescribability does not consist in being

---

1. 4. 3. 10.

2. 5. 2. 9.

3. S. B. 3. 2. 4.

4. tasman na sat nâpi sadasat paraspara virodhat ity anirvâcyam evaropaṇiyam marīciṣu toyam âstheyam, tad anena krameṇâ-dhyastam toyam paramârthatoyam iva, ata eva pûrvadṛṣṭam iva, tattvatastu na toyam na ca pûrvadṛṣṭam kintvanṛtam anirvâcyam. evam ca dehendriyâdiprapanco' pyanirvâcyah. —Bhāmâtī on S. B. 1. 1. 1.

something peculiar than real and unreal. Its peculiarity is owing to the fact that it cannot be said to be either real or unreal. Things that we experience is an error on our part. This error is mental, not physical. To mistake the conch shell for silver is not owing to the silver present in that shell. It is entirely a mental creation of the seer. The misperception of objects as existing outside our mind does not imply that objects really exist independent of our mind but because our mind erringly perceives them as existing independent of itself<sup>1</sup>.

The objective world is said to be the creation of mind. Is this creation a real transformation or mere appearance? It cannot be a real transformation. We have seen that the world is like an illusory appearance. It is compared to a snake in a rope. The rope itself is not transformed into the snake. The snake only *appears in* the rope. This appearance of a snake does not affect the rope, yet is dependent on it. The world is an appearance or *vivarta* of the mind; it appears to be something independent of the mind while really it is not. It depends on the mind itself. They are nothing but the mind itself appearing in colourful ways.<sup>2</sup> They are not outside our mind.<sup>3</sup>

The objective world depends upon the mind. Our mind appears in different ways through physical objects, as words appear in the form of sounds. What we experience is the physical replica of mental object as what we hear is a verbal expression of the mental word. Both words and objects are mental, physical words ( sound ) and objects are constructions on the mental word and object.<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. Illusion is called *smṛtirūpa* (it is of the nature of memory which is always mental). S. B. 1. 1. 1.
  2. (a) S. B. 1. 1. 1.  
(b) *Parmārtha Sāra*. 33.
  3. (a) *Aitareya Upani.* 5, 2-3.  
(b) *Parmārtha Sāra*. 23, 30.  
(c) *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. 2. 6. 50-51.
  4. *yovārtho buddhiviśayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ  
sa bāhyam vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ samyagiśyate.*—V.P. 2. 134.



## II

## THE RELATION OF WORDS TO OBJECTS

( 1 )

Words are mental, so are objects. They both relate to give meaning. The word 'cow' when related to the object cow in the mind of the hearer, produces the consciousness of meaning in him. The sentence 'There is a pot' is meaningful because the pot existing in the mind is pointed out to exist in the world outside. The verb 'to be' indicates this. It confirms the existence of the mental in the physical world. In the sentence 'There is no pot', the word 'no' negates the existence of a pot in the outside world, while the use of the word 'pot' confirms such existence in the mind. 'Where the mental object corresponds with the physical object, the word meaning such object is credible', says Nāgeśa.<sup>1</sup>

Such words as 'mirage', 'barren woman's child', 'hare's horn' are meaningful, but not credible because although these words are related to such objects in the mind, no such object is to be found in the outside world. These words have no corresponding objects in the outside world. Correspondence determines credibility but not meaningfulness. A word may be incredible yet meaningful. Abusing a person by bad names is totally incredible but it has meaning, and so the hearer becomes angry. Correspondence or verification can only make a word worthy of belief, it cannot make or unmake a word meaningful. Meaning is determined by the correspondence of mental word with mental objects. Such a word which has no corresponding mental object is meaningless. The word 'depda' for example has no meaning for me because in my mind there is no corresponding object to it. The word is not related to any object.

1. yatra hi ābhyantarārthasya bāhyārthena samvādaḥ sa śabdah pramāṇam, viśamvāde tvapramāṇamiti vyavasthā.

—Manjūśā p. 337.

Names of historical or legendary persons can be explained on this very principle. 'Julius Ceasar' has meaning because the history associated with this word has formed a conception in the mind and the word corresponds with such conceptual object. It is credible as well, because if one would have been there he would have verified the mental Julius Caesar with the physical Caesar. It is not necessary that correspondence should be immediate. Inferred correspondence is equally effective to make a word worthy of belief. Legendary names 'centaur', for example, are meaningful because the word has the corresponding notion of a monster, halfman, half horse in the mind of a man. It may not arouse belief in the mind of the hearer, but it has meaning.

Patanjali gives a very good account of such words. There is an example 'He kills Kaṁsa' or 'He confines Bali'. Kaṁsa and Bali are legendary figures or they are historical figures occurring in the remote past. Kaṁsa was killed and Bali was confined long ago, how then the use of present tense is permissible with them? To this he replies that Kaṁsa and Bali are presented here as being slain or confined because their history which is in our mind is produced in words. Words represent the mental killing or confining of Kaṁsa and Bali. Although Kaṁsa and Bali are persons of the past yet their history is represented in the mind as of the present. The use of the present tense represents this present mental object and, therefore, they are meaningful.<sup>1</sup> Bhartṛhari explains this passage of Patanjali beautifully thus: the history of Kaṁsa etc. is presented in the mind as if it were a present occurrence. Such mental history is presented in words. These mental objects are represented in words by a speaker and this very mental existence appears in different forms through different words.<sup>2</sup>

---

1. M. B. B. 3. 1. 2. 26.

2. V.P. III. 7. 5-6.



A man has never heard the name 'centaur'. I utter the word before him. He hears the word and being unable to connect that word with any object asks me 'What does it mean?' I then explain to him that the word stands for an object which is 'half man, half horse'. This explanation is enough to make him understand the meaning of the word because after this explanation he is able to connect the word with that object. But it is clear that such an object called by the name 'centaur' does not exist in the objective world. Yet the word acquires meaning. And this happens because the word is connected with a mental object.

Thus a word (which is mental) is always connected with an object which is equally mental. This correspondence between a word and an object in the mind of the hearer is very necessary to convey meaning. In the absence of such correspondence no meaning is ever possible. When this correspondence is available in the objective world the word is said to have a credible meaning. The word which does not correspond with an object in the objective world is not believable but is still meaningful. Meaning of a word does not depend on external verification as positivists believe, but it depends on mental correspondence.

( 2 )

A meaningful word is necessarily related to an object; entirely mental in the case of incredible words, both mental and physical in the case of credible words. For meaning in any case correspondence between words and objects is necessary. Without such correspondence a word is meaningless.

This correspondence is not arbitrary. It is preestablished. The word 'cow' cannot correspond with 'pen' as they are not related. This correspondence is determined by some relation. In this sub-section we shall try to study the nature of such relation.

In our ordinary discourse we confuse objects with words. If someone asks 'What is this' the answer is 'This is a pen'.

The word 'pen' here is used in place of an object. The word 'this' points to an object at hand but the word 'pen' does not point to that object, it simply substitutes itself for that object. There is no distinction between that object and the word 'pen'. Nāgeśa defines this relation between a word and an object as that of adhyāsa (apparent identity)<sup>1</sup>.

Now let us briefly consider the the nature of adhyāsa. This may be defined as confusing or identifying two different things and taking them as one. Identification presupposes difference. Without some sort of difference the notion of identification is impossible. Two pens may be identical in shape, size, colour etc. But they are not one, because at least they differ in occupying different spaces. They specially differ and therefore they are identical. Identification is, therefore, not the same as unity. In identification differences are apparently cemented, but they are there<sup>2</sup>. They do not altogether vanish, in unity differences altogether vanish. There is no apparent or real difference between the two. Words are said to be confused with objects because they fundamentally differ. They seem to be identical but they are different, they are not one.

This adhyāsa of one upon the other is the cause of meaning<sup>3</sup>. The word 'pen' is confused with object because they are similar yet different. They are related to each other because although being totally different they are apparently similar. One means the other because of this apparent similarity. Really speaking there is no real relation between the two. They seem to be related but they are not related.

This explanation of meaning implies a particular metaphysics. It presupposes that word is the only Reality and

1. tasmāt padapadārthayoh sambandhāntaram eva śaktir  
vācyavācakabhāvāparaparyāyā tadgrāhakam ca itaretarādhyāsa  
rūpam tādātmyam. Manjūśā p. 26-27.
2. mithyāpratyaayaścāropaviśayāropanīyasya mithunam antareṇa  
na bhavati. Bhāmatī. 1.1.1.
3. Manjūśā p. 36-39.



that objects are merely creations of ignorance. They are opposed like light and darkness. There is nothing to which a word is related. Objects are only creations of words and thus they are not different from words themselves. They appear to be different but they are one. Our meaning is possible so long as they appear different. Once they are taken as one the whole meaning vanishes<sup>1</sup>.

We have to say something about this explanation of meaning. We subscribe to the metaphysical view held by Nâgeśa to a great extent. We will in the subsequent section try to prove that the Real must be one and the world is only an appearance. But at the same time we are not prepared to say that Real is of the nature of words. The Real is only Pure Existence, (Brahman). There is not the slightest consciousness of word in it. It is the essence of words and not the word itself. Word is a creation out of it although the highest creation out of which the world around us emanates. We cannot advance arguments in support of the above thesis here, but postpone it for a subsequent discussion. Thus to us words and objects are cast in a different relation. This relation we call causation.

Word is the cause of the object. This causation itself is the meaning of the word. A word causes an object<sup>2</sup>. This may appear to be a very crude way of saying, but if we review our previous discussion about the nature of words and objects, this may not appear so. We have said that words and objects are mental. They are in the mind, they are objective by courtesy. Really they are mental. But, again to refer to our previous discussion in the Chapter on 'Śâdbodha', every knowledge is a knowledge through words. Words are prior in every knowledge. We cannot know an object without having any word for it. It is through words that we reach at an object. Words in this sense facilitate the knowledge of

---

1. *ibid.* p. 45-50.

2. V.P. III. 3. 32.

objects. This we call the power of words. This is of the nature of causation in the sense that it produces the knowledge of the object. Objects are not real transformations of words, they are apparent. As a rope is called the cause of the knowledge of snake, so an object is caused by words. But as snake is not the same or even indetical with rope so objects are not the same or identical with words. Yet they appear differently and they cannot be related in any other way than by causation. Thus to us meaning is of the nature of causation. A word is related to an object causally.

Bhartṛhari says that word is the cause of object, because object is born of words. Object is an effect of the word and being an effect it must have some cause ; this cause is the word itself.<sup>1</sup> He says that by the object in the mind of a man a word *seems to exist*. Here the word 'seems to exist' (pratiyate) may mean that objects cause words as words cause objects. Helārāja prefers this explanation. But this explanation is against the thesis of Bhartṛhari<sup>2</sup>. Bhartṛhari advocates with great emphasis that no knowledge is possible without words<sup>3</sup>. That words have eternal relation with objects<sup>4</sup>. This relation proceeds from words to objects. If objects make the knowledge of words possible, before this causation objects would be without words and would be known to exist as such. But according to Bhartṛhari this cannot be. Thus it is the word itself that causes the knowledge of objects and not *vice-versa*. Thus the verb 'pratiyate' in the above context does not mean 'seems to appear' but it means 'is inferred.' By the existence of objects in the knowledge we can infer that there is some cause for this occurrence, and that cause is the word itself.

---

1. śabdaḥ kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate. tathā ca buddhiviśayād arthācchabdaḥ pratiyate. —V. P. III. 3. 32.

2. Helārāja on the above.

3. V. P. I. 124.

4. V. P. I. 23.



The relation of causation is affirmed by other schools of Indian Philosophy. Śāntarakṣita, a great Buddhist logician, says that words cause the reflection of objects in the mind and, therefore, words are said to have meaning and objects are said to be meant. This relation between words and objects is that of cause and effect. Kamalaśīla explains his teacher by saying that because words cause the reflection of objects in the mind and because that reflection is caused by words, the former is said to cause meaning ( *vācaka* ) and the latter is said to be meant ( *vācya* )<sup>1</sup>. Mādhvācārya in his commentary of Vyāsa sūtra commends this by saying that word is naturally related to an object<sup>2</sup>.

How this natural relation of a word with an object leads to the conception of causation is another point for our consideration. A word may be related to an object either naturally or conventionally. We have elaborately discussed the conventional relation in a previous chapter and found it illogical. We need not repeat it here. There seems to be no choice for us except to accept the first alternative i. e. the relation between a word and an object is natural. It is not brought about by someone. It is beginningless, says Bhartṛhari<sup>3</sup>. But, it may be asked, if this relation is natural, not conventional, why does not a man who has no knowledge of relation between a word and an object get the knowledge of meaning of that word? It is seen that only that person has the knowledge of meaning of a word who knows some convention about its relation with an object. Thus convention is necessary for meaning. Bhartṛhari points out against this

---

1. tadrūpapratiḥbimbasya dhiyaḥ śabdācca janmani. vācyavācaka-  
bhāvoyam jāto hetuḥphalātmakaḥ.

Tattva-saṁgraha. k 1012.  
and Panjikā on it.

2. (a) pratyakṣavacca prāmāṇyam svata evāgamasya hi-B. S. 1. 1.  
(b) Jayatīrtha on the above.

3. V. P. III. 3. 29-31.

objection that our senses have natural power to perceive their corresponding objects, but they do not always perceive things. It is only when an object is brought into contact with a sense organ, that organ is able to perceive it. Similarly a word means naturally but it does not always mean. It requires a contact with object in the mind of the hearer. If the hearer is able to relate any object with that word he can have meaning, if he cannot recall any relation he is unable to have any sense, although the word is there<sup>1</sup>.

Is this relation of causation between words and objects universal, i. e. are all words related to all objects, or is it particular i. e. is one word related to one object? If the first alternative is accepted any word would mean anything; 'cow' may mean a pen and 'pen' may mean a man. If the second alternative is accepted there will be no other explanation possible than accepting convention as causing a particular word mean a particular object. The word 'pen' means pen because by long convention they are related. If a word has a natural relation with an object, why only that word is so, why not others? We can reply to this objection in this way. Words are symbols and as such are potential to mean anything and everything. Words do not contain in themselves any principle to mean one thing only and not the other. Any word can be employed to mean anything, thus all words can mean all things. It is another question that they do not mean all things. Our emphasis here is on the universal character of words. Words have potential power to mean. It is upto us to limit that power to one object and not extend it to others<sup>2</sup>.

Theoretically, every word can mean every object, but practically every word means some object. The use of word is to convey some intention from the speaker to the hearer. The

---

1. *ibid.*

2. *Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa* K. 36.



communication is always the communication of the specific, not of the general. The most general cannot be communicated. Thus to be communicative words must be related to a specific object. For the sake of communication their scope is limited. This limitation of the power of words to a specific object requires a convention, and here we happily acknowledge the role of convention in language. But we cannot acclaim convention as the initiator of language.

Thus to conclude this long discussion about the nature of the power of words we can say that words in general have power to cause the knowledge of objects. Theoretically there is no harm in saying that every word may mean every object. For our practical purposes we can limit the scope of words and here we acknowledge the limitation imposed on the universal power of words by convention. But surely convention is not the originator of the power of words. Power of words is presupposed by convention<sup>1</sup>.

Every word means every object, therefore words always mean objects. There is not a single word which is devoid of the power to mean. Even those words that appear to us meaningless are potentially meaningful; they do not actually mean because they are not particularised in their meaning. A word may be meaningless today but after ten years it may become as meaningful as any other word in our use is. The word 'jet' for example, would have been a meaningless word before the jet planes had come into existence, now it has meaning because that particular word is limited to a particular object. No one can say that the word 'jet' was not before the invention of jet planes, nor it can be said that the word 'jet' had no power to mean at that time. If it had no power at that time, it cannot have any subsequently. Thus in this wider sense every word is always powerful to mean. At no time a word is devoid of the power to mean if it is a word. The power, which is a

---

1. Manjûśā p. 22.

relation and which is called the meaning of that word, is, therefore, eternal and inseparable from words.

Words mean eternally. As long as words are there they will mean. There is not a single moment when they are devoid of this power. In our use a word is said to change its meaning. Really it does not change its meaning; only its limitation from one object is shifted to another object. The word 'family' was in old times used to mean 'the household', now it means the children alone. There are words which have abandoned their old meaning altogether. They are either obsolete or used in an entirely different sense. These facts of change of meaning only prove that the emphasis of a word is shifted from one place to another. A word is not eternally related to one object only. It is related to objects in general, it is we who limit its range. The change rather proves the general character of words. It proves that words have potential power to mean any and every object.

The use of the same word in different senses also proves this contention. A very interesting example is provided by the *Āryamlecchādhikaraṇa* of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. The word 'yava' is used by the Aryas in the sense of barley but the melcchas use the word to mean priyaṅgu, a wild fruit. The same word used in different contexts and in different places mean differently because that word has power to mean anything. Words have thus universal and eternal relation to objects in general.

In communication the universal meaning must be limited to some particular object. Without this communication is impossible. Limitation of meaning of a word is effected by negating the other. The word 'cow' means something but that thing is not horse, not pen, not table and so on. What is left after negating all other is the proper communicative meaning of a word. The negation of the other is very essential for meaning in the narrower sense. The negation is not negation



in toto<sup>1</sup>. It is negating in order to affirm something. In our communication the word 'cow' does not cause the knowledge of horse, pen, table or any other thing because its universal power is confined to a particular object, and not because it is intrinsically limited to that object. If a word is intrinsically related to one and only one object the process of negation would become futile. Thus the Buddhists advocating the theory of negation (apoha) of the other tacitly accept this universal power of words. When a word is entirely incapable of meaning one and only one thing, no negation of the other is required. The negation is significant only when that word is capable of meaning many things.

We have called this meaning eternal. We know that meaning is only a relation between a word and an object. If any of these terms is non-eternal how can the relation be eternal? The relation depends upon its terms and as soon as any of its terms is destroyed the meaning ceases to exist. In order to prove the eternality of meaning we have to prove the eternality of words and objects.

Are, then, words eternal? If by word we mean spoken words surely words are not eternal. But we have proved that spoken words are only images of mental words. Words are not physical, they are mental. But being mental is not a reason for acclaiming it as eternal. Our feelings and emotions, for instance, are mental but they are fleeting, words may also be momentary. We see that words do not always exist in our mind. They exist only when our mind is active. In the passive mind, in dreamless sleep, words do not exist, nor can we infer their existence, as we do infer the existence of soul.

Similarly objects are not eternal, even when their mental character is granted. Objects do not always figure in our

---

1. nāsmābhir apohaśabdēna vidhīreva kevalobhipretah.  
 nāpyanyavyāvṛttimātram kintvanyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhis  
 śābdānāmārtah. Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts p. 3.

consciousness, and that is enough to prove that they are momentary creations of mind. To answer these objections we proceed to the theory of *Sphoṭa*.

### III

#### SPHOṬA: THE ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE OF WORDS AND OBJECTS

##### ( 1 )

The question here is how are words and objects eternal? and whether they are eternal at all? In order to answer these questions we start first by examining the existence of objects.

The word 'object' is used to mean everything that exists and thus is capable of being known and communicated. We know a pen because it exists. I know I am angry because anger exists in me, and I can express it and know it to exist. I exist because I know I am and I can make others know of my existence. A centaur exists because I know such a monster which is half-man and half-horse, and I can communicate this to others. Thus existence is not necessarily physical; it is mental. Whatever can be conceived exists. What one cannot conceive does not exist, and the most impossible thing that a man can imagine exists because at least the man with such a notion tells that such and such thing is impossible. Impossibility is physical not ideal. A thing may be impossible in history; it is not impossible in reality. This is the mental character of objects that we have firmly advocated thus far.

Again a thing, say a pen, exists and is known. An individual is known as an individual related to others. A pen is known because it is similar to other pens and dissimilar to what is not pen. Any knowledge presupposes the knowledge of the similar and the negation of dissimilar. A pen is pen because it has something common with other pens and is not *not-pen*. An individual having no reference either to similarity



or to negation of the other is unknowable. If a thing is known to resemble other things but it is not known as different from others, it can never be known. Similarly, if a thing is known as different from others but does not totally resemble with anything of the sort that we know to exist on the earth, it cannot be known. For a thing to be known exclusion ( differentiation ) of it from others and resemblance of it with other things is necessary.<sup>1</sup> What is not as such cannot be known and thus cannot exist either mentally or physically.

A thing resembles other things because it has something common with those things. A pen is similar to other pens because it has something which other pens also have. This common characteristic is called the universal in philosophy. A thing is known because it participates in a universal. A pen resembles other pens because they all have 'penness' in common.

Philosophers have mistaken this common characteristic or universal as existing in the outside world. Universal is taken to be something that is to be found in all pens as colour and form are found. This leads to many difficulties that we have considered in a preceding chapter. It is, therefore, not physical; it is totally a creation of mind. Objects are known because they participate in the mental universal. Our mind by its very nature knows things as having something in common with others. We are forced to see a thing through the eye-glass of universals. Things that are known are known universally, and as they are known so they are expressed. We express universals, not particulars<sup>2</sup>.

---

1. (a) na tad utpadyate kincid yasya jātir na vidyate. ātmābhi-vyaktaye jātih krāñānam prayojikā. —V. P. III. 1. 25.

(b) sarva-vastuṣu buddhiśca vyāvṛtṭyanugamātmikā. jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sa ca na siddhyati. —S. V. 16. 5.

2. tasmāc chabada ākṛtipratyayasya nimittam. tasmād gaurāśva ity evamādayaḥ śabdā ākṛter abhidhāyakā iti siddham.

—Śābara Bhāṣya 1. 3. 10. 33.

The universal is a common characteristic of things participating in it. There are pens because they participate in the universal pen. There are cows because they participate in the universal cow. Men are known as participating in the universal man. There are as many universals as there are classes of things. Conceptual things are not individual things ; they are universals.

The same logic which leads us to accept the universals will compel us to accept the eternity of these universals. We are conscious of things because they participate in one or other universal. But how are we conscious of thing as such ? How do we know that there is a thing as such ? Or there is a thing at all ? Surely this consciousness of thing-in-general is owing to a higher universal which is present in all universals. We call this Existence. There are universals because they participate in the Existence<sup>1</sup>. We know thing in general and things in a less general way because they all exist. Nothing can be known which does not exist, to use the word 'exist' in the widest possible sense. Thus things are Existence. One can never annihilate Existence, the consciousness of it can never be contradicted. Even in a passive mind things exist because the soul or mind, which is also a thing in this sense, exists. Things are eternal because they are not different from Existence. What is the relation of things to this Existence is a subject to be dealt with in the next section. At present we must be content with this much that things are known because they exist, and Existence as a

---

1. (a) Sarvaśaktyātma bhūtatva-nekasyaiveti nirṇayaḥ.

—V. P. III 1,22.

(b) Sambandhibhedāt Sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu ; jātir ityucyate tasyām sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ.

—ibid. 33.

(c) gavaśvādiṣu sattaiva mahāsāmānyam eva jātir gotvā syatvādikā aparasāmānyam nānyā paramārthabhinnā sā vidyate.

—Helārāja on the above.



collective characteristic of all things is eternal. Only in this sense we call things eternal.<sup>1</sup>

( 2 )

In the last sub-section we have arrived at a universal Existence. We have said that whatever we know must exist ; the non-existent is unknowable. But our knowledge of a thing ( an expression of Existence ) being a knowledge must be in words. We know words, through words and in words. Every knowledge functions in and through words. Words is a prior condition for the rise of knowledge. The knowledge of a universal must be a knowledge in words ; pen, man, cow, table, sorrow, joy all these are known because we have words for them. We may not have precise words for each experience, but we have at least some vague words to express any knowledge. This is because the knowledge itself is embodied in words ; it cannot go beyond words. So if we know a thing we have a word for it. Existence is known in and through words.

We have said in a previous context that words are mental and have universal, eternal power. Words are always ready to mean an existent. Where there are words there are necessarily existents, therefore, words are inseparably connected with existents and thus ultimately with Existence. Words cannot be separated from Existence. Existence may remain without words, but for us it is as good as non-existent. We have concern with and knowledge of only such existent as is knowable and expressible. Such an existent is necessarily embodied in words. We cannot separate words from existents. Words are one with Existence.<sup>2</sup> They are eternal.

1. (a) V. P. III. 1. 34.

(b) *sā codayavyayarahitattvānnityā, satpratyaṃyasya sarvadānu-  
vṛtteh.* —Helārāja on the above.

2. *Svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhiyate tatortha-  
jātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.* —V.P. III. 1. 6.

and Helārāja on the above.

( 3 )

This Pure Existence is the principle of both words and objects. In it words and objects are fused together to form a whole. They are inseparable; they are one. We cannot say that this much is word and this much object. Words and objects are separated when we descend from it and see them manifest in the sensuous world. How this separation is affected we will discuss shortly. Here we are trying to see one point. We have to investigate the place of relation between words and objects. We have called this as causation. When word and objects fuse together causation is not possible. Does this causation vanish altogether and arise accidentally when they are separated or does it remain somewhere? Here we shall show that Existence, the ultimate principle of words and objects, is nothing but this relation. It does not vanish, it remains in its pure form to facilitate their existence in the sensuous world.

Our knowledge is always presented in words. We know objects in words, we cannot know what is not in words i. e. what cannot be expressed. We can know only what exists. Existence is known only through words. Expressibility and existence are inseparably related. Whatever is expressible exists, and not *vice versa*. Existence is wider than expression. Existence may remain unexpressed but whatever is expressed is 'nothing other than existent. Expressibility is the sole condition of knowledge.

What we know is not the object, but objects expressed in or associated with words. It is as if word did split itself into two parts. One part is the pure word which means and the other is the objectified word or word as taken to be an object.<sup>1</sup> The relation between these two parts of words is

---

1. (a) V. P. I. 119-121.

(b) dvāvupādāna-śabdeṣu śabdu śabdavido viduḥ' eko  
nimittam śabdānām apro'rthe prayujyate. -V.P.I. 44.



called causation. One word causes the other. The word 'pen' causes the knowledge of the object which is expressed as pen. Both these are words. The word 'pen' from the mouth of the speaker causes the knowledge of objective pen in the mind of the hearer which is nothing but the word pen itself.<sup>1</sup> This is the reason why we always take a word and an object known through that word as the same. I ask a question 'What is this?' This question demands the knowledge of an object, not of a word. But the answer, say 'This is a pen' is in words. The question asks about the object but the answer is in words and this satisfies the questioner. The object is before the eyes of the questioner; he sees it and can know the object by examining it. But this is not enough for him. He wants to know something more about that object, he wants a name for that object without which the presented object is as good as nothing. This is the reason why he asks about it and is satisfied when a word is given for that object.<sup>2</sup> Knowledge of an object is impossible without a word for that object. It is complete only when given in words.<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes a word is known, but its meaning is unknown i. e. its relation to an object is unknown. The man who is ignorant of such a relation asks the question about that word. I happen to know the word 'mantle' but I do not know its relation to an object (objectified word), I ask Mr. X about it. My question is directed to know the object but when Mr. X says to me 'Mantle is a cloak or loose outer garment' my curiosity vanishes. What Mr. X has said is only words, but these words have satisfied a query about an object. Definitions are explanations of words in words. They do not explain things.

---

1. grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca dve śakti tejaso yathā tathaiṣa sarvaśabd. nām ete pṛthag avasthite.

—V. P. I. 55.

2. ato' nirjñātarūpatvāt kim āhetyabhidhīyate.  
nendriyāṇām prakāśyerthe svarūpam grīhyate yatah.

—V.P. I. 57.

3. ibid, 128, and Puṇyārāja on it.

But suppose I do not know the meaning of the word 'cloak' or 'garment' and still I persist to know the relation of the word 'mantle', to an object. What Mr. X would possibly do in this case would be that he will pick up the object and point it out to me and say 'This is mental'. What he shows is not really 'mantle'; it is an object, but he calls it mantle. The reason is that he identifies the word with the objectified word. After this demonstration I am satisfied and I have known the meaning of the word. Thus the meaning is the relation from a word to a word, which is taken as different from it but it is not.<sup>1</sup>

But the word 'mantle' and object-mantle exist. And because they exist they are related. In the above example Mr. X had demonstrated or defined the word 'mantle,' I had only the word 'mantle' in pure form. It has not related to any particular object because that object did not exist at that time. After the labour of Mr. X that object came into existence and thus the relation was established. One and the same existence when split into two makes the two related. Existence itself unites the two. Because words exist and because objects (objectified words) exist they are related.

The causation can be defined as the force of bringing some thing into existence. The force of the word 'mantle' has brought the objectified word into Existence. But that force itself is nothing more than mere existence. Existence causes existence. Words and objects exist because of existence, they are related because of Existence.<sup>2</sup>

This conception of causation is not new philosophy. Rope appears as snake because for a person both rope and snake exist. If he had not any knowledge of snake he would never have been afraid of a snake when a rope was seen in dark night. As he knows a snake and also knows rope, he perceives a

---

1. V. P. I. 131.

2. ekasyaivātmano bhedaū śabdārthāvapṛthak sthitau. Prakāśka-a prakāśyatvam kāryakāraṇarūpatā. antarmātrātmanas tasya śabdatattvasya sarvadā-V. P. II. 31. 32.



snake in the rope. In such perception although he is not conscious of rope as rope but without his knowledge of it, causes the snake to appear, because it is related to snake. This relation is caused by similarity. By similarity one appears as causing the other. In technical language we call this causation as *vivarta* or emergence. One takes the objective world as real, forgetting that it is only a false creation of reality. He does not realize that all this is real as a dreamer does not realize that what he is seeing is only a dream while he is dreaming. But the dream is not real, it is only an appearance of the subconscious mind. The sub-conscious mind appears as objects in dream, because it is related to those objects. It is the soul which appears in the form of mind and object and makes them unite. Mind and matter are related because they are Real Brahman. Words and objects are related because existence manifesting itself in the form of words and objects makes them related. Words and objects are only manifestations of existence. Existence causes them to exist and thus related. The cause is not external to terms. It is immanent in them. It is the only Reality. It is only in this sense that we have said that a relation can exist in itself without any reference to its terms. Viewed from the point of view of words and objects existence is a relation-bond uniting the two, but it does not depend on them for its existence. It is beyond them.

Thus Existence embodies in itself both words and objects. But it is impossible to discern words and objects in the body of this Existence. It is neither word nor object. But it appears to be both word and object. The appearance of the Real exists for us as long as we do not know the Real. But once the Real is known the whole appearance vanishes and only the Real remains. Words and objects are illusory, they are unreal yet they exist. The element of Existence is the manifestation of the Real in them. The Real is present in them, they are real.

Bhartṛhari in his very first verse of the *Vākyapadīya* explains the character of the Real. The Real is without a

beginning, without an end, yet is the source of the world, which is presented in the form of objects. But this is a unique cause different from others. There are causes which change themselves in the form of effects ; they are transformed. There are certain other types of causes which change partially, some portion of them is transformed into effect and some portion remains unchanged. There is a third type of cause which is totally lost when an effect is produced. Effect is something entirely new which succeeds cause. Causation in this sense is a mere succession. In the first case, the cause totally disappears and therefore is not real, in the second case there is decay of cause and, therefore, it cannot be the Real. The third type of causation is no causation at all. The cause of Bhartṛhari is without a beginning and without an end ; therefore, it never transforms itself in the world. It is real for all time to come ; therefore, it does not undergo partial transformation ; it is without decay ( akṣara ). The cause is Real, without decay and death. Nothing is taken from it, yet it is the source of the objective world. This is because the cause itself *appears* in the form of the world. The world emerges out of it.<sup>1</sup> This appearance is real because of the Real. It exists by the side of the Real as snake exists by the side of the rope.

The Real appears in the form of this objective world. The world is known as existing in our experience because we have words for them. There is no knowledge without words. The knowledge of the world is in words. In knowledge words are prior to contents ; therefore, in Reality words are first in the order of emergence, followed by objects. The Real is the essence of words ( śabdatattva ). Word is the first manifestation of the Real. It is really from this that the objective world shoots forth<sup>2</sup>. The word is, therefore, called as that from which objects emerge ; it is Sphoṭa. Sphoṭa in

- 
1. anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadākṣaram  
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. —V. P. I. 1.
  2. ibid. 121.



itself is the highest manifestation of the Real but it is not the ultimate Reality. The ultimate Real is the essence of this Sphoṭa and is beyond the Sphoṭa.

Words and objects are subjectively real in our experience. But words precede objects in our knowledge as no knowledge is ever possible without words. Wherever objects are known they are through words; known objects can never exist beyond words. They both are, therefore, related. Their relation is an eternal relation, and this relation manifests itself in the form of words and objects. Words and objects are appearances of the Real. But the word being prior in knowledge is also first in Reality. Word is the first creation of the Real. This word is called Sphoṭa. Now we will see the order in which the manifestation of the Real takes place.

#### IV

#### THE EVOLUTION OF WORDS AND OBJECTS

##### ( 1 )

The pure existence is Absolute, without a second. It is of the nature of consciousness, because only conscious existence can manifest itself in the world. A table cannot manifest itself in various forms because it is dead matter. Only conscious being has power to appear in various forms. The rope does not manifest itself in snake but it is the conscious being for whom a rope appears as a snake. It is the conscious Absolute for whom the world is a creation. But unlike the rope-snake example the creation is false for the conscious Absolute. He knows it to be a mental fabrication. It is like day-dreaming by the Absolute, where He fancies Himself creating the multifarious universe yet knows that He does not<sup>1</sup>.

The Absolute is not dead. He is dynamic. He is endowed with power. The power is not separate and distinct from him. It is His very essence. He is the powerful conscious Absolute<sup>2</sup>.

1. lokavattu līlākāivalyam. —B. S. 2. 1. 33.

2. sarvajñam sarvaśakti mahāmāyam ca brahma. —S. B. 2. 1. 37.

He is not inactive like matter. Although there is no difference between His power and Himself, we in our language inevitably separate the two and say the power as the power of the Absolute.

The Absolute being the presupposition of our knowledge and action cannot be expressed in words, it cannot be known by our finite mind. It has no equality through which we can know it; saying anything about it is a logical error. Thus what we say about the Absolute is really about the personified Absolute. Our saying that there is an Absolute really refers to this and not to the Absolute. It is only this personified Absolute or God that can be described as powerful, conscious Being. The source of creation is personified Absolute or God. It is by His fancy that this apparent world evolves<sup>1</sup>.

This power of God is called *mâyâ*. From this powerful God the world emerges, says the *Sūtasamhitā*<sup>2</sup>. It is said in the *Skanda Purāṇa* that the Absolute, being alone, could not play and thus desired to become many. This very desire is said to be the power of the Absolute. The one becomes two: Śiva and Śakti<sup>3</sup>.

This line from the *Skanda Purāṇa* is in conformity with the Upaniṣadic tradition which also says "He desired: I am one, I should be many"<sup>4</sup>. There is a question asked at this point, if the Absolute is the perfect Being, He must be content with Himself and why should there be any desire in Him?

---

1. pratiṣiddha-sarvaviśeṣasyāpi brahmaṇaḥ sarvaśaktiyogaḥ sambhavati, ity etad apy avidyākālpitārūpabhedopanyāsenoktam.

—S. B. 2.1.31.

2. brahmarūpātmanas tasmād etasmācchaktimiśritāt. Sūtasamhitā.  
3. yadekalo no śaktosi rāntum svairancara prabho. tadicchā tava yotpannā saiṣa śaktirabhuttava. tvameko dvittvamāpannaḥ śivaśakti-prabhedataḥ.

—Skanda Purāṇa, Kāśikhanda.

4. ekohaṃ bahusyāṃ prajāyeya.



Desire indicates want, imperfection; the Absolute being perfect must not have any desire, and if He has any desire, He is not the Absolute<sup>1</sup>. No satisfactory answer is given to this objection of the Tantric Absolutists. The only answer that is found in different forms at different places is: "as the contact of senses with various objects makes the mind of a man appear in various forms, so also the Karmic force of beings to be created just now makes *mâyâ* desire for subsequent creation<sup>2</sup>."

This answer only complicates the issue. The one desires to become many. This desire is initiated by the accumulated Karmic forces of individuals that are dormant and are waiting for the time of fruition. The Absolute is forced by the Karma of the individual souls to create the world. This means that He has no control over the Karmas of individuals. He has to obey the law of Karma by facilitating its fruition. Again, what about the first creation? When there were no individuals whose Karma could induce Brahman to create, how was He obliged to create the first individual soul? The only answer to this is that the creation is without a beginning, thus implying that the power to create in the Absolute has also no beginning. But side by side with this they maintain that the beginningless power has an end. The world has no beginning but it certainly has an end. But this is not very logical indeed. Does this power of creation (*mâyâ*) end totally or does it end only for individuals? The first alternative cannot be accepted; because if it ends totally, no creation would be possible in the future. If it ends for individuals only and not totally, it still remains in the Absolute or with the Absolute; thus it has not ended. If this logic is

---

1. S. B. 2.1.32.

2. *yathâ viṣayendriyasannikarṣâjjivopâdhyantaḥkaraṇa-vṛttibhedâ jâyante, evaṃ sṛjyamânaprâṇikarmavaśâna parameśvaropâdhibhûtâyâṃ mâyâyâṃ vṛttibhedâ 'idamidānīm sraṣṭavyam' ityākārikâ jâyante.*

—Kunjikâ on *Manjûṣâ* p. 171.

rigorously followed it will lead us to accept *mâyâ* as the endless power of the Absolute. The *Bhagvadgītā* says therefore that this World-tree is without a beginning and without an end<sup>1</sup>.

Philosophers have tried to explain this difficulty by the analogy of ordinary illusion. A rope in a dark night appears to be a snake. Does this rope require some power to appear to be as snake? But a dead rope cannot *require* something. The rope without having any power to appear appears as snake. The reason is that it is only the conscious being for whom a rope appears as a snake. It is I who perceive a snake instead of perceiving a rope; by my perception the rope does not change into snake, the rope is rope for ever. It is by virtue of consciousness that the rope is changed. It is the power of consciousness and not of the thing.

But do we exercise some effort to perceive a snake in a rope? Do we require some power external to ourselves to perceive a snake in a piece of rope? The answer is in the negative. We neither make any effort on our part to see a snake nor do we require any extra power in ourselves for seeing an illusory snake. The appearance of snake is spontaneous and without effort on the parts of the perceiver. The mistake is *in* me but not *from* me. I do not consciously, deliberately make the mistake occur.

The Absolute which is Pure, Conscious and Existent Being does not make any effort or evince a desire on his part to make the world appear. The world appears in Him spontaneously. He has no desire to create it<sup>2</sup>. But once it has

- 
1. na rūpamasyeha tathopalabhyate  
nānto na cādir na ca sampratiṣṭhā. Gītā 15. 3.
  2. (a) evaṃ pravṛttirahito p'śvaraḥ sarvagataḥ sarvātmā  
sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiṣca saṁ sarvaṁ pravartayedit-  
tyupapannam. B. S. 2.2.2.  
(b) neyaṁ sṛṣṭir vastuś, yenādvaitino vastusato  
dvitīyasyabhāvādanuyujeta. kālpanikyām ca  
sṛṣṭāvasti kālpanikam dvitīyaṁ sahāyaṁ māmāyamaṁ.  
—Bhāmati on the above.



occured, individuals falling in the fold of illusory creation begin to think themselves independent of the Absolute. They forget their real nature. To illustrate this by a very crude example. A lump of iron is cut into pieces. So long as it is one it is perfect but when it has been divided, every division of it assumes an individual position without any regard to the common source. They tend as if to assume that they are different from the iron. Individuals once created tend to assert their independent character and thus drift away from the Absolute. They cannot be anything else than the Absolute, as a piece of iron cannot be anything other than the iron. The more an individual asserts himself the more he is bound by his folly. What he sows he has to reap ; the Absolute is not going to help him out of that riddle. But once he has realized his true nature, once he has known himself to be the Absolute, he ceases to be what he is. He is Absolute. This is the only reasonable explanation that can be given to explain the evolution.

Once an illusion starts it plays many tricks. A man being convinced of a snake tries to flee away or tries to kill that snake ; he may try to catch it and throw it away and so on. The snake unfolds itself to the individual gradually. The Absolute similarly is unfolded in an order. This order is the order of evolution.

There is no one to see the process of such appearance of the Absolute as His appearance is eternal. But this can be inferred from the present state of fact. Every knowledge is the knowledge through words and in words, words are prior in our knowledge, they are knowledge itself. The word therefore, must be the first appearance of the Absolute.

We cannot know the Absolute, as it is devoid of any quality which is necessary for any knowledge. What we say of Him is only of the First appearance of the Absolute. We

describe or say anything about this qualified Absolute and not about the pure Absolute<sup>1</sup>.

( 2 )

The first appearance of the Absolute is Potential (avyakta). The Absolute cannot be the cause or effect, it is beyond any relation. It can be called 'cause' only when particularized by Mâyâ<sup>2</sup>. Mâyâ is as if an instrument for the creation. Through this illusive power the Absolute appears as Potential or Existent. But as this Power was always present there it has no beginning.<sup>3</sup>

Mâyâ becomes susceptible of being cause or effect as a result of the union of the Absolute with herself, i. e. when the Absolute is qualified by Mâyâ. This Mâyâ being an instrument can act only when in relation with the conscious Absolute, while the Conscious Absolute can be a cause only with the help of Mâyâ.

From this qualified Absolute or the Potential comes out universal intellect or mahat from which the self (ahamkâra) issues. In this notion of I-ness (ahamkâra) there are three divisions namely Change (vaikârîka) Brilliance (tejas) and Materiality (bhûtâdi) corresponding to the notions of abstract Existence, mental notion and physical notion. From the second come the organs of action, organs of perception and mind and from the third arise the five sensible elements.

This is in brief the plan of evolution given in the Vedânta.

---

1, tadevam avidyâtmakopâdhiparicchedâpekṣam eveśvaras-  
yeśvaratvam sarvajñatvam sarvaśaktitvam ca na para-  
mārthato vidyayāpāstasarpopâdhisvarūpa ātmanīśitri-  
śitavyasarvajñatvādivyavahāra upapadyate.....evam  
paramārthāvasthāyām sarvavyavahārābhāvam vadanti vedāntās  
sarve.

—S. B. 2. 1. 14.

2. *ibid.*

3. B. S. 2. 1. 36 and S. B. on it.



The same plan with some modification is adopted by the Tantric school with different names. The potential is characterized by three points (bindu). The conscious point is called bindu (kârya) the unconscious is called bija (seed), the form of the conscious and the unconscious combined is called nâda (vibration). One and the same Absolute Being through the apparent illusion appears having something quite opposed to its nature, i. e. unconscious element. It is pure consciousness but through Mâyâ it appears to have the unconscious element. Viewed as non-different from the Absolute it is conscious, viewed from the material world it is unconscious ; but for the layman it is the conscious and the unconscious combined. Bija, Bindu and Nâda are three different angles from which one and the same Absolute is seen. Really the potential is neither pure consciousness, because it is in union with Mâyâ, nor the purely unconscious because it is not different from the conscious Absolute. Its being a creation of illusion is for an ordinary person both conscious and unconscious combined in one. It is Nâda.<sup>1</sup>

Nâda is the source of creation of this world. The thing named ( vâcya ) and its name ( vâcaka ) are both manifested from this Nâda. The unconscious element in it applies to the substance shaped by both word and form ( nâma-rûpa ). The conscious element of the Nâda gives birth to the conscious element in the world. Thus Nâda covers the whole world<sup>2</sup>.

The world of name-form springs from the unconscious element of Nâda. Names are words. First, the word springs forth from the unconscious element of Nâda, and does not yet possess the particular characteristics which constitute the principle of articulate sound. But it has the potential power to generate articulate sound. This is called parâ-vâk ( the supreme speech ) This is all-pervasive; but in living beings is manifested by means of the agitation of the subtle fluid in the

---

1. Manjûṣa p. 172-173.      2. Prapancasāra Tantra, Patal. 1.

Mûlâdhâra Cakra ( the lowest nervous centre of the body which is located at the base of the spinal cord. ) The wish to express a definite form ( artha ) causes an effort ; by this effort the fluid in the Mûlâdhâra is stimulated and the Supreme speech is produced. This is the basic substance from which are made all words<sup>1</sup>.

This Supreme speech acting upon the subtle fluid which is in the centre of navel and uniting there with the mind becomes the intelligent, non-particularized vibration ( sâmanya spanda ). It is then called Mental Voice ( paśyantî vâk ). The same vâk reaching to the heart and there uniting with Intellect ( buddhi )—whose nature is choice—becomes a particularized vibration ( viśeṣa spanda ), perceptible to mind and is called Intermediary Voice or Madhyamâ Vâk. The same impulse when it reaches the mouth striking with the throat or other places of articulation to form the letters as A, E etc., it becomes audible and intelligible for others and is called Articulate voice or Vaikharî Vâk<sup>2</sup>. People in general know this articulate voice as the only form of speech.

To sum up. The desire to signify stimulates the base of the spinal cord from which non-vibrating sound appears which is called the Supreme speech. This speech acting upon the navel and uniting with the mind produces non-particularized vibration; this vibration is intelligible. The same vibration reaching up to the heart and uniting there with the Intellect becomes particularized vibration cognisable though not audible by others. The same reaching mouth and striking with places of articulation there is transformed into audible and intelligible word. The first three modes of speech are not communicable to others, it is only the last speech that men

---

1. (a) Manjûsâ p. 174.

(b) Prapancasâra. *ibid.*

2. Manjûsâ p. 175-178.



use, says the *R̥gveda*<sup>1</sup>. The Supreme speech is the seat of the three modes of speech; says *Bhartṛhari*<sup>2</sup>.

As the speech is manifested from *Nâda*, likewise objects manifest from it. We are not concerned here with elaboration of the process in which the objective world is evolved. Any good book on *Vedânta* will explain that. We have to point here only the fact that words and objects being creations of ignorance and belonging to a common source are ultimately the Absolute Existence. It is this Existence that appears in the form of words and objects (*Nâma* and *Rûpa*) owing to *Mâyâ*. Words and objects are one and the same. The perpetual relation between words and objects indicates the Absolute which is the real meaning of words.

The Absolute Existence qualified by *mâyâ* has been called *Nâda*. This *Nâda* being the source of words and objects is called also *Sphoṭa*. The word *Sphoṭa* means that from which objects shoot forth, i.e. that which causes objects to appear. In our ordinary life words cause objects to appear. Words with the power of causation (*Kâraṇa-viśiṣṭa śabda*) are the *Sphoṭa* itself. But words viewed as having no power cannot be called *Sphoṭa* as they are devoid of power. Power to mean is the essence of words; this power is the *Sphoṭa*; this is the bond between words and objects. *Sphoṭa* itself is the meaning.

( 3 )

The *Śaiva Siddhânta* holds that *Śiva* and his Power (*śakti*) are one and the same thing. The inherent power of *Śiva* (*samavâya śakti*) is the efficient cause while the assumed power of *Śiva* (*parigrahaṇa śakti*) is the immanent cause. When this assumed power is combined with the Supreme Self it is called *Bindu*. This *Bindu* is of two kinds : pure *Bindu* (*śuddha*) and impure *Bindu* (*aśuddha*). Pure *Bindu* is transcendental *Bindu* (*mahâ bindu*) or transcendental Illusion (*mahâ mâyâ*) and is

1. catvâri vāk parimitā padāni tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ.  
guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti turīyam vāco manuṣyā vadanti.

2. V. P. I. 144.

made of both knowledge and ignorance (vidyâ and avidyâ,) while impure Bindu is only Creative Illusion. The assumed or veiling power of Śiva is the 'false knowledge' (vikalpa) or 'the knowledge of difference (bheda jñāna). With its help Śiva creates instability in Pure Bindu from which spring the creative currents of words and significations. It is the current of Words (śabda-dhâra), namely, the Supreme speech or Parâ vāk, mental voice (Paśyanti), subtle voice (madhyamâ) and articulate voice (vaikhari), which is the pure current (śuddha dhâra). Impure Bindu is then rendered unstable and this creates the impure current (āsuddha dhâra) of word-significations (śabdârtha-forms). This current of word-significations is the impure current of the Pure Bindu. Both Bindus being material and unconscious (jaḍa), the two kinds of currents flowing from them are also unconscious. It is only by transcending the two currents that liberation takes place. Thus according to this school words and objects are one and the same; they both are emergents of Śiva-Śakti (The Absolute with inherent power). Words and objects are related because of this Absolute. Absolute itself is the Sphoṭa. Absolute is the meaning of words. Nâda and Śiva-Śakti are two names for one and the same Absolute.

Those who know what the essential nature of Śabda really is, say that the Sphoṭa is one and indivisible; but as a pure crystal in contact with a rose takes its colour from it and appears red or yellow, so the Sphoṭa appears in different forms as it is projected through sentences, words and letters. One indivisible Sphoṭa appears as the significance of a sentence (vākya Sphoṭa), as the significance of words (pada Sphoṭa) and as the significance of letters (varṇa Sphoṭa). Really it is neither fully signified by sentences nor by words nor by letters. Sentences, words and letters are only partial ways to manifest the Existence. They are all unreal. But as the sentence expresses the maximum of Sphoṭa it is the highest unit of speech that is available to us. Words and letters do not stand independent of the sentence, they always signify the



Sphoṭa participating in a sentence, and therefore, they are less real than the sentences. Sentences are the primary units with which our speech works.

The relation between the Sphoṭa and our articulate speech is explained by Bhartṛhari in different ways. But before we proceed to state his explanation we must remember one thing. Bhartṛhari called the Sphoṭa as Sphoṭa and he uses the word Nāda in the sense of articulate sound (vaikhari) and not in the sense of the Supreme Existence which is also called by that name. Our articulate speech only illuminates the Sphoṭa, as a flash of light illuminates an earthen jar in a dark room. The light did not produce the jar, the jar was there and the light only illuminated it. Similarly the Sphoṭa which is suddenly exposed by our speech is something whose nature is completely independent of any physical sound (prākṛta dhvani), and articulate sounds (vaikhṛta dhvani) are only the instruments of the temporary perception of the Sphoṭa already present. This is why, in spite of peculiarities of enunciation (slow, fast etc.) we recognize one sound as the same. The nature of the letters is not affected by a fast, slow or moderate enunciation. Although there is a difference in the uttered articulate sounds, due more or less to laziness and to the particularities of enunciation and although there may be a difference in the perception of articulate sounds due to the tendency of the speaker to speak fast or slowly, this does not bring about a difference in the sound of letters.<sup>1</sup> When a drummer strikes his drum, says Patanjali, the sound (dhvani) may last long enough to take twenty steps, thirty or forty, Sphoṭa is the same, duration is enhanced by sound.<sup>2</sup>

1. V. P. I. 75-79, 102-107.

2. *evam tarhi sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ. katham ? bheryāghātavat. tadyathā. bheryābantaḥ bherīm āhatya kaścīd vimśatipadāni gacchati kaścīd trimśat kaścīd catvāriṃśat. sphoṭas tāvāneva bhavati dhvanikṛtā vṛddhiḥ. dhvaniḥ sphoṭas ca śabdānām dhvanis tu khalu lakṣyate. alpo mahāśca keśāmcid ubhayam tatsvabhāvataḥ.* —M. B. I. 1. 9. 70.

Words and their meaning are called eternal. Words are mental and eternal because they are Sphoṭa itself. Objects are eternal because the Sphoṭa expressing itself through the conception of the universal produces in us the consciousness of something independent of the mind which they are not. The relation between such words and objects are eternal because the cause of the objective consciousness is nothing but the Sphoṭa itself. Sphoṭa is one, Existent, Eternal, Conscious entity, without a second. But owing to its power it is manifested as words on the one hand and as objects on the other. Words and objects exist, but they exist not as they are appearing but as Sphoṭa. Sound is apparently momentary and individual objects impermanent. Words are apparently imperfect because they depend upon a higher unity of sentence. Universals too, are unstable because all universals fall into a greater universal which is the Universal or Existence. Sentences are real by courtesy because even they do not represent the Real in full form. But for our purpose they are the representatives of the Real to the highest degree that is available to us. But they are real as Sphoṭa in essence. There is no difference between Sphoṭa and Existence and there is thus no relation between them. There is no real relation between words and objects. But as words and objects are presented to us they require a relation for their standing and we have called this the relation of causation. Words cause objects to occur in mind. Unknown objects are nothing. The knowing of them is their Being ; words make them known and thus bring them into 'existence'. This power of words is called the meaning of words which is really not separable from words. Words are always meaningful. Words mean one *thing* and not the other because a convention has associated that word with only one object. There is nothing in words that connects them with a particular object. Words are potentially meaningful. The study of meaning therefore, is necessarily a study of words.



Sphoṭa is the Existence qualified by power. But if we can anyhow separate this power from the Existence we will get the real nature of Existence. In an ultimate sense the Sphoṭa means only that Existence which is called Pratibhâ by scholars. Pratibhâ is the ultimate meaning.

---

## CHAPTER XI

### SOME OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE THEORY OF SPHOṬA

The theory of Sphoṭa is a unique theory propounded by the Grammarian school of Indian Philosophy. We have tried to state the theory in its explicit form and have shown that words that we utter are not the real words. Real words are not different from the Reality and the whole objective world is an emergence of the word. Our sound is a means to get at the Real and that Real is called Sphoṭa. Sphoṭa is the principle or essence of words and objects.

The theory has been criticized by other schools of Indian philosophy. Their criticism is mainly directed to two points. There is no Sphoṭa over and above words, and the world is not an evolution of Word. The Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā have directed their attack against the theory on the former ground, and the Buddhists and Jainas have taken the latter standpoint to prove the futility of the theory.

#### I

#### THERE IS NO SPHOṬA OVER AND ABOVE WORDS

Words are what we actually hear. We do not hear Sphoṭa and thus it is not word.<sup>1</sup> Meaningfulness cannot be the criterion of words. We cannot say that all those that are meaningful are words, because, if that be the sole nature of words smoke can be a word. Smoke means fire and thus according to the definition it will be a word. Similarly, that which does not mean will not be called word and a letter

---

1. S. V. 15. 5.



having no meaning will cease to be called a word.<sup>1</sup> Thus only that which can be spoken or heard is the real word and not necessarily that which is meaningful. This is the reason that even when one does not know the meaning of a word he knows it to be a word at least.<sup>2</sup> But these words are nothing over and above the letters of which they are made.

No one will ever say that meaningfulness is the sole property of words alone. There are things which are meaningful or significant. But it is equally true that which is spoken or heard is also not necessarily a word. Rattling of doors and croaking of frogs are heard or spoken but that is not a word. No one will say that he hears a word when a cuckoo coos a song on the top of a tree. The song of a cuckoo is not a word. To say that word exists without a meaning is contradiction. A word is always a meaningful word. That sound which has meaning is called word. Speakability or audibility is not the only criterion of words. One knows a word without knowing its meaning. He knows that word as having some meaning but what that meaning is he does not know. He knows a word as meaningful, but he does not know the specific meaning of the word. A word is that which can be spoken or heard and at the same time is meaningful.

Kumârila says that a word is a combination of eternal letters. Letters are one. 'C' is the same all over the world.<sup>3</sup> The difference in two cases of C is owing to the speaker's peculiarity. C is the same, its spoken forms differ. There are not different 'C's in which a universal C resides, because no one ever feels that two 'C's are different.<sup>4</sup> He only says that the utterance of C differs. Modulations of letters are not properties of letters because a letter is eternal and thus cannot be short or long.<sup>5</sup>

---

1. S. V. 15. 7.

2. *ibid.* 15. 8.

3. *ibid.* 15. 15.

4. *ibid.* 15. 21-23, 26.

5. *ibid.* 15, 20.

If we examine this position of the *Mimāṃsā* we find that the position does not go along with logic. The advocate of the view has to accept that sounds are different from the letters. Letters being eternal cannot be spoken; because what is spoken is momentary. Our spoken letters are not letters and real letters are not spoken. If what is spoken is itself the letter, it will be momentary. Thus if letters are accepted as eternal they must be indicated by the spoken sound. Thus what people call as letter will be different from the real letters of Kumārila. The criticism of Kumārila against Sphoṭa—that what is word is not Sphoṭa—will be equally applicable here. We may say what is letter is not the real letter of Kumārila. Or, else, what we speak is not letter and what is letter is not speakable.

Again, Kumārila says that the combination of letters is unreal. The whole is not different from its constituents. The whole is a combination of various parts existing together. But letters that we speak are momentary; they cannot exist beyond a moment, thus their combination is impossible. Again letters are eternal and all-pervasive. And the whole as a rule must be more than constituents. But there cannot be anything more or less in a combination of all-pervasive letters, and a combination as over and above letters is impossible.<sup>1</sup> Thus letters cannot form a whole. What we call combination of letters is only a construction of our mind. We mistake the order of letters to be a whole.<sup>2</sup> These letters themselves have power to mean and, therefore, their order gets a meaning.<sup>3</sup> Spoken letters are said to reveal the Sphoṭa but they do not reveal the whole of it unless they are complete in the form of words. Different letters of a word gradually begin to reveal the Sphoṭa. The process of revealing is complete when letters have formed words. This logic applied in the case of Sphoṭa can be equally applied here.<sup>4</sup> But the Grammarian

1. *ibid.* 15. 65.    2. *ibid.* 15. 67.    3. *ibid.* 15, 68-69. 89-90.

4. *ibid.* 15, 91-93.



has to accept the Sphoṭa as over and above spoken letters, a Mīmāṃsaka has not to accept any such thing.<sup>1</sup> For a Mīmāṃsaka letters when taken in an order give a complete meaning.<sup>2</sup> Sphoṭa cannot be different from letters and only letters used in an order give meaning. Letters are real, not words: words are real not sentences.<sup>3</sup>

It is true that a combination of letters is impossible, whether letters are eternal or momentary. One has to accept the combination as illusory. The Mīmāṃsaka has no doubt about it. A combination of momentary spoken letters cannot be eternal. The order of letters according to Mīmāṃsaka is the order of eternal letters that are indicated by spoken letters. We may take two words; 'cause' and 'causeless'. They are different words. But their order of letters is similar to some extent. The order of *cause* in the word 'causeless' is the same as it is in the word 'cause'. If the order of the letters is the same in both how are they, then, different? Their difference lies only in this: The word 'causeless' though has a similar order is different because it has something more. The whole 'causeless' is different from the whole 'cause' because the former though similar in order is different as a whole from the latter whole. It is not only the order of letters in a word but also the whole word and its meaning that make a word differ from the other. One has to accept the whole as different from parts and this whole although illusory is important in language. Whether letters are eternal or momentary they must form a whole which is different from their order, to be significant.

Again, to say that letters are meaningful and therefore, their order is also meaningful contradicts our experience. If letters are meaningful, the gradual occurrence of letters would gradually reveal meaning also. But meaning is revealed

---

1. *ibid.* 15. 94.

2. *ibid.* 15. 108.

3. *ibid.* 15. 137.

only when a word is complete. If letters are accepted as meaningless, their order cannot be meaningful. The Mīmāṃsaka does not accept a whole; parts are put together without there being any unity in them. How then can isolated parts give birth to some thing which is not found in parts? Thus unmeaning letters cannot give forth meaning when they are put together.

Again, it is wrong to think that Sphoṭa is a combination of letters and words. The Sphoṭa is neither an aggregate nor a whole of these. It has no relation with words and letters. To say that the Sphoṭa is a whole is to distort the truth. Words and their combination have nothing to do with it. Thus to deny the whole is not the denial of Sphoṭa because it is not a whole. Whether words are wholes or only aggregates of letters the theory of Sphoṭa has no concern with it. The position about a whole has absolutely no relation with the theory of Sphoṭa. The Mīmāṃsā has to accept a letter as different from spoken letters. We accept a Sphoṭa different from spoken words. But letters themselves cannot be meaningful, they have to depend upon a word for meaning. Thus they have to accept an unreal combination of real letters which gives real meaning. But to say that an unreal thing produces real things, is against the logic of Mīmāṃsā. This is the reason why it has advanced the definition of a word as that which can be heard whether it is meaningful or not. For the Sphoṭavādins this difficulty does not exist. Unreal combinations of unreal letters give unreal meaning. What we call meaning is unreal meaning. This was clearly shown in our last chapter. The attempt of Kumārila to give words and sentences a real position has thus ended in utter failure.

The criticism of Vācaspati does not raise any new issue. He does not say anything other than what Kumārila has said. He says that a whole of letters is not possible. We cannot find a whole of momentary letters. We cannot



say that letters reveal Sphoṭa because the Sphoṭa being partless cannot be revealed gradually. We do not experience a Sphoṭa and therefore we cannot say that our language is an imposition upon it. That which is never known cannot be an object of illusion. One who does not know a conch—shall cannot mistake it for silver. Again the Sphoṭa cannot by its very existence be the cause of meaning. It is the cause of meaning only when it is known. The knowledge of Sphoṭa is possible only through the knowledge of meaning of words. But the knowledge of meaning depends upon words and the knowledge of words depends upon meaning. There is no way out of this circularity. Therefore letters that are experienced by us give birth to meaning when they occur in a particular order. They cannot prove the existence of an unseen Sphoṭa which makes our experience of letters unreal.<sup>1</sup>

This argument does not demand any new answer. We have replied to these objections in the last chapter itself. We never say that the Sphoṭa is a word among words. It is not a word, and therefore letters cannot make it. Momentary letters only help us to know a meaning. This meaning does not depend upon the combination of letters because that is never possible. We have to accept a conceptual word which has meaning. The Nyāya cannot deny this. Thus the knowledge of meaning depends upon words and the knowledge of words depend upon meaning for a Naiyāyika also. He too cannot get out of this circularity. If he says that the knowledge of words is not necessary for meaning he cannot explain the difference between 'on' and 'no'. In both these cases letters are the same. Their meaning differs because words differ and not because the letters differ. Therefore without accepting a word as different from letters uttered one cannot explain the knowledge of meaning, nor can he get out the circle. The knowledge of words may depend upon letters but the knowledge of letters does not depend upon

---

1. Nyāyavārtika Tātparya Tikā on N. S. 2. 2. 55.

words. The knowledge of meaning may depend upon these conceptual words but the knowledge of words does not depend upon meaning because words are always meaningful. There is no real difference between these words and their meaning. In our experience we have a circularity from which we cannot get out. Every one has to accept this circularity.

## II

### THE WORLD IS NOT AN EVOLUTION OF WORDS

The world is said to be an evolution of Sphoṭa or Śabda Brahman. But does this Sphoṭa leave its wordy nature when it is evolved in the form of objects or does it retain its wordy nature? If the first alternative is accepted, the Sphoṭa will leave its original nature to become objects and thus will not be an eternal existence. In the second case, one may hear words when one sees a thing<sup>1</sup>. If one does not hear words one may even not see objects because those objects are not different from the word<sup>2</sup>. Again, is this word one and the same in different objects or is it different? If it is one, all objects should occur at one place and they must all be known as one. If it is different in different objects, it will become many<sup>3</sup>. If the word is eternal and all objects are made of it, the objects must also become eternal. If that is so objects will be associated with the Word for all time and no necessity for its evolution will arise<sup>4</sup>. If the evolutes of the word are different by nature from the Word itself, how can they be called the evolutes of the Word<sup>5</sup>. Objects are by their very nature different from each other. Seeing some similarity among them, one imagines a universal as existing in different objects. But here one cannot imagine a universal word existing in different things because no such characters can ever be imagined in things which have nothing to do with

1. T. S. 129-131.

2. *ibid.* 134.

3. *ibid.* 136-137.

4. *ibid.* 138.

5. *ibid.* 141.



words<sup>1</sup>. It is said that the same Brahman through ignorance appears as many. But we do not have any reason to believe in such a Brahman. We do not see any Brahman as different from objects. Nor do we have any middle terms to prove the existence of such Brahman by inference<sup>2</sup>. We can know only those things that are changing and successive. Brahman being without change is one eternal being and thus cannot be known even by yogins in Samādhi<sup>3</sup>.

The whole criticism of the theory is based upon the misunderstanding of the nature of evolution. The first *kārikā* of Bhartṛhari, which is the main object of criticism, lays down the nature of evolution very clearly. He says that this objective world is an emergence or appearance of Brahman. It is not transformation. It is only appearance. Therefore the criticism is only a clear betrayal of ignorance of the opponent. Objects being appearances cannot be expected to share Brahman and produce something which is in Brahman. Objects are totally different from *Sphoṭa* and thus by seeing objects one does not hear words. There is no question of the same word being in different things. It does not live in things. Things do not take a part of Brahman. Objects are not made of the word; objects only appear as they are. Brahman cannot come down in the form of objects. A rope does not become a snake. The snake is not made of rope. They are, therefore, not eternally associated with Brahman. Objects are different from Brahman; they are not Brahman. Again it is not necessary that all characteristics of the real should be manifest in the appearance also. If that were so, no illusion would ever be possible. By seeing an illusory object one cannot know the real. So also by seeing objects one cannot imagine the existence of a universal Brahman. Again, a person seeing a snake in a rope does not at the same time see a rope also. The creation of ignorance by its very nature hides the real.

---

1. *ibid.* 142, 143.

2. *ibid.* 144-148.

3. *ibid.* 149-151.

If the real were presented with ignorance no illusion will ever occur. Similarly a person seeing a snake does not even infer the existence of a rope. Because at that time he has no middle term. What one sees is real for him. But that does not shake the reality of the rope. The rope is real although it is not seen nor is inferred. We know only those things that are changing. We cannot know an eternal and non-decaying object. Our knowledge is confined to change only. Thus Brahman cannot be known by us. To know Brahman we have to be Brahman. We cannot know him but we can know our finite nature. We can know our ignorance. Yoga and samādhi are means to get rid of this ignorance. Our aim is to be out of ignorance, we cannot expect anything else. Thus the criticism of Śabda Brahman by Śāntarakṣita is not a real criticism. He has raised objections against Brahman; we have refuted those objections and thus our arguments set forth in the last chapter to prove such a Brahman remain intact.

The criticism of Sphoṭa by the Jainas is more or less on the same pattern on which the Buddhists have discarded the theory. They say that if the world is made of words we must find words in our consciousness. But we do not have such consciousness of words in our knowledge. Again, we find so many other things which are not words or are made of words. Mountains, trees, cities, etc. etc. are different from words and sentences. We do not find any trace of words in them.<sup>1</sup>

This world can neither be the transformation of words nor the creation of it. In the former case, we should find words everywhere and a deaf person may hear words when he sees a

- 
1. atha jagataḥ śabdamayatvāt taduttaravartinām pratyayānām tanmayatvāt tadanuviddhatvam siddham evetyabhidhiyate. tadapyanupapannam eva. tanmayatvasyādhyakṣādibādhitatvāt. pada-vākyāditonyasya giri-taru-pura-latādes tadākāraparāṅg-mukhenaiva savikalpakādhyakṣeṇātyantam viśada-tayopalambhāt.

—Prameya Kamala Mārtanda, I. p. 12.



thing. But really speaking the transformation of the eternal is impossible. The impossibility of the creation of the world by the Word is ruled out because the Word is eternal. If the eternal Word produces this world the whole world would be presented simultaneously. No succession would ever be possible. Nor can we explain this world as an emergence of the real word through ignorance, because we do not have any evidence for that.<sup>1</sup> We do not find such a Word in our perception. There are no Yogins apart from the Brahman who can be said to see Brahman. We do not have any middle term to prove the existence of Brahman through inference. There is no verbal testimony to prove the existence of Brahman. The statement 'everything is Brahman' cannot prove His existence. In this statement different from Brahman? If it is, Brahman is not Absolute. If it is not, how can it prove the existence of such Brahman? Therefore we cannot prove the existence of such Brahman by perception, inference or verbal testimony.<sup>2</sup>

We may not repeat all those arguments which we have advanced against the Buddhists. The Jaina do not say anything new. They do not see the significance of vivarta which is the basic principle of Sphoṭavâda. If we could see such a Brahman no quarrel would ever have arisen over the nature of Him. But no one can see Him. He is realized by being one with Him and that is not realization in our sense. Inference and scriptures cannot be of help in proving Him because they are not ultimately different from Him. The ultimate position which we hold about the nature of Brahman is silence. But our silence is not the silence of the ignorant. We are ready to oppose the arguments from our opponent. In our empirical life we have to follow the rules of nature. We may not see Brahman. We may not even infer Him. Just as we do not see the rope nor

---

1. *ibid.* pp. 12, 13.

2. *ibid.* pp. 12, 23.

do we infer such a rope when we see a snake in the dark. We see that we see but our seeing is not real. How have we then proved our experience of snake as false? It is only through subsequent contradiction or cancellation of our experiences, that we arrive at the knowledge of the real. The unreal cannot hang in the air. The unreal is possible because of something which is real. Our Brahman being the presupposition of all existence is the Supreme Real, and this is the strongest proof for the existence of such Existence.

---



## EPILOGUE

'The limits of my language *are* the limits of my world' because truth or falsity can be significantly attached only to the prepositions which are always in words. Our knowledge is invariably associated with language, thus the world of unexpressible reality—if there be any such world—must also be unintelligible.

Language can represent the entire face of truth and the study of language is really the study of truth. The unit of language is that to which truth and falsity can be attributed. Only sentence can be true or false; words of a sentence do not express any such thing which can be significantly true or false. Words are, therefore, not the proper units of language. Sentence is the unit of language.

Sentences are the expressions of truth, we may call this truth as the meaning of sentences. The referend of a sentence is not an object in our world of experience, it is a mental proposition. Sentences mean this proposition. The division of sentences into words is only a formal division; parts of speech do not correspond to a real parts of propositions. The study of parts of speech is helpful only in knowing the unitary character of sentences and meaning.

Sentences or words are meaningful because they have some relation to referends. Sentences are the causes of the knowledge of these referends. Words by their very nature are potentially meaningful but a particular word is made related to a particular referend by convention and

usage. Convention and usage do not give words a power to mean ; they only specify that power which is already present in words. The meaning power of words is eternal.

Words are momentary. But those words that we hear (vaikharî) are only expressions of a word which is more subtle. Our spoken language is the result of a 'vibrating' language (madhyamâ) in the heart of a speaker. This cannot be heard by others but spoken language is the full replica of it. These two stages of formal language depend upon a more subtle stage called paśyantî. At this stage language is purely mental. This mental language can only be realized by yogins in samâdhi. But the mental language or paśyanti has its root in the vibration of the Real. The desire to speak causes motion in the Real and this vibrating Real is the cause of the mental language which produces this vibrating language and finally the spoken language is heard. Thus the spoken language has a deep root in the Real and our words are really not different from Real. Words in this sense are eternal.

The referends of words are mental. The objects of our knowledge are the ideas of our mind. We know ideas of objects and not objects directly. These ideas are mental and the knowledge of these ideas assumes the form of a mental proposition because nothing can be thought of which is not in words. Thus words themselves are the real objects of our knowledge. We *mean* mental words by spoken words. Word is the meaning of words.

The pure Existence manifests itself in the form of words and objects (nâma-rûpa). It is the source of words and objects. Words and objects are the appearances of the Real Existence. Spoken words are related to objects in our conversation because of the Real Existence. The Real is the relation between words and objects and It exists in them.



The study of meaning in India is the study of Real Existence. The problems of meaning are really the problems of existence. Our language is the only reality with which we can deal in our life and we are ultimately lost in the Word which is the Highest Goal to be realized by a bound soul.

—ooo—

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ādiṣeṣa, *Paramārtha Śara*, ed. Surya Narayana Sukla, Banaras, Achyuta Granthamala, 1932.
- Aitareya Upaniṣad*, collected in "Īśādi-daśopaniṣadaḥ", ed. Balakrishna Sastri, Banaras, Vani Vilas Sanskrit Pustakalaya.
- Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, trans. in Eng. E. M. Edghill, in "Works of Aristotle", Vol. I, ed. W. D. Ross, London, Oxford University Press, 1950.
- Bādarāyaṇa, *Brahmasūtra*, ed. with Śāṅkara's Bhāṣya etc., Bombay, Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1917.
- Bhartṛhari, *Vākyaṭpāṭya*, (i) First kāṇḍa with *autocommentary* and a *sub-commentary* by Vṛṣabhadeva, ed. Charudeva Sastri, Lahore, Ram Lal Kapoor Trust, 1934 ; (ii) First & second kāṇḍa with the *Commentary* of Puṇyārāja and third kāṇḍa with *Com. by Helārāja*, Banaras, Benares Sanskrit Series, 1887.
- Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, *Bhāṣana (Vaiyākaraṇa)* with *sāra*, ed. K. P. Trivedi, Bombay, Bombay Sanskrit & Prakrit Series, 1915.
- Manoramā (Praudha)*, ed. Pt. Gopal Sastri, Banaras, Chowkhamba Sans. Series, 1934.
- Śabdakaustubha*, ed. Pt. Ramkrishna Sastri, Banaras, Chowkhamba Sans. Series, 1898.
- Siddhāntakaumudī*, ed. Guru Prasad Sastri, Banaras, Rajasthan College, 1939.
- B. Bosanquet, *Logic*, 2 Vols., 2nd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1931.
- F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 9th imp., London, Oxford University Press, 1930.



- Bṛhadâranyakopaniṣad*, collected in "Îśâdi-daśopaniṣadah", ed. Balkrishna Sastri, Banaras, Vani Vilas Sans. Pustakalaya.
- Chândogya Upaniṣad*, ed. Kashinath Sastri Agashe, Poona, Anandashram Sans. Series, 1902.
- Dharmakîrti, *Pramâṇavârtika*, with autocommentary and a sub-comm. by Karnagomin, ed. Rahula Sankrityayana, Allahabad, Kitab Mahal, 1943.
- Dinnâga, *Pramâṇasamuccaya*, restored from Tibetan by H. R. Ramaswamy Iyenger, Mysore, Mysore University, 1930.
- Gadâdhara, *Śaktivâda*, ed. Damodar Sastri, Banaras, Chowkhamba Sans. Series, 1929.
- Vyutpattivâda*, ( with *Jayâ Comm.* ) ed. & Published by Dr. Umesh Misra, Allahabad 1940.
- Gâgâ Bhaṭṭa, *Bhâṭṭacintâmaṇi*, ed. Surya Narayan Sukla, Banaras, Chowkhamba Sans. Series, 1933.
- Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintâmaṇi*, ed. by several scholars, Calcutta, Bibliothica Indica, 1884-1891.
- Gauḍapâda, *Āgamaśâstra*, ed. Pt. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, Calcutta University, 1943.
- Gautama, *Nyâyasûtra*, ed. & Trans. S.C. Vidyabhusana, Allahabad, Sacred Books of Hindu Series, 1911-13.
- Jagadîśa, *Śabdaśakti-prakâśikâ*, ed. Dhundhirâja Sastri, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series. 1934.
- Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyâya-mañjarî*, ed. Surya Narayan Sukla, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1934.
- Jayatîrtha, *Tattvaparakâśikâ*, Comm. on *Madhva's Bhâṣya* on B. S., ed. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma, Madras, Law Journal Press, 1934.
- Kamalaśîla, *Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikâ*, Comm. on T. S., ed. Pt. K. Krishnamacharya, Baroda, Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1926.

Kaṇāda, *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, ed. A. E. Gough, Banaras, 1873.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, *Bhāṣaṇasāra (Vaiyākaraṇa)*, see—*Bhāṣaṇa*.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārtika*, with *Nyāyaratnākara*, ed. Pt. Rama Sastri Tailanga, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1898-99.

Madhvācārya, *Bhāṣya on B. S.*, ed. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma, Madras, 1934.

Maṇḍana Miśra, *Bhāvanā-viveka*, ed. M. M. Pt. Ganga Nath Jha, Banaras, Saraswati Bhavan Series, 1922.

—*Sphoṭasiddhi*, ed. & French Trans. M. Biardeau, Pondichery, Institute Francais D' Indologie, 1956.

*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, see *Aitareya Upaniṣad*.

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, *Mañjūsā (Vaiyākaraṇa Siddhānta)*,

( i ) upto *Sphoṭavāda*, ed. Pt. Sabhapati Upadhyaya, Banaras.

( ii ) Complete with *Kuñjikā* Comm., Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series.

—*Śabdendu-śekhara (Laghu)*, ed. with 7 Comms. by Guruprasad Sastri, Banaras, Bhargava Pustakalaya, 1936.

Pānini, *Śūtra*, see *Mahābhāṣya*.

Pārthasārathi Miśra, *Nyāyaratnamālā*, ed. Gangadhara Sastri Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1900.

—*Nyāyaratnākara*, see *Ślokavārtika*.

—*Śāstradīpikā*, ed. Dharmadatta Suri, Bombay, Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1915.

Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. with *Kaiyata's Comm.*, Bombay, Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1951.

Plato, *The Sophist*, Trans. Jowett, 3rd. ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1893.

Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Sastri, Bombay, Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1941.



- Prajñākara Gupta, *Pramāṇavārtika Bhāṣya*, ed. Rahula Sankrityayana, Patna, K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
- S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, 2 Vols., London, George Allen & Unwin, 1948.
- Ratnakīrti, *Apohasiddhi*, Collected in "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts" ed. M.M.H. P. Sastri, Calcutta, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910.
- R̥gveda*, ed. Lakshman Sarup, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1939-1955.
- B. Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, New York, Norton, 1940.
- Śābara, *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, ed. Subba Sastri, Poona, Anandashram Sans. Series, 1929.
- Śālikanatha, *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1900.
- Śankara, *Brahmasūtra Śārīraka Bhāṣya*, see *Brahmasūtra*.
- Śankarācārya, *Prapancasāra Tantra*, ed. Arthur Avalon, Calcutta, 1935.
- Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, see *Tattvasaṃgraha pañjikā*.
- H. P. Sastri, (ed.) *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, see *Apohasiddhi*.
- Śaunaka, *R̥k-prātiśākhya*, ed. Dr. M. D. Sastri, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.
- L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., London, Methuen & Co. 1950.
- Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, ed. with Comm. Kashinath Sastri Agashe, Poona, Anandashram Sans. Series, 1900.
- Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa*, ed. Pt. A. Chinnaśwami Sastri, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1935.
- Udyotakara, *Nyāyavārtika*, ed. Pt. Vindhyesvari Prasad Dube, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1915.

- Vācaspati Miśra, *Bhāmātī*, Comm. on S. B., see *Brahmasūtra*.
- Nyāyavārtika-tātparyā-tikā*, ed. Gangadhara Sastri, Banaras, Vizianagaram Sans. Series, 1898.
- Tattvabindu*, ed. M. Biardeau, Pondichery, 1956.
- Vādideva Sūri, *Pramāṇa-nayā-tattvālokālaṅkāra*, ed. Motilall Ladhaji, Poona.
- Vālmīki, *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, ed. Vasudeva Sarma, Bombay, Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1918.
- Vāmana & Jayāditya, *Kāśikā*, ed. Ananta Sastri, Banaras, Chow. Sans. Series, 1931.
- Vasubandhu, *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, ed. S. Levi, Paris, 1925.
- Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyasūtra Bhāṣya*, Poona, Anandashram Sans. Series, 1922.
- Vyāḍi, *Samgraha* ( Found only in citation ).
- Vyāsa, *Sūtasamhitā*, Poona, Anandashram Sans. Series, 1925.
- Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Bomhay, 1889.
- W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, Eng. trans. by James H. Tufts, New York, Macmillan Company, 1893.
- L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1922.
- Yāska *Nirukta*, with *Durga's Comm.*, ed. R. G. Bhadkamkar, Bombay, Sans. & Prakrit Series, 1942.
-



## INDEX

- Abhâva 203.  
 Abhihitânvayavâda 11, 69, 72, 75, 78, 149, 150f, 162, 165.  
 Ablative case, 144.  
 Absolute 20, 254ff;—Existence 19;—word 19, 22;—not expressible 255.  
 Absolutist 20.  
 Absolutistic philosophy of language 18, 22, Chapt. X.  
 Accusative case 123, 124, 128, 135, 142, 143ff., 146, 147, 171.  
 Acquaintance with power of words 183 f.  
 Action 49, 51, 52, 86, 106, 107, 143, 145, 146, 147;—qualified by result 122, 168f.  
 Active voice 122f, 135, 142, 147, 148.  
 Activistic meaning 31-32.  
 Activity 117, 168, 169; as meaning of verb 120f., 124f.; as meaning of suffixes 126f.;—and result 118 ff., 168, 171;—and result not separable 122 f.  
 Adhikarâna 144—146.  
 Adhyâsa 237ff.  
 Adjective 49, 86, 114, 151, 152, 166, 168, 214; meaning of suffixes after—151ff.  
 Adṛṣṭa 124, 167.  
 Adverb 49  
 Agent 117, 131, 143, 144, 146, 177.  
 Aggregate & whole 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 169  
*Aitareya Upanisad* 233 n.  
 Ākânkṣâ 77, 150 f, 158, 162.  
 Ākânkṣâ-bhâṣya 150.  
 Ākhyâta 118.  
 Ākṛti 190.  
 Akṣara 253.  
*A Modern Introduction to Logic* (Stebbing) 56n, 57n.  
 Analogy 184.  
 Anâtmavâda 200.  
 'Aṅgirâḥ', etymology of 8.  
 Animated action 124—126; —as meaning of suffix 126f.  
 Anticipatory reaction 31.  
 Anvitâbhidhânavâda 11, 69, 70, 72, 76, 78, 149, 150f, 162, 165.  
 Apabhraṁśa 13.  
 Apâdâna Kâraka 144-45.  
 Apoha, theory of, 200ff., 244; not total negation 209; three stages in the development of—218 f.  
*Apohasiddhi* 209n, 217n, 218n, 219.  
 Appearance, the nature of, 233.

- Appearance & Reality* 40n f., 233 ff.  
 Aristotle 59, 59n, 60, 62, 63, 64;—on propositions 59-60.  
 Aristotelean logic 61, 125n.  
 Artha 86.  
 Arthâtma 208.  
 Ārthi bhāvanā 139-40.  
 Articulate speech 29, 85.  
 Ārya-mlecchādhikaraṇa 243.  
 Asaṅga 230.  
 Āsatti 161-62  
 Association 174-78.  
 Aśuddha Bindu 262  
 Atoms 69, 73, 116, 124, 166, 177, 178.  
 Attribute 86, 103.  
 Audumbarāyaṇa 12n,  
 Aum 9, 10;—and Real 10  
 Aupamanyava 12n.
- Bali 235  
 Bearer, of action 123, 128, 134-35, 145, 147;—of result 123, 134-35, 145, 147;—as meaning of suffix 124ff., 134, 142.  
 Becoming 68.  
 Being 59-60, 67, 119.  
*Bhagavadgītā*, *The* 257, 257n,  
 Bhāmaha 210n.  
*Bhāmati* 230, 230n, 232n, 237n, 257n.  
 Bhartṛhari 4, 7, 10, 18-23, 35n, 37-39n, 42n, 46n, 80, 100, 143, 170, 235, 239, 240, 252-53, 274;—on language 18f,—on Sphoṭa 264f.  
 Bhāṭṭa, on universal 194ff.  
*Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* 22, 115n, 121n, 126n, 138n, 139n, 157n, 158n, 159n, 160n, 161n, 162n, 163n, 168n, 184n.  
 Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita 22.  
 Bhāvanā 139f; Śābdi & ārthi 139-40.  
 Bhāvapradhāna 118; two interpretations of—118f.  
 Bhāvapratyaya 107n.  
 Bhāvavacana 119.  
*Bhāṣaṇa (sāra)* 22, 45n, 103n, 116n, 118n, 122n, 123n, 128n, 135n, 169n, 170n, 241n.  
 Bija 260.  
 Bindu 260, 262 (Śuddha and Aśuddha).  
 Bosanquet, B. 56.  
 Bradley, F. H. 40n;—on relation 40nf.  
 Brahman 19, 232, 238, 252; as word 19.  
 Brāhmaṇas 5, 6, 7, 8,  
*Bṛahmasūtra*, *The*, 240n, 254n, 255n, 259n.  
*Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 232.  
 Brhaspati 6-7.  
 Buddhism 68.  
 Buddhist 18-21, 23, 45, 188, 199, 2n8-10, 211, 214, 218-20, 224, 244, 267;—objections



- against Sphoṭa 273 ff ;—refuted 274f ;—on universals 200 ff.
- Budhyâtma 208.
- Cases 52-53, 90, 105, 141 ff, 151, 168 ; number of—146f ; table of—145 ; relation not a—146.
- Case-ending 90, 166.
- Categories of Nyâya 202.
- Causation 52, 117, 166, 177-78, *Chandogya Upaniṣad* 8n, 231-32.
- Class (see also universal) 17, 153-54.
- Class-concept 28.
- Concept 32, 48, 50-51, 60-61, 67-68, 83, 89.
- Conceptualism 68.
- Conceptual referend (see also referend) 89.
- Conditions of meaning 156 ff.
- Confusion between words & objects 256 ff.
- Conjunction 49, 87.
- Command 56, 59, 62-63, 132-33, 191 ;—as meaning of verb 136 ff ;—intrinsically valid 137 ; psychological process involved in—137 f ; the sources of—137 ff.—as expressed in sentences 62-64.
- Communication 25 f, 30, 41, 81-82, 172, 174-75.
- Complex names 88, 90, 93, 106 ff, 111 ; analysis of—107 f.
- Compound names 88, 90, 93, 106, 111ff ;—& complex names 107 ;—& sentence 114 ; three views on—111 ff.
- Consciousness, stages of 9.
- Context 71-72, 77, 158 ff, 161-63, 173.
- Convention 24f, 37, 96, 98-100, 110, 135, 164, 241-42, 278-79 ; beginning of—174 f ;—as means to know meaning 184 ; meaning a product of—172 ff, 180-81 ;—is one 181.
- Conventional relation between word & object 240.
- Conventional theory of meaning 184 f.
- Copula 60-61.
- Correspondence between words & objects 236 f.
- Credibility & meaningfulness 234 f.
- Credibility of words 234 ff.
- Dative case 145.
- De Interpretatione* 59
- Dharma 13, 15.
- Dharmakīrti 18.
- Dhvani 38, 46, 81, 264.
- Diṇnāga 18, 218.
- Durgâcārya 119 n.
- Dyōtaka suffixes 150.

- Ekārthibhāva 107, 115.  
 Eliding of suffixes 135.  
 Epilogue 278 ff.  
 Epistemology 34, 53.  
 Eternalistic theory of meaning 183 ff.  
 Ethics 132 ; utilitarian ethics of Mīmāṃsā 136.  
 Evolution, according to Tantras 260 ff ; according to Vedānta 259 f ;—of words & objects 44f, 254ff.  
 Exclamation 62-63.  
 Exclamatory sentence 56, 59.  
 Existence 42f, 47, 53, 197f, 279-80 ;—as principle of words & objects 249 ff ;—& universal 197 f, 247 ff.  
 Experience 3.  
 External world 230 ff.  
  
 Form 60, 67, 87 ;—& matter 67f, 87.  
 Formation of sentences 156 ff.  
 Function of words 166 ff.  
  
 Gadādhara 22.  
 Gāgā Bhaṭṭa 22.  
 Gaṅgeśa 21.  
 Gārgya 12 n  
*Gauḍapada-kārikā* n10  
 Gautama 190.  
 Gender 97 ff, 128, 147, 151, 189-90, 214 ; depends on convention 100 ; types of— 97 f ; scientific definition of— 98-99.  
 God 5, 23, 25n, 124, 167, 176—80, 185-86 ;—as the creator of language 175 ff ; name of—23 ; power of— 255 f ; will of—176, 179-80.  
 Grammar 82, 185 f ; nature & function of—109 f.  
  
*Haridāśi* 176n  
 Helārāja 45n, 46n, 49n, 52n, 239, 247 n, 248 n.  
 Historical language 38f.  
 Homer 55.  
 Horizontal universal 220 f.  
  
 Idea 60 ; analysis of—48-49.  
 Identity 153f ;—of words 227f.  
*Iliad* 55  
 Images, as referend 189 ff.  
 Imperative 139-40.  
 Imperative mood 63, 132f, 139-41.  
 Impression 79 ;—of letters & words 226 ff.  
 Indeclinable 49.  
 Individual 153, 171-72, 188 ff ; —alone not referend 191f ; types of (Jainism) 221f ;—as referend 188ff.  
 Indra 6 ;—the first grammarian 8f ; etymology of '—' 8.  
 Inherence 70, 194, 203-4.



- Instrumental case 144.  
 Intention 25, 37, 54, 71, 74, 78, 101-2, 134, 148, 150f, 155, 156 ff, 161, 163.  
 Intrinsic validity of knowledge 64f.  
 Itaravyâvṛtti 153.  
  
 Jagadīśa 22.  
 Jaimini 15.  
*Jaimini Sātra* 136n, 137n.  
 Jainas 20-23, 188, 267; conception of referend according to—220ff;—objections against Sphoṭa 275 f; universal according to 220 ff.  
 Jāti 45-46.  
 Jayanta 76.  
 Jayatirtha 240n.  
 Judging 56.  
 Judgment 81-82; & proposition 56n.  
  
 Kaiyaṭa 4, 21, 47n, 66n.  
 Kamalaśīla 208n, 240.  
 Kaṁsa 235.  
 Kaṇāda 14  
 Kāraka (see cases) 143;—vibhakti 103.  
 Karaṇa 145.  
 Kāraṇa-viśiṣṭa śabda 262.  
 Karma 145, 256.  
 Karnagomī 205n.  
 Kartā 145-46.  
*Kāśikā* 144n.  
 Kātyāyana 4, 17.  
 Knowledge, and words 26, 28ff, 33f, 79 ff, 168 ff, 248 ff, 254;—of qualification & qualified 212 f; verbal—165 f.  
 Kṛdanta suffix 87, 106n, 108.  
 Kṛt 87,  
 Kṛti 124, 126.  
 Kumārila 18, 22, 64, 75, 198, 210, 218, 220, 268-69, 271.  
*Kuñjikā* 256n.  
  
 Language, Higher 4; beginning of—175ff; division of—48 ff, 83-84; historical—32, 38 f; logical syntax of—12, 46 ff;—of sign & gesture 26, 38; universal—38 f; learning of—81 f;—as intermediary between knower and known 33.  
 Legendary names 235 ff.  
 Letters 225 f; not a source of meaning 225 ff.  
 Linguistic form 48.  
 Linguistic meaning 3.  
 Lloyed Morgan 31.  
 Locative case 144.  
  
 Madhvācārya 240.  
 Madhyamā vāk 7, 261, 263, 279.  
*Mahābhāṣya* 7, 16, 17n, 20, 21, 46n, 47n, 53n, 54n, 57n, 66n, 90n, 93n, 98, 99n, 100n, 109n, 110n, 111, 114n, 119n, 120n, 127n, 130n, 131n, 143n.

- 144n, 145n, 146n, 157n, 186n, 190n, 191n, 194n, 226n, 228n, 235n, 264n.
- Mahâ Bindu 262.
- Mahâ Mâyâ 262.
- Mahâ vâkya 55.
- Maṇḍana Miśra 120-21.
- Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* 9.
- Mañjūṣa* 37 n, 39 n, 121 n, 122 n, 126 n, 130 n, 131 n, 157 n, 158 n, 159 n, 161 n, 163 n, 186 n, 226 n, 229 n, 234 n, 237 n, 238 n, 242 n, 256 n, 260 n, 261 n.
- Manoramā* 87 n.
- Mantra 5, 22 ; Vedic—10.
- Matter 60, 67, 87.
- Mâyâ 262 ;—as power 255-57.
- Meaning 4 ;—different from words & objects 27, 36 ;—of things 30 f ; pre-linguistic—30 ff ; verifiable—4 ;—as relation 27, 30, 39 f ;—as negation Chap. IX, 209 f ; metaphysics of—34 ff ; change of—174 f ; nature of—Chap. VII ; conditions of—156 ff ; requirements of 55 ff, 65 ;—a product of convention 172 ff, 180-81 ; transferred—173 f ;—as eternal 186 f, 243-44 ; eternalistic theory of—183 ff ;—in use 78 ff ;—& suggestion 43f ;—& proposition 59f.
- Meaningfulness & merit 185 f.
- Meaningfulness & sâdhutva 17.
- Mental growth 82.
- Metaphorical use of names 93 ff.
- Metaphysical expressions 4.
- Metaphysics & science 1 ff
- Mimāṃsā 9, 11, 15, 17—19, 22, 64, 68, 69, 72, 73, 75-77, 114, 136, 140-41, 149-51, 161, 166-67, 179, 185, 188, 198-200, 206, 210, 224, 267 ;—on language 13f ;—against Sphoṭa 267 ff ;—criticised 270 ff ;—on parts & whole 72 f.
- Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 13, 14 n, 15, 243.
- Mokṣa 22.
- Moods 128, 132 ff ;—indicated by suffixes 133 f ;—& tenses 132 ff.
- Morality, rules of 138 f.
- Mūlâdhâra cakra 261.
- Nâda 5, 260, 262, 264.
- Nāgeśa 4, 22, 226, 229, 234, 237-38.
- Naiyâyika 20-22, 76, 115, 125, 150, 156.
- Nâma-rûpa 260, 262, 279.
- Name 31, 37, 49-52, 65, 67, 83, Chap. IV ;—defined 90 ; meaning of—50 ff, 86, 87 ff, 93 f, 166, 171, 229, 235 ; individual as meaning of—50 ff ; universal as meaning of—50f ;—as conceptual 51 ;—



- as subordinate to verb 166 ;  
 —always related to verb 143f,  
 —& verbs 52 f, 86 ;—&  
 sentence 89 f ; —without refe-  
 rend 88 f ; —derived from  
 verbs 12, 106 ; relation of  
 names to each other 102 ff ;  
 metaphorical use of 93 ff ;  
 new—174 ff, 177 ; free—104 ;  
 legendary—235 f ; complex—  
 88, 90, 93, 106 ff, 111 ; com-  
 pound—88, 93, 106, 111 ff ;  
 complex & compound—107.
- Negation 86 ; —as meaning  
 206 ff, 243 f, Chap. IX ; —  
 implied in meaning 216 f ; —  
 presupposes affirmation 211f ;  
 —of 'all' 215 ; two types  
 of—208 f.
- Nipāta 49.
- Nirākāṅkṣa 77, 158.
- Nirukta* 4, 11-13, 16, 118 n.
- Nominalism 68.
- Nominal suffixes 105.
- Nominative case 123-28, 135,  
 142ff, 146-47, 166-67, 171 ;  
 —as the principal 166 ff.
- Nonsense 2, 59.
- Number 97, 101 f, 128, 147,  
 151, 189, 190, 214 ; types of  
 —101 ; depends on conven-  
 tion 102.
- Nyāya 11, 15, 17-19, 22, 25 n,  
 68-69, 72, 75, 83, 114-16, 124,  
 126, 149-54, 161-62, 166, 168,  
 177, 178, 181-82, 185, 188,  
 190, 198, 199-200, 202, 206,  
 224, 228, 267 ; —on language  
 15 f ; —on relation between  
 word & sentence 69 f ; —on  
 causation 124 f ; categories  
 according to—202, —against  
 Sphoṭa 271 ff.
- Nyāya Bhaṣya* 190 n.
- Nyāyamañjarī* 70 n, 71 n, 72n,  
 76 n, 156 n, 157 n.
- Nyāyaratnakara* 28 n.
- Nyāyaratnamālā* 22, 74 n.
- Nyāyasūtra* 15, 50 n, 69, 70 n,  
 178 n, 189 n, 190 n, 192 n.
- Nyāyavārtika* 70 n, 193 n, 204,  
 215, 227 n, 229 n.
- Nyāyavārtika-talparyatikā* 70n,  
 217n, 227n, 272n.
- Object 245 ff.
- Organic whole & aggregation  
 76, 77, 169.
- Ought 132.
- Pada 4, 86.
- Pada-prakṛti 11.
- Padārtha 86.
- Padārthopasthiti 163.
- Paṇi 6.
- Pāṇini 16, 17, 21, 50, 87n, 88n,  
 100, 102n, 112, 142n, 144n,  
 145n, 146 ; —on language 16.
- Paramārthasāra* 231 n, 233 n,  
 260 n, 261 n.

- Parâ vâk 7, 263.  
 Parigrahaṇa śakti 262.  
 Parts & whole 69 f, 76 f, 83 f, 165, 169 ;—according to Mīmāṃsā 72 f.  
 Pârthasârathi Miśra 22.  
 Participle 106.  
 Particular 17, 19, 27, 59-60, 96, 127 ; primitive—18.  
 Particularity 28 ( see individual also )  
 Parts of speech 19, 48 ff, Chap. III, 149, 278.  
 Paryudâsa 208.  
 Passive voice 122 f, 135, 142, 147-48.  
 Paśyantī vâk 7, 261, 279.  
 Patañjali 4, 7, 16, 17, 20, 22, 57, 66, 87, 90, 98, 99, 100, 111, 112, 119, 143, 157, 235, 264 ; purpose of grammar according to—16 f.  
 Phala 118 ; phalâśraya 123.  
 Philologist 48 ;—view of language 24,  
 Philology 109.  
 Phrase & sentence 104 f.  
 Physical sciences 3.  
 Plato 50.  
 Power of words 25 ff, 91, 172ff 242 ;—beginningless 182 f ; conventional—173f ; intrinsic 183ff ; transferred—173f ; unique—183 ff.  
 Prabhākara 18, 194.  
*Prakaraṇapañcikā* 136 n, 137 n, 194 n.  
 Prakârâtâvâda 149, 150 f, 165.  
 Prâkṛtadhvani 264.  
 Pramâṇa 57.  
*Pramâṇa-naya-tattvâlokaikāra* 222 n.  
 Pramâṇa śâstra 56.  
*Pramâṇa vârtika* 201 n, 203 n, 204 n, 205 n ;—*vṛtti* 202 n.  
*Prameya-kamala-mârtanḍa* 220 n, 221 n, 222, 275 n, 276 n.  
*Prapañcasâra Tantra* 260-61 n  
 Prasajya-Pratiṣedha 208.  
 Prasava 99,  
 Pratibhâ 44-46, 266.  
 Prâtipadika 87, 108, 111.  
*Prâtiśākhya* 4, 10-13, 16.  
 Pratyaya 87  
 Prayer 59, 63.  
 Predicate 60-62, 65.  
 Prefixes 52, 110.  
 Preposition 49, 86, 102-5, 168.  
 Present time 129 ff.  
 Principal word 166, 169.  
 Principle of the division of language 48 ff.  
 Process expressed by verb 117.  
 Pronoun 49.  
 Proposition 4, 19, 56-60, 65-66, 79-80, 82-83, 165, 278 ;—a source of language 79 f ;—as expressed in sentence 56-58 ; division of—67 ff, 83 ;—& forms of language 56 ff.



- Proximity 71, 73, 161-63. —39-41, 50 ;—of non-difference 151 ff ;—not a case 146 ;—of location 135, 142.
- Puṇyarāja 250 n.
- Pure Existence 19, 238.
- Puruṣa, etymology of, 8. Request 56, 59, 62-3.
- Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ-see Mîmâṃsâ. Result 118, 142-147 ;—as meaning of suffix 120 f ;—as meaning of verb 126 f ;—as qualification of action 122, 168 f.
- Qualification & qualified, knowledge of 212 f ; relation of—122, 153 f.
- Radhakrishnan, Dr. S. 9 n, 76 n.
- Râmâyana 55, 136.
- Ratnakîrti 217, 219.
- Real 9, 20, 23, 42, 44, 47, 230, 238, 252-53, 279.
- Realism 68.
- Reality 4, 68, 237.
- Recognition 31-32.
- Referend 15 17, 20, 33, 87-88, 90-91, 94-102, 106-108, 111-114, 171-72, 175-78, 180-82, 187, Chaps VIII & IX, 278-79 ;—as unique particular 207 ff ;—as universal 193 ff ;—as individual participating in universal 188 ff ;—of sentence 172 ;—& word 182 f ;—a combination of universal, individual & image 190 f ; individual alone not—191 f ; images as—189 ff : unique individual as—200 ff.
- Relation, nature of, 39 f, 86 ; —as Existence 41 ; terms of
- Āgveda* 5 n, 6, 7, 262 ;—on language 5 ff.
- Rh-prâtiśâkhya* 11.
- Rules of morality, formation of 138 f,
- Russell, B. 45 n.
- Śābara Bhāṣya* 28 n, 69 n, 136 n, 182 n, 246 n,
- Śābdabodha 35, 72, Chapt VI.
- Śabda Brahman 273.
- Śabdakaustubha* 22, 45 n.
- Śabda-śakti-prakāśika* 22, 115 n, 124 n, 162 n, 167 n, 179 n.
- Śabdatattva 253.
- Śabdendu-sekhara* 89 n, 90 n, 93 n, 94 n, 95 n.
- Śābadī Bhāvanā 139.
- Sādhu 17, 185.
- Sādhutva 17 ;—& meaning 185 f ;—grammar 185 f.
- Śaiva siddhānta 262.
- Sākāṅkṣa 77, 158.
- Śākaṭyāna 12.
- Śakti 22, 26, 172, 255 (see also power of words)

*Śaktivâda* 22, 173 n, 176 n, 177 n.

*Sâmânya spanda* 261.

*Samavâya* 70, 76, 84, 193 ;—criticised 73 f, 84, 193.

*Samavâya śakti* 262.

*Samgraha* 39 n.

*Samhitâ* 4, 11.

*Sampradâna* 145-46.

*Samsarga* 77 f.

*Samsargatâ vâda* 72, 149-52, 165.

*Sanskrit*—the only language created by God 16 ;—as the sacred language 13 ;—alone as meaningful 179f, in rituals 13 ; classical—11-12 ;—& Vedic languages 13.

*Samstyâna* 99.

*Śaṅkara* 231 n, 232, 233 n.

*Śaṅkara Bhâṣya* 254 n, 256 n, 257 n, 259 n.

*Śāntarākṣita* 18, 218, 240.

*Śāstradīpikâ* 73 n, 137 n, 183 n, 185 n.

*Sastri, Dr. Mangaladeva* 11 n.

*Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa* 8.

*Science & Philosophy* 1 ff.

*Semantics* 3.

*Sensation* 81.

*Sentence* 19, 47 f, 65 ff, 73-74, 77-78, 84, 112-13, 149, 161-66, 168-9, 224-25, 227-29 ;—as prior to words 21 ; definition of—58, 74 ;—a combi-

nation of words 69 ;—as construction of words 69 ff, formation of—156 ff ;—a collection of sound 78 f ;—as expression of proposition 56-58, 80f ;—as unit of language 278 ;—an indivisible unit 78 ; samsarga as meaning of—77 f ;—expressing command 62-64 ;—ideal 227 ff ;—& proposition 57 f ;—& names 89 f ; one-word—65 f.

*Siddhânta kaumudî* 22, 88 n, 93 n.

*Śikṣâ* 10-11.

*Śiva* 5, 22, 255, 262-63.

*Siva-Sâkti* 263.

*Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts* 209 n, 217 n, 244 n.

*Ślokavârtika* 28, 64 n, 72 n, 74 n, 101 n, 180 n, 181 n, 182 n, 184 n, 195 n, 196 n, 197 n, 210 n, 211 n, 212 n, 213 n, 214 n, 246 n, 267 n, 268 n, 269 n, 270 n.

*Socrates* 61.

*Sophist, The* 50 n.

*Sound* 8, 51 ;—we cannot hear 29 f.

*Space* 41, 99 ;—& time as reflected in language 49 f.

*Spanda* 261 (*sâmânya* & *viśeṣa*)

*Speech*, according to Upaniṣads 9f ; four-fold - 7 ;—& its parts 16, Chap. III, 19, 48ff



- 149, 278; static parts of - 49, Chap. IV ; unit of—19, 47 f, 54 ff, 65 f, 79 ; Vedic—5f. Sphoṭa 4, 10, 44-47, Chaps. X & XI;—& Existence 265 f; — as the principle of words & objects 245 ff;—as the first manifestation of Real 253f; objections against Chap. XI ; Vākya—263.
- Sphoṭavāda 7, 11, Chaps. X & XI Stebbing, L. S. 56n. Subject 60-62, 65. Subject-predicate form 60-62. Substance 86, 103, 143. Śuddha Bindu 262. Suffixes 52, 87-90, 102, 105-8, 110, 120-21, 124, 127, 130, 133-4, 142, 147-50, 153-5 ; meaning of—87ff, 102f, 151f; —have no meaning 93, 150f; function of—90, 103, 142 ; result as the meaning of 120f ; verb as the meaning of 126f ; moods indicated by—133f; — as dyotaka 150;—as vācaka 150; nominal—105 ; —& words 149ff ; —do not mean gender & number 102f; kṛt—87; taddhita—87, 106n, 108; time as meaning of verbal—129f ; time as specified by—132f; verbal—123ff, 134ff, 147.
- Sūkta 6. Sūtasamhitā 255, 255n. Sūtra 17, 21. Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda 64. Syllogism 60, 62. Syntax 21, 52; logical—of language 12, 46ff. Taddhita suffixes 87, 106n, 108. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 8. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 8. *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* 8. Tantra 22, 23. Tantric Absolution 256. Tantric School 5. Tātparya 161, 164. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* 21, 23. *Tattvasaṁgraha* 83n, 201-216ns, 240n, 273n, 274n. *Tattvasaṁgraha-ṣaṅkṣā* 240n. Tautology 152. Tenses 128ff, 131-2. The language 4, Theory of impermanence 200. Theory of relational conceptualism 72. Time 49, 117, 129 Chap. V; — as presupposition of change 117 ; nature of—129f; —as meaning of verbal suffixes 129f;—as presupposition of verb 132f, 148 ;—as mental construction 131;—as specified by suffixes 132f ; present —129ff. Transfer of word or meaning 93ff, 115. Translation 141.

- Udyotakara 18, 204, 215, 216, 218, 220.
- Understanding of words 35f;—  
of machines 35.
- Unique individual as referend 200ff.
- Unit of speech or language 19, 47f, 54ff, 65f, 78, 79; 278.
- Unity of referend 87ff, 91-92f, 106-7, 111-12, 171.
- Universal 17-19, 27, 45-6, 50-51, 59-60, 86, 96, 171-2, 181, 188ff, Chaps. VIII & IX, 227, 241, 246;—as construction 18, 210f;—as conceptual 45, 246ff;—as eternal 247f;—as bond between words & objects 27f; referend as—190, 193ff;—alone not referend 190f; similarity not the basis of 201, 206;—according Jainism 220ff;—according to Nyâya 192f;—according to Bhâtta 194ff; criticism of—201ff; relation between individual & 193ff; two types of—(Jainism) 220f;—language 38f; vertical —220f.
- Unverifiable 2, 59, 163.
- Upâdâna śabda 80.
- Upaṇiṣads 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, 18, 22; speech according to—9f.
- Upapada, sambandha 105; vibhakti 103f.
- Upavarṣa 18.
- Usage 82, 110, 179-80.
- Vācaspati 18, 69, 178n, 192n, 217, 230, 271.
- Vaikhari 7, 261, 263-4, 279.
- Vaikṛta dhvani 264.
- Vaiśeṣika 198-99;—on language 14f.
- Vaiśeṣika sūtra* 14, 15, 198n.
- Vājapyāyana 17.
- Vāk 4; madhyamâ—279; parā 7, 263; paśyanti—7, 261, 279; Vaikhari 7, 261, 263-4, 279.
- Vākya-padīya* 10, 19-20n, 26n, 28n, 30n, 33n, 35n, 37n, 38n, 42n, 45n, 49n, 51n-53n, 78n-81n, 83n, 84n, 99n, 101n, 118n, 129n, 130n, 131n, 143n, 145n-47n, 170n, 186n, 226n, 228n-229n, 233n, 235n, 238n-41n, 246n-53n, 262n, 264n.
- Vākya sphoṭa 263.
- Vālmiki 55.
- Vāmana 21.
- Vārṣaganya 12n.
- Vasubandhu 230.
- Vasurāta 18.
- Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* 70n, 116n.
- Vedas 5, 8, 20, 22, 185;—created by God 15;—as eternal & impersonal source 14.
- Vedānta 68, 262.
- Vedic, injunction 14;—mantras 10;—seers 4-8;—conception of speech 5f.



- Verb 49, 51-53, 65-67, 83, 86, 90, 103, 105-7, Chap. V, 149, 166-171; definition of—118; analysis of—118f; intransitive—123; transitive 123; 142; process as expressed by—117; command as meant by—136ff; time presupposed by—132f, 148;—as principal 166ff;—& names 134f, 142ff;—subordinate to names 166;—root 52-3, 125, 127f.  
 Verbal, knowledge 165 f;—suffixes 123 ff, 134 ff, 147.  
 Verification 2, 3, 234; verifiable 2, 3, 59, 89, 161, 163.  
 Vertical universal 220f.  
 Vibhakti 90, 149.  
*Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* 230n.  
 Vikalpa 210, 263.  
*Vimsatikā* 230 n.  
 Viśeṣa spanda 261.  
 Viśeṣaṇa & Viśeṣya 122.  
*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 233 n.  
 Vivarta 233, 252.  
 Vṛṣabhadeva 37.  
 Vṛtti 173.  
 Vyāḍi 4, 17, 18.  
 Vyākaraṇa 9, 11, 17.  
 Vyakti 46  
 Vyāpāra 118;—āśraya 123.  
 Vyāsa sūtra 240.  
*Vyutpattivāda* 22n, 116n, 125n, 150n, 152n, 153n.  
 Windelband 60 n.  
 Wittgenstein 66.  
 Whole & parts 69f, 72f, 76f, 83f, 165, 169.  
 Word 19;—& existence 42f, 248ff;—as ideal 45, 228ff;—as eternal 17, 244f;—potentially meaningful 242f;—& object 25, 28, 30-32, 37, 234; natural relation between W. & object, 240 ff; conceptuality of W & object 225ff; every W. can mean any object 241 f;—as cause of objects 238ff, 249 ff;—corresponds to mental object 229ff; relation between W. & object eternal 14, 19, 46;—not eternal 15; power of—25ff, 91, 172ff, 242; power of W. beginningless 182f; conventional power of—173f; power of W. intrinsic 183f; transferred power of W. 173 f; power of W unique 183ff; principal—166, 169; suffixes &—149 ff; knowledge &—26, 28ff, 33f, 79 ff, 168ff, 248ff, 254; confusion between W. & object 236ff; W. & sentence 71, 73ff, 78, 166ff;—W. & its referend 172ff; W as independent means of knowledge 21.  
 Word—Absolute 18-20.

World, as appearance 252ff ; Yâska 12, 118;— on speech 12f.  
—not evolved from word Yatna 167.  
273ff ;—as indescribable Yogavâsiṣṭha 231n.  
232ff. Yogyatâ 160f, 163-65.

---



# ERRATA

Page	Line	Read	For
1	14	is	was
9	13	'?	after Real
10	note '2'	prakriyâ	prakriayâ
12	7	delete one 'of'	of of
13	note 1	dharmaḥ	dharmāḥ
14	25	sources	sourccs
14	28	infallible	infalliable
15	14	infallible	infalliable
15	note 1	kāraṇataḥ	karaṇataḥ
17	7	than	that
19	13	meaning	merning
21	22	Real	real
23	12	persists	persits
26	3	stop after 'there'	
	4	no comma after 'Similarly'.	
29	22	inarticulate	inrticulate
	22	mental	meatal
33	13	separately	separate
	33	language	lenguage
36	2	the	ths
38	15	juxtaposition	juxtraposition
	21	stop after 'utter'	
	note 3	'pacayâtmakâ	pacayâlmakâ
39	16	If this is not	If this not
40	14	between	beetween
	note 1 (b)	relation	realation
41	15	depend	depends
43	33	associated	assosiated
48	10	parts	part
50	22	stands	stand
55	2	There may be	There be

Page	Line	Read	For
57	17	it is	it it
	19	form	from
	20	forms	froms
58	3	meaning	meauing
	28	importance	importantce
60	23	must be	must
62	9	proposition	propositlon
66	note 1 (b)	tatrotsargataḥ	tatrotargataḥ
69	20	which embodies	which a embodies
72	11	theory	theery
74	note 1	padârthâ eva	padârtha eva
75	8	words	wo rd
	16	hearer	hoarer
	20	If he	I he
78	17	become	becomes
83	11	we	wo
84	note 2 (l. 1)	vâkyeṣvavayavâ	vâkyesvavayavâ
	ibid. (l. 2)	na	no
85	8	eternal	enternal
93	4	they are	the are
95	9	referend	refrend
96	30	experiential	experiencial
98	13	peculiar	peaculiar
	29	The name	name
99	note 1	strî	str
103	1	implicitly	implicitly
104	17	attempt to	attempt of
105	12	widely	videly
108	10	meaning	meaniag
111	12	constituents	constitutents
	13	do	do
112	2	do	do
	4	do	do
	28	gives up his	leaves hie
	28	carpentry	carpentary



Page	Line	Read	For
113	18	constituents	constitutents
118	28	synonymous	synonymous
120	10	different	defferent
	16	possibilities	possibilites
121	9	in A	n A
	15	possession	possessition
124	28	an animate	a nonanimate
125	note 2	kâṣṭham	kâṣṭham
126	26	expected	expeted
129	3	meanings	meaning
	13	therefore	thererore
130	16	a series	series
	24	presence	represence
131	16	sense	sonse
133	6	However	Howsoever
	9	present	preseut
135	5	verbs	berbs
	35	suffixes	siffixes
150	13	open	apen
152	11	qualified	qnalified
	13	it	is
153	4	defined	difined
155	last line	has no	has not
156	last line	unmeaningful	unmeaning
159	second note	2	1
160	note 2	yogyatâjñânasya bâdha-darśanena	yogyaâtjñânasya bâdhâdarśanena
164	21	effect	affect
	26	and	aud
165	6	language	languge
167	1	activated	activised
	21	spontaneous	spontanuous
170	7	vague	vogue
	14	describe	deseribe
172	14	related	ralated

Page	Line	Read	For
179	6	immaterial	immatesial
182	16	initiator	intiator
186	11	such	which
193	note 2	âśrayâśrayi-bhâvena	âśrayâśraya-bhâvena
196	6	parts	arts
197	29	peculiarity	paculiarity
198	15	advocated	abvocated
	23	separated	separates
	25	itself	itseif
202	3	letters	latters
204	12	advocating	abvocating
205	28	universal ?	universal.
207	17	objects	objets
	28	owing	owin
	31	exists	exits
209	17	<i>touch</i>	<i>tonch</i>
214	13	of	af
	20	qualified	qualfied
215	last line	negative	negatixe
216	28	advocated	abvocated
217	21	advocated	abvocated
222	note 2 should be read as 1 & 1 as 2		
233	notes	Paramârthasâra	Parmârthasâra
234	23	determined	determinded
235	17	killed	killed
240	18	to be	to
246	note 1	karaṇânâm	krâapanam
251	5	mantle	mental
	14	was	has
	23	objectified	objectfied
	27	new in	new
	note 2	prakâśaka	prakâśka-a
257	note 2 (a)	S. B.	B. S.
268	26	peculiarity	pecularity



1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
10	10	10	10
11	11	11	11
12	12	12	12
13	13	13	13
14	14	14	14
15	15	15	15
16	16	16	16
17	17	17	17
18	18	18	18
19	19	19	19
20	20	20	20
21	21	21	21
22	22	22	22
23	23	23	23
24	24	24	24
25	25	25	25
26	26	26	26
27	27	27	27
28	28	28	28
29	29	29	29
30	30	30	30
31	31	31	31
32	32	32	32
33	33	33	33
34	34	34	34
35	35	35	35
36	36	36	36
37	37	37	37
38	38	38	38
39	39	39	39
40	40	40	40
41	41	41	41
42	42	42	42
43	43	43	43
44	44	44	44
45	45	45	45
46	46	46	46
47	47	47	47
48	48	48	48
49	49	49	49
50	50	50	50
51	51	51	51
52	52	52	52
53	53	53	53
54	54	54	54
55	55	55	55
56	56	56	56
57	57	57	57
58	58	58	58
59	59	59	59
60	60	60	60
61	61	61	61
62	62	62	62
63	63	63	63
64	64	64	64
65	65	65	65
66	66	66	66
67	67	67	67
68	68	68	68
69	69	69	69
70	70	70	70
71	71	71	71
72	72	72	72
73	73	73	73
74	74	74	74
75	75	75	75
76	76	76	76
77	77	77	77
78	78	78	78
79	79	79	79
80	80	80	80
81	81	81	81
82	82	82	82
83	83	83	83
84	84	84	84
85	85	85	85
86	86	86	86
87	87	87	87
88	88	88	88
89	89	89	89
90	90	90	90
91	91	91	91
92	92	92	92
93	93	93	93
94	94	94	94
95	95	95	95
96	96	96	96
97	97	97	97
98	98	98	98
99	99	99	99
100	100	100	100









**VEDĀNTA SŪTRA** with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya translated into English by George Thibaut. This translation in the **SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST SERIES** Vols. XXXIV & XXXVIII contains a translation of the sūtras, together with the full, thorough commentary and exegesis by the great monist philosopher Śaṅkara. Long introduction explains the background, meaning and significance of this work.

Demy Octavo 1184 Pages Full Rixin Bound with Gold Letters  
in 2 Vols. Price Rs. 40/-

\*\*\*\*\*

**VEDĀNTA SŪTRAS** with Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya translated into English by George Thibaut. **SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST SERIES** Vol. XLVIII.

This Bhāṣya, which is the first to press itself upon our attention, is composed by the famous Vaiṣṇava theologian and philosopher Rāmānuja. The intrinsic value of the Śrībhāṣya moreover is a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation.

Demy Octavo pp 816, Full Rixin Bound with Gold Letters  
Price Rs. 20/-

\*\*\*\*\*

**AN INTRODUCTION TO ŚAṅKARA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE** by Dr. N. K. Devaraja, M.A., D.Phil., D. Litt. This work is a scholarly text study of Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge and has exceptional merit as an authentic presentation of Śaṅkara's views. It is a valuable addition to the literature of Advaita Vedānta.

Demy Octavo 244 Pages Full Cloth Bound Price Rs. 12/-

\*\*\*\*\*

**SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY** by Dr. C. Kunhanraja. This book covers the entire fields starting from the Vedas and coming to the medieval period. The book is divided into three parts, dealing with the problem of knowing, the problem of the world that is known and the problem of man that knows the world.

Demy Octavo pp 440 Full Cloth Bound Price Rs. 20/-

\*\*\*\*\*

**MOTILAL BANARSIDASS**  
DELHI :: PATNA :: VARANASI